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Introduction
A decade ago, the member states of the United Nations gathered for a special session of
the General Assembly to address the question of how to respond to the world’s drug prob-
lems. Convened under the motto “A Drug-free World: We Can Do It!” the nations pledged
to achieve significant progress toward total elimination of the opium poppy, the coca bush,
and the cannabis plant, and to take “appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing
illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.”1 They also agreed to convene
another high-level meeting ten years later to assess how these efforts were progressing. 
This volume, which focuses on the experiences of people who use drugs and those
who work with them, offers a partial answer. While drug control policies have indeed been
strengthened in many countries of the world, there is little evidence that they have suc-
ceeded in significantly reducing supply of illicit drugs or the numbers of people who use
them. Abundantly evident, however—and now acknowledged by the Executive Director of
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as virtually every credible inde-
pendent authority on the subject—is that drug control has had multiple, unintended neg-
ative consequences. Whether you are talking about Pakistan or Phnom Penh, Manipur or
Moscow, the “war on drugs” has frequently devolved into a war on drug users, resulting
in increased incarceration, human rights violations, and disease. After reading the stories
contained here of suspected drug users in Indonesia strip-searched on public streets; for-
mer drug users in China humiliated in front of their families and friends and hauled in
handcuffs to police stations for urine tests; or newly incarcerated drug users in India hav-
ing their withdrawal symptoms treated by prison authorities with “the stick,” the question
is not just whether a drug-free world is possible, but how many violations of human dig-
nity and ethical conduct are seen as acceptable in the effort to achieve it. How can drug
control conventions aimed at “reducing human suffering”2 be permitted to excuse so
much hardship and humiliation? 
Today, and in the next decade, the goal should be to achieve total elimination or sig-
nificant reduction in these unconscionable abuses committed in the name of drug control. 
The costs and scars of the war on drug users are carried on the bodies and minds
of those interviewed here. In China, a mother who used drugs for a brief time and stopped
still remembers the look on her daughter’s face as they were pulled from a line to process
papers so her daughter could attend university, and she was ordered by police in front of
all the other families to submit to a urine test. In Cambodia, women accused of drug use
tell of being rounded up, locked together in former Khmer Rouge torture facilities where
they were subjected to beatings and rapes, and denied food or medicines to alleviate the
painful symptoms of withdrawal. They were allowed only two bathroom breaks a day, and
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those who defecated on themselves received more beatings. One woman who escaped
these tortures vows to never again seek help for addiction. In Karachi, Pakistan, a drug
user describes how police beat him and his friends mercilessly, assuming that they were
intoxicated and couldn’t feel the pain, or forced them to strip in order to beat them on
their injection wounds. 
Despite the fact that sharing injection equipment is among the most efficient means
of HIV transmission and that an estimated 33.4 million people were then living with HIV,3
the 1998 declarations from the UN’s General Assembly Special Session on Drugs did not
mention AIDS or include AIDS experts in the proceedings. A decade later, the price of
that omission is terribly clear. Outside of Africa, nearly one third of new HIV infections
are due to contaminated injection equipment. In Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and much
of Southeast Asia and the Southern Cone of Latin America—including countries of such
enormous size and geopolitical importance as Russia, China, Ukraine, Malaysia, and
Indonesia—injection drug users account for the largest share of those with HIV. Those
shaping the global response to drugs in 1998 did not mention the need for programs to
provide sterile injection equipment, or the importance of prescribing the essential med-
icines methadone and buprenorphine that reduce opiate injection and HIV risk. These
approaches were omitted from the 1998 declarations despite the multiple studies showing
that they in no way encourage new drug use, but are effective to reduce risk of blood-borne
infections, reduce illicit drug use, and are associated with improved family function,
adherence to HIV treatment, and linkages to other kinds of care. 
A woman watches as a policeman conducts an antinarcotics operation in Mexico City.
Daniel Aguilar/ Reuters 
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As these chapters make clear, such lifesaving HIV prevention approaches, often
referred to collectively as harm reduction, have been not only ignored but impeded by
global drug control efforts. In Burma, opium shortages resulting from drug seizures have
led many to turn to drug injecting so that they can get more for their money; harm reduction
services, such as needle exchange programs, however, are largely unavailable. In Vietnam,
tens of thousands of drug users are interned for years in compulsory treatment centers
whose primary mode of “treatment” is forced labor for ten or more hours a day at below
market wages; those who fail to meet their quotas are beaten or locked in small isolation
cells for weeks. Despite high levels of HIV infection (internees are tested, though not told
the result) and continued drug use in the centers, antiretroviral treatment and sterile injec-
tion equipment are almost always unavailable. In Manipur, India, as in many places that
refuse for ideological reasons to provide sterile injection equipment in prisons, as many
as 30 inmates share a single syringe. In Russia, where more than 80 percent of the
nation’s cumulative one million HIV infections have been due to injecting drug use, and
where 80 percent of those infected are under age 30, the essential medications methadone
and buprenorphine are illegal. In Brazil, though harm reduction approaches are permitted
by law, the “law of the streets” says otherwise: police use possession of sterile syringes as
evidence to arrest people on drug charges, and heavily armed drug raids into urban slums
breed distrust of outsiders, including public health workers.
In addition to measuring hectares of opium eradicated or coca fields fumigated, it
is clearly time for the United Nations to engage in another calculus: the measure of how
many people will die in the name of zero-tolerance policies that require drug users to be
abstinent before they are considered human or worthy of human rights. Considered
together, the accounts in these pages make it clear that harm reduction must be reconcep-
tualized to include not only measures to prevent the spread of blood-borne illness, but
also to reduce the suffering and pain caused by bad drug policies. 
Overview
Section I: A War on Drug Users: Police Abuse in the Name of
Drug Control
Police practices violate drug users’ human rights and hinder their
access to health care and harm reduction services.
This book begins with four case studies that examine how policing practices directly
impact the lives of people who use drugs. Though the settings differ, the themes are similar:
an approach to drug use that is primarily the responsibility of law enforcement officials
rather than health care personnel results in corruption, abuses, and reluctance on the part
of drug users to access even the most basic disease prevention services. 
8 AT WHAT COST?: HIV AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL “WAR ON DRUGS”
In all of the countries featured in this section—Indonesia, Cambodia, China, and
India—injection drug use continues to be a major mode of HIV transmission. HIV preva-
lence among injection drug users is more than 10 percent in all the countries; indeed in
Indonesia the proportion of IDUs who are HIV positive is estimated at 42.5 percent.4 As
these chapters make clear, it is not enough to simply institute such services as needle
exchange, methadone and buprenorphine, and HIV treatment—these services must exist
in an environment in which people who use drugs do not risk police abuse and punish-
ment when attempting to access them. As the recent UN-commissioned report “Redefin-
ing AIDS in Asia” points out, HIV prevalence in Asia is still concentrated largely among
high-risk groups (sex workers, injection drug users, and men who have sex with men),
and in order to prevent a generalized epidemic, governments should focus their attention
on prevention and treatment among these specific groups. For such programs to succeed,
efforts to reduce stigma and discrimination, and to engage affected individuals, are vital.5
In their chapter, Sara L.M. Davis and Agus Triwahyuono describe the findings of a
grassroots effort on the part of Jangkar, a network of groups working with people who use
drugs in Indonesia, to document police abuses against drug users. Through focus groups,
a written survey, and in-depth interviews with drug users and others, the study gathered
evidence of how draconian laws and corruption together result in abuses of people who
use drugs. Indonesia’s restrictive drug legislation includes making it illegal to carry
syringes without a prescription. Possession of even small amounts of drugs can result in
up to nine years in prison; as there are no clear guidelines for sentencing based on quantity
of drugs in possession, judges exercise wide discretion in imposing terms of punishment. 
The majority of drug users interviewed reported experiencing physical abuse at the
hands of the police, and half reported psychological abuse; people who use drugs detailed
how police beat and tortured them in order to elicit confessions for unsolved crimes and
to extort bribes. As one person recounted, “They accused me of selling putaw [low-grade
heroin]. They searched me and my friend. They found nothing. After 30 minutes, three
more policemen came…I was beaten up and my toenails were pulled out so that I would
admit that I sold putaw. It lasted four hours.” As Davis and Triwahyuono point out, with
people who use drugs facing extortion, arrest and torture, and long prison sentences, it is
no surprise that they are driven underground, away from services, and with increased
chances of engaging in risky practices, including unsafe sex and needle-sharing.
The next chapter moves away from focus groups and data to firsthand accounts that
examine, through five interviews with drug users, the impacts of policies to address drug
use in Cambodia. Police there frequently conduct raids to round up drug users and other
marginalized groups (including sex workers, elderly homeless people, and street children)
in order to “beautify” the streets before public holidays. People who use drugs are forced
into compulsory treatment centers that, in reality, offer little in the way of treatment, and
may instead endanger the health and life of those interned there. In addition to lack of ade-
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quate food or appropriate medications for alleviating painful drug withdrawal or treating
other common medical conditions (including HIV, tuberculosis, and hepatitis C), those
interviewed for this chapter report experiencing serious human rights abuses at the hands
of guards in so-called treatment centers, including severe beatings and sexual assault. 
Recently, police roundups of drug users have again escalated in Cambodia, with the
new police chief reportedly pledging in December 2008 to round up all drug users and
to build additional treatment centers in which to intern them. Police have stationed them-
selves between a main drug-using neighborhood and the harm reduction organization
where people who use drugs go to obtain clean injection equipment and other health serv-
ices. As a result, organizations working with drug users have been unable to locate their
usual clientele, who have gone into hiding.
Police raids are only one means of social control; regimes of forced drug testing and
internment are another. The third chapter looks at China’s policy of registration and com-
pulsory urine testing of people who use or who have used drugs. The system is such 
that when people use their government-issued ID cards—for example to check into a 
hotel or apply for government documents—their names appear on a web-based registry.
Police then arrest them and take them to the police station for compulsory testing that
can sometimes take the better part of a day. Besides being humiliating and inconvenient,
people forced to submit to the drug tests may experience other kinds of abuse, including
unnecessary violence and violations of confidentiality. A single positive urine test can
A policeman patrols drug users at work in a compulsory drug rehabilitation clinic in China, where
people are often used as a source of cheap labor, working long hours and enduring punishments 
if work quotas aren’t met. Reinhard Krause/Reuters 
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result in three years of forced confinement, followed by three years of “community treat-
ment” at centers that are really labor camps under a new name. The stories in this chapter
tell the experiences of several former drug users arrested and tested while attempting to
go about their daily lives. While these experiences take place in China, drug user registries
and forced urine testing have similar negative implications in other countries. In Ukraine,
being listed on government registries as a drug user can lead to loss of employment, denial
of a driver’s license, or even loss of custody of children.6 In Georgia, where police force
suspected drug users to take compulsory drug tests, a positive test results in a fine so large
that it often obliges people to forgo necessary medical care or, if they can’t pay, see their
home confiscated to be auctioned off by the government.7
The final chapter in this section moves to South Asia to look at Manipur, in north-
east India, where a combination of factors—the state is situated near a major center of
opium production and also has a strong military and paramilitary presence—produce a
situation where drug use is widespread, and responses to it are primarily punitive in
nature. Through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, the authors, Chakra-
pani and Kumar, examine drug users’ interactions with police and military forces, and the
impacts of those interactions on access to health programs. 
Chakrapani and Kumar find that people who use drugs have a high likelihood of
being stopped and searched, ostensibly due to security concerns related to the insurgency.
In reality, they may be an easy target from which police and military forces can extort
bribes. Respondents reported that searches are more common near drug hotspots, or for
people with visible injection scars. Police activities had a direct impact on drug users’ abil-
ity to practice harm reduction and access health services: people who use drugs were afraid
to carry clean syringes, and reported injecting in a hurried manner or in less safe areas
on the body to avoid detection by police. Respondents said that police often staked out
drop-in centers and needle exchange programs to arrest drug users as they exited. Fur-
thermore, police harass and hamper the work of peer educators and outreach staff. As
described in other chapters in this section, people who use drugs had to pay regular “taxes”
to police in order to avoid arrest; they also reported the ability to bribe their way out of
arrests or to obtain lighter sentences. Drug users who are not able to pay their way out of
prison find themselves in a situation where drugs continue to be available, but clean inject-
ing equipment is not, resulting in up to 30 inmates sharing one syringe. Sex workers who
use drugs face particular harassment and abuse.
The negative health implications of these police tactics are clear: people who use
drugs are afraid to engage with harm reduction services, they are more likely to share used
syringes, sex workers who use drugs have to take more clients in order to make up the
money lost to police bribes, and heavy reliance on incarceration means that increasing
numbers of people are at risk of HIV infection and other blood-borne viruses.
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Section II: Superpower Influence: The Export 
of Russian and American Approaches
Russia and the United States pressure their neighbors to adopt their
hard-line approaches to drugs.
The second section of this book looks specifically at the influence of two superpowers—
the United States and Russia—on the drug policies of neighboring countries. Since the
fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to influence its neighbors to introduce drug
legislation as strict as its own. While citing obligations under the UN drug control 
conventions, Russia’s drug laws have often gone beyond the conventions. The chapter by
the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network looks specifically at four member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and examines the extent to which they have
adopted a CIS model law on drugs (largely informed by Russia) or the drug laws of Russia
itself. Both Russia’s drug legislation and the CIS model law share common features,
including prohibition of drug use per se, a ban on methadone and buprenorphine for treat-
ment of opioid dependence, and a prohibition of “propaganda of narcotic drugs and psy-
chotropic substances.”
Residents of the Rocinha slum in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil pass by heavily armed antinarcotics officers
during a search for drug traffickers. Almeida/AFP/Getty Images
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Whatever the ideological differences between Russia and the United States may be,
they seem to agree on a law enforcement-based approach to drug use. The second chapter
of this section looks at the influence of the United States on the drug policies of its Latin
American and Caribbean neighbors. Attempts by the United States to influence interna-
tional drug policy are nothing new; indeed they date back to the Shanghai Opium Com-
mission, convened by the United States a century ago in 1909.8 More recent attempts by
the United States to dictate the drug policies of other countries have focused extensively
on Latin America, in fact, as the chapter notes, as much as 50 percent of U.S. foreign pol-
icy assistance in the hemisphere has been directed toward combating drug trafficking.
These attempts include pressuring countries to eradicate their drug supply through drastic
methods such as aerial spraying, as well as encouraging strict and punitive approaches to
addressing supply of and demand for drugs. Plan Colombia, a predominantly military
strategy shaped and supported by the United States, sought to tackle illicit drug production
and trafficking, but may have resulted in the proliferation of the more dangerous cocaine-
base paste, which can be produced in clandestine labs. In 2008, the United States sup-
ported Mexico to implement a similar plan to address drugs, called the Mérida Initiative,
which also relies heavily on military and police forces, with few mechanisms for monitoring
and oversight. 
Children watch as riot police demonstrate an arrest using a dog during a youth antidrug event in
Bangkok, Thailand. Pornchai Kittiwongsakul/AFP/Getty Images
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So far these tactics have proven unsuccessful in reducing supply as well as demand,
but have led to overcrowded prisons ill equipped to provide appropriate disease prevention
or treatment measures. Some countries in the region, however, are beginning to move
away from the U.S. “War on Drugs” approach, and toward more humane policies, even
though they face disapproval and sometimes repercussions from the United States for
doing so. 
Section III: Drug Control, Drug Use, and HIV: 
Reports from South and Southeast Asia
“Shadow reports” urge Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam to
align policies on drug control and HIV.
The final section of this volume provides a survey of drug policies and their impacts on
HIV and drug treatment services in three countries in Southeast Asia and in Pakistan.
These chapters, which are intended as “shadow reports” to the official country progress
reports, detail some notable findings. The Southeast Asian countries surveyed, Vietnam,
Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand, are attempting to come to grips with growing popula-
tions of methamphetamine users. Approaches thus far have to a large extent centered on
building an increasing number of drug treatment centers and “reeducation through labor”
camps that have little evidence of effectively treating drug use, while often violating drug
users’ human rights and endangering their health in numerous ways. The Asian Harm
Reduction Network, authors of the chapter on Southeast Asia, recommends reducing the
number of drug users housed in custodial settings, including drug treatment programs,
while instead instituting voluntary programs in the community. 
In Thailand, known as a leader in the fight against AIDS for its “100 Percent Con-
dom Campaign” to distribute condoms to sex workers, the approach to drug use has been
markedly different—criminalizing people who use drugs rather than encouraging access
to healthcare and disease prevention measures. Thailand’s “War on Drugs” approach took
an extreme form in 2003 when more than 70,000 people were detained without access
to due process, and more than 2,000 were killed. Interestingly, while the policy was osten-
sibly enacted to address methamphetamine use, it may actually have had the unintended
effect of prompting some drug users to switch from heroin to methamphetamine use
when the drug war resulted in a spike in heroin prices.9 While the country has since
stepped back from such shocking practices, the government did declare a renewed drug
war in 2008, though it has not, to date, taken the 2003 form of mass roundups and
killings in the name of drug control. Still, drug users are interned in increasing numbers,
without any means to prevent HIV transmission, which in a country where antiretroviral
access is disproportionately unavailable to drug users, is in effect a death sentence. 
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Government policies have also had an unintended effect in Burma, where attempts
to stem the tide of poppy cultivation have resulted in higher opium prices, and a concomi-
tant switch from inhaling to injecting as a more efficient (and of course, also more dan-
gerous) mode of administration.
The chapter on Pakistan describes similar unintended consequences of strict drug
control policies. Following efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation in Pakistan and stop traf-
ficking of poppy products from Afghanistan, opium and heroin, which were traditionally
smoked in Pakistan, became increasingly scarce and prohibitively expensive for many. As
Shamim details in her chapter, this has led to a shift to injecting cheap and readily avail-
able pharmaceuticals. With rates of HIV among drug users in Pakistan on the rise, exist-
ing services do not meet the needs for prevention and treatment, and at the same time,
drug users face social stigma and police abuses. Shamim describes the impacts of these
barriers in three case studies from drug users in Karachi.
Shaking the Foundations—Toward a New Approach to
Drug Use
These pages represent only one of several efforts to raise civil society voices in the drug
policy dialogue. In July of 2008, nongovernmental organizations from around the world
gathered in Vienna to offer guidance to international drug control authorities about what
was needed a decade after the Special Session. This gathering of more than 500 groups
from 116 countries and 65 international organizations followed a series of earlier regional
consultations where diverse groups, including those devoted to abstinence and zero-tol-
erance as well as those who believed that positive change could be achieved even without
total prohibition on or cessation of drug use, considered the question of how far the world
drug effort had come. Their consensus statement, included as an appendix to this volume,
emerged through a consultative process similar to that engaged in by governments at the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Strikingly, despite government proclamations of success
in the drug arena, all those present made it clear that efforts to win the drug war had
resulted in terrible collateral losses. Among the recommendations endorsed by all partic-
ipants were calls to emphasize the need to adhere to human rights commitments, attend
to the need for comprehensive health interventions in prisons and other closed settings,
and ensure adequate supply of medications to treat drug dependence and relieve pain.10
These pages offer a less careful, more provocative call. It is unlikely that consensus
declarations from Vienna will address the gross abuses of the kind that occur when Thai
officials use blacklists and arrest quotas to round up, intern, interrogate, and sometimes
kill those suspected of breaking drug laws. One cannot expect a system that requires agree-
ment from all governments present to criticize a Member State by name, even when that
State, like Russia, has a policy that denies essential medicines like methadone or
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buprenorphine to millions at risk for HIV. This year, as the UN system assesses itself, we
can safely assume that it will not find consensus on the proposition that its drug control
efforts are fundamentally wanting. To quote the poet and activist Audre Lord, “the master’s
tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” We hope these pages will help to at least
shake the foundations of the drug control system, and move those who have grown com-
fortable with its structures and assumptions to ask whether we are bringing more pain
than progress through a drug control approach that fails to appreciate the value of health
and human rights. In the words of one of the women interviewed about compulsory drug
testing in China: “We are suffering, angry, screaming inside. Where is civility?! Where is
human rights?! Where is justice?!”
Daniel Wolfe
Roxanne Saucier
International Harm Reduction Development Program
Indonesian drug users are chained at a “personal asylum for narcotics” in Jakarta. Such abusive con-
ditions of detention often deter people from seeking treatment. Choo Youn-Kong/AFP/Getty Images
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Police Abuse of Injection 
Drug Users in Indonesia
Sara L.M. Davis, Asia Catalyst, and Agus Triwahyuono, Jangkar11
As the frequent target of anti-crime campaigns, injection drug users are highly vulnerable
to abuse by the police. In Indonesia, an ongoing “war on drugs” has resulted in numerous
arrests, and groups working with drug users have long heard anecdotal reports of torture
and abuse in detention. Until recently, however, there was little effort to document or
investigate the issue. 
In late 2007 and early 2008, a coalition of grassroots groups in Indonesia set out
to fill this gap. Jangkar, an association of nonprofit organizations working with injection
drug users in Indonesia, conducted a survey of more than one thousand injection drug
users about human rights conditions in police detention and at health care facilities.12
More than 60 percent of the drug users interviewed said they had experienced some form
of physical abuse by police.
The broader problem of police abuse in Indonesia has recently received quite a bit
of attention. In November 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture conducted a mis-
sion to Indonesia, visiting police stations and prisons around the country and meeting
with experts and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Torture is “routine practice” in
Jakarta and other large cities in Java, he reported, and the conditions of detention in police
stations amount to “degrading and inhuman treatment.”13 The absence of transparency
and monitoring systems to hold police accountable for torture results, he said, “in a system
of quasi-total impunity.” Following the Special Rapporteur’s mission, the Jakarta Legal
Institute, a leading Indonesian civil rights NGO, published a survey in August 2008 find-
ing that a majority of those in police detention were subjected to physical abuse.14
The Jangkar report gives a more detailed picture of how drug users experience
abuse, and provides insight into the root causes of the abuse. It also raises concerns about
Indonesia’s approach to fighting the rapidly spreading HIV epidemic. 
Until 1998, the Indonesian police were a part of the military force under the com-
mand of President Suharto, who used force to quell dissent.15 Since that time, as part of
broader efforts at security sector reform, Indonesia’s police force has engaged in an exten-
sive process of restructuring, separating from the military, and establishing itself as an
independent public agency with new professional standards.16 While this process has led
to some notable achievements, many police officers themselves acknowledge that it is far
from complete. The country’s new police force faces an important challenge with rapidly
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escalating drug dependence in Indonesia.17 At the same time, injection drug use appears
to be one of the key vectors of HIV transmission in the country, and prevalence among
drug users is rising. Indonesia’s public security forces and public health agencies urgently
need effective and pragmatic responses to drug dependence and HIV.
Drug use in Indonesia
Drug use in Indonesia is, by all accounts, spreading rapidly. The number of drug users is
debated: some health experts estimate between 200,000 and 500,000, while Indonesia’s
anti-narcotics chief estimated there were 3.2 million drug users in Indonesia.18 Staff of
Indonesian IDU NGOs estimate the number may be as many as 4 million today.19 
Indonesia’s response to drug use, like that of many other countries, has been puni-
tive, with the launch of a national war on drugs and moral rhetoric condemning drug use.
“Instead of making this country a heaven for drug traffickers, we will promise them hell,”
threatened the chairman of the National Narcotics Bureau (BNN), Inspector General I
Made Mangku Pastika.20 The drug war has included sweeping arrests and lengthy prison
sentences for both traffickers and individuals found in possession of narcotics. Those
found guilty of trafficking face more than nine years in prison or, in certain circumstances,
the death sentence.21 Those found in possession of even a small amount of narcotics may
serve up to nine years in prison, including pretrial detention periods that can last months.
Indonesian laws do not provide guidelines for sentencing based on the amount of nar-
cotics in possession, so judges exercise wide discretion in drug cases, often issuing dra-
conian sentences. 
Lengthy and arbitrary sentencing results in overcrowding in Indonesia’s prisons.
Absolute numbers vary: According to the BNN, the number of drug-related cases increased
from 17,355 in 2006 to 22,630 cases in 2008.22 A UN statement in October 2008 esti-
mated that 28,000 drug users were incarcerated at that time.23 However, it appears that
these numbers may underestimate the problem. The Ministry of Justice and Human
Rights reported in April 2006 that of 89,000 prisoners housed in 396 prisons, most had
been convicted of narcotics-related crimes.24 Only one prison in Bali offers methadone on
a pilot basis, which reached 33 prisoners as of June 2006, and no prison facilities offer
needle exchange.25
HIV/AIDS among drug users
HIV prevalence is on the rise in Indonesia, and its rise directly parallels the increase in
drug use.26 Indonesia’s “War on Drugs” approach has apparently been unsuccessful in
curbing the spread of the disease. In late 1998, HIV prevalence was below 0.1 percent,
but it began to increase rapidly in 1999-2000.27 By 2006, the estimated prevalence was
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0.2 percent, or about 193,000 people.28 In 2008, the United Nations estimated 290,000
infections.29 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Indonesian Min-
istry of Health, roughly half of all drug users are HIV positive.30 About 46 percent of peo-
ple living with HIV/AIDS in Indonesia are injection drug users.31
Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment is available in Indonesia, though according to WHO
and UNAIDS, ARV treatment was provided to only 6,600 people in 2005, constituting
only 15 percent of the total number who need ARVs.32
Drug user NGOs report that drugs are widely available in Indonesian prisons,33 while
measures to prevent the spread of HIV are not. Many people who are HIV positive do not
receive ARV treatment in prison; according to a media report, one prison is apparently
distributing Chinese herbal medicines instead.34 Outside of prison, national laws limit
which agencies may distribute clean needles, and carrying a needle is illegal without a pre-
scription. Under national regulations, police
may not distribute clean needles even if they
wish to do so.35
Indonesia’s punitive approach to drug
use hampers government efforts to fight the
AIDS epidemic. When drug users know they
are at risk of arrest and may face torture, extor-
tion, and long prison sentences, they are much
less likely to come forward to participate in
government and NGO-run HIV prevention programs. Instead, they are driven under-
ground and are more likely to engage in unsafe practices such as needle-sharing and
unsafe sex. 
Over the past few years, drug users and former drug users around the country started
mobilizing their communities at the grassroots level to fight AIDS. They established dozens
of small NGOs to conduct outreach to drug users, established needle exchange programs,
and began advocating locally and nationally for access to ARV treatment, harm reduction
policies, and AIDS information. With limited resources, this growing network of small
NGOs has achieved a great deal locally, persuading local hospitals to increase their stocks
of ARV medicines, establishing kiosks with HIV/AIDS information, and placing dozens of
peer educators on the streets for outreach to drug users around the country.
Methodology
Jaringan Aksi Nasional Penguran Dampak Buruk Narkoba Suntik, or Jangkar, is 
the largest of several national networks of drug user NGOs. Jangkar’s network spans 75
organizations around the country, including groups of IDUs and migrant workers. Jangkar
Drug user NGOs report that
drugs are widely available in
Indonesian prisons, while 
measures to prevent the 
spread of HIV are not.
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defines itself as “the medium for communication among the institutions or individuals
who have concerns about the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission among drug users,
especially those who intravenously inject drugs.”36 These groups rely on the efforts of an
extensive network of field organizers, most of them former drug users themselves, who
have strong contacts with current and former IDUs.
Beginning in 2007, Jangkar launched an extensive project to document rights
abuses, including police abuse and discrimination against injection drug users in access
to health services. Member groups in 13 cities participated in training workshops that intro-
duced rights violation documentation standards.37 The sampling relied on the existing net-
works of field organizers, who interviewed drug users on the street and in field offices.
[See Table 1]
Jangkar used convenience sampling for this report, and asked those interviewed to
refer others to participate. Interviewers, most of whom were field organizers, were
instructed to interview any drug users with whom they had contact in local communities,
but were also instructed to avoid weighting the sample toward those who had experienced
abuse. In practice, it is likely that field organizers mostly interviewed those who already
knew and trusted them, and to some degree, interview subjects may have self-selected for
A policeman in Jakarta walks past a campaign poster marking the United Nations international day
against drugs, June 26. Ahmad Zamroni/AFP/Getty Images
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those who had some grievance. On the other hand, some drug users who did experience
abuses were reluctant to participate in the interviews, saying that they believed the inter-
viewer might be “a spy for the police.”
To protect the anonymity of subjects, the interviewers used codes to identify them
on all materials. Interview subjects were first interviewed using a simple questionnaire
that asked only for biographical data (age, gender, occupation, educational level, and mar-
ital status). Interviewers also asked if subjects had experienced either police abuse or dis-
crimination in access to health services. Those who said they had were then asked to share
their experience in more detail, using a second interview form that asked for date, time,
perpetrator, place of the abuse, details of the abuse, as well as physical, psychological, and
social effects on the victim. Interviewers used audio recordings to back up their written
interviews.
In addition, the first author spent about two weeks in Jakarta in October 2008, meet-
ing with scholars, international donors, UN officials, and senior police officers. She also
met with IDU NGOs from Jakarta, East Java, and Central Java, and held four consultations
with a total of roughly 20 NGOs that work with IDU groups on the issue of police abuse
against injection drug users. This article draws on those meetings as well as on the Jangkar
report.38
Citites                                                                  Number of 
                                                                          interviewees
                                                                                    
Palembang 97
Jakarta 117
Bandung 108
Semarang 83
Surabaya 61
Samarinda 61
Medan 68
Manado 100
Makasar 100
Denpasar 100
Ambon 56
Kupang 99
Jogjakarta 56
Total 1106
Table 1. Number of drug users interviewed in 13 cities
POLICE ABUSE OF INJECTION DRUG USERS IN INDONESIA 2 3
Research findings
The majority of the injection drug users Jangkar interviewed were educated and unmar-
ried young men with some form of employment. 
Of the 1,106 respondents, 985 (89 percent) were male. According to Jangkar, finding
female interview subjects was challenging; this likely reflects the actual gender breakdown
in the IDU population.39
Eighty-nine percent (987) of those interviewed had a senior high school-level edu-
cation or above. Sixty percent (668) of the interviewees were single (never married).
Slightly more than three-quarters, or 846, were between the ages of 25 and 34. Thirty-
seven percent of those interviewed were unemployed, while 44 percent described them-
selves as “self-employed.”40 [See Chart A above]
While researchers did not attempt to confirm the details of individual accounts, com-
monalities in respondents’ experiences indicate the widespread nature of police abuse.
Sixty-two percent of those interviewed reported experiencing physical abuse by the
police. These incidents included beating of the feet, hands, chest, and head by officers
using their hands, fists, and boots. In addition, several subjects said that police had beaten
them with pistol butts, folded chairs, or blackjacks, and one reported being beaten with
a wrench and the flat side of a metal saw.41 Others reported being burned with cigarettes
or given some form of electrical shock. One subject said that police stabbed him with a
hypodermic needle that broke off in his skin.42 Six percent of those interviewed reported
sexual harassment or abuse, including inappropriate touching of women during street
searches by male police officers.
According to the interview subjects, police abused IDUs for two reasons—to coerce
a confession, or to extort bribes.
Chart A. Occupation of Respondents
Self-employed 44%            
Unemployed 37%
Private employee 11%
Student 5%
Civil servant 2%
No answer 1%
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Coerced confessions
In many cases, subjects reported that police tortured them in an effort to obtain confes-
sions. One young man, who said he was married and had a university-level education,
described his arrest in Jakarta:
Around 11 p.m. two policemen arrested me [at my friend’s house]. They
accused me of selling putaw [low-grade heroin]. They searched me and my
friend. They found nothing. After 30 minutes, three more policemen came.
One of them was the Unit Head. I was taken to a car. In the car I was beaten
up and my toenails were pulled out so that I would admit that I sold putaw. It
lasted four hours.43
In another case in Semarang, Central Java, a single man with a university education
said he and his friends were beaten in an effort to compel them to sign a false confession:
My eyes were covered with a bandage and I was taken to the police station. All
of us were beaten up…We were also treated rudely when they were preparing
the official report. They beat us up with
a chair, rattan stick, and an iron ruler.
The official report they made was not in
line with the real events. We were not
accompanied by any lawyer during the
process.44
Corruption
Police departments are under-funded, and despite ongoing efforts to fight corruption in
the government, injection drug users report that they are often asked for bribes. In 2007,
Transparency International surveyed roughly one thousand Indonesian citizens and found
that a majority said the police were the government agency most likely to take bribes, an
assertion the police rejected.45
Nonetheless, some of the Jangkar interviewees said that police beat them in order
to extort “coordination fees,” or bribes. In the words of a married man between the ages
of 35 and 44 from Surabaya, who admitted that he sold drugs:
I was often arrested previously, but since there was no evidence I was released.
My family often gave ransom to the police to release me. Each time I was
caught by the police, I was tortured.46
In Semarang, an injection drug user reported that he was beaten, threatened with
a gun to his head, and released when he paid 20 million rupiah.47 In a case from South
Sumatra, police spotted a package of heroin sitting on the dashboard of a car and took the
driver and his friend to the police station:
According to the interview 
subjects, police abused IDUs 
for two reasons—to coerce a
confession, or to extort bribes.
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He asked for “coordination money” from us. Because we said that we had no
money, he took our wallets. As he only got a little money from our wallets, he
asked for [my friend’s] watch. I threatened the officer that I would report him
to my uncle, who has a higher rank, but [the officer] only punched me. After
he took the putaw and the watch we were finally released.48
NGOs working with drug users and organizations providing legal services to them
report that corruption is widespread throughout the criminal justice system. Lawyers say
that drug users may be asked for bribes by prosecutors in exchange for lighter charges,
and from judges in exchange for lighter sentences.49
Drug users who requested medical treatment for injuries sustained during interro-
gation said they were sometimes refused, as in the case of this man from Surabaya:
They tried to make me tell them where I bought the putaw. I refused to give
any information. The police got impatient and hit me. One of the policemen
folded a chair and used it to beat me all over my body. I broke my left hand. I
gave the information eventually, because I could not stand it anymore. 
I begged them to take me to a hospital, but they laughed at me and said that
I was fortunate that they had only broken my hand and did not shoot me in
the kneecap.50
A drug user, his legs chained, sleeps on the floor of a Jakarta drug treatment center. The United
Nations has yet to articulate guidelines for evidence-based drug treatment. Choo Youn-
Kong/AFP/Getty Images
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Two drug users interviewed for the Jangkar report said that they were refused access
to ARV treatment while in detention in the police station; they also said that police dis-
closed their HIV status to others.51 
In addition to physical abuse, respondents said that some police used threats to both
drug users and their families, as well as public humiliation, to coerce confessions or extort
bribes. Half of those interviewed reported some form of psychological abuse, including
verbal abuse, being threatened with a gun, and other threats. In one case, an interviewee
was forced to strip and submit to a search while standing on a public street.52
When incidents of the kind described by
the Jangkar report happen occasionally, they
may be the fault of rogue officers. When they
happen repeatedly, and take similar forms in a
variety of locations and times, they point to a
pattern that is broader than the problems of
any single police station, officer, or province.
Solutions that have worked in other countries
include system-strengthening within the
police force, and legal reforms to protect the
rights of people in custody.
Addressing systemic problems
Police forces that transition from military to civilian control are often plagued by reports
of police abuse.53 While Indonesia’s police have made strides in establishing themselves
as an independent civilian force in the past ten years, international experts who have stud-
ied ways that other countries have effectively addressed police abuse recommend that the
government also establish clearer systems for evaluation and promotion, systems for
police accountability, an independent and transparent civilian complaint mechanism, and
adequate staff compensation to remove financial incentives for corruption.54 The govern-
ment should take steps to enforce the UN Convention Against Torture, which mandates
several of these measures, and to ratify and implement the Optional Protocol of the Con-
vention Against Torture.55
Since 1998, Indonesian police have participated in an extensive process of security
sector reform. The military has gradually removed itself from governance, and the police,
in turn, have separated from the military. The new systems they have established include:
clarifying the respective functions of the military and the police, creating a national Police
Law, creating new codes of conduct, uniforms and ranks, and undergoing extensive train-
ing—overall an ambitious project, made even more challenging in the context of the 2002
Two drug users said that they
were refused access to ARV
treatment while in detention in
the police station; they also
said that police disclosed their
HIV status to others.
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bombing of a Bali nightclub frequented by tourists and the concomitant concerns about
terrorism.56 Yet senior Indonesian police experts such as Adrianus Meliala note that
progress has not included adequate steps to ensure accountability.57
An independent mechanism within the police department to accept, investigate, and
handle complaints from the public is a measure that has proven, in other countries, to
reduce the number of abuse incidents.58 Currently, there are two such mechanisms in
Indonesia, but by most accounts, neither functions effectively. 
The National Police Commission (Kom-
polnas), which functions at the national head-
quarters level, is charged by law with advising
the president on the budget and personnel of
the police, and also accepts complaints from
the public about the performance of the
police.59 Profesi dan Pengamanan, (Probam),
the ethics and discipline division of the police,
also accepts complaints orally or by letter. In
addition, some chiefs have reportedly gone so
far as distributing their own cell phone num-
bers to members of the community in order to collect reports of abuses.60
Yet according to experts in the field and community lawyers, neither of these agen-
cies has had the clout to hold police accountable. Currently, according to one lawyer who
provides legal aid to those accused of crimes, “torture is considered as a mere disciplinary
breach; thus, the perpetrator gets lenient punishment, and indeed only administrative
penalties.”61 Moreover, neither Kompolnas nor Probam issues reports to the public on the
number or outcome of these cases.62
In addition, according to lawyers working with police abuse victims, Probam may
require a higher standard of evidence to support complaints than is feasible in cases of tor-
ture by police officers. For instance, lawyers may be asked to produce witnesses or photo-
graphs to prove that torture actually happened. In Surabaya, lawyers report that police are
using methods such as waterboarding and suffocation with plastic bags in order to avoid
leaving marks.63 The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, recommended
in his report on Indonesia that the burden of proof in such cases should lie with the pros-
ecution rather than the defense. He suggested that the law should require prosecutors to
prove that abuse did not occur during interrogation, and recommended that police record
or videotape confessions as evidence that they were obtained without force.64 Custody reg-
isters are also rarely used in Indonesian police stations, but they could help to guard against
the problem some drug users report of friends “disappearing” into detention.65
In Surabaya, lawyers 
report that police are using 
methods such as waterboarding
and suffocation with 
plastic bags in order to 
avoid leaving marks.
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A second critical step in any program to deter abuse is the establishment of a clear
system for evaluation and promotion of officers. Promotions should take into account a
variety of factors, including the numbers of complaints against an officer. In Indonesia’s
“War on Drugs” environment, where there is intense pressure to increase the number of
arrests and no other clear system for evaluation and promotion, officers may use violence
in an effort to coerce confessions and raise the number of convictions. 
A chronic lack of funding for the police force could be another cause of the extortion
of bribes, though as one police officer asked rhetorically, “How much money will be
enough?”66 
International support to date has largely
focused on providing training to officers at
every level of the system. Training will be
important as the police work to develop an
understanding of and respect for human
rights, but without mechanisms in place—and
proper funding—to create a framework that
supports human rights in practice, training
alone will not stop police abuse. Indonesia
could draw on the experience of police forces
in other countries to learn how they have
established mechanisms within the police to
prevent abuses of the kind detailed here.
Legal reform
While structural weaknesses within the police system are important to address, reforming
the legal framework is in many ways even more critical. According to Indonesian legal
experts and drug user advocates, priority areas for legal reform include: extremely long
pretrial detention periods, heavy reliance on confessions for evidence in court, barriers to
access to legal counsel, and the difficulty of challenging illegal searches and detentions in
court.
One of the key factors often leading to abuse in detention is the length of the 
detention period for drug users. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak,
recommends:
As a matter of urgent priority, the period of police custody should be reduced
to a time limit in line with international standards (maximum of 48 hours);
after this period the detainees should be transferred to a pretrial facility under
a different authority, where no further unsupervised contact with the inter-
rogators or investigators should be permitted.67 
Where there is intense pressure
to increase the number of
arrests and no other clear 
system for evaluation and 
promotion, officers may use 
violence in an effort to coerce
confessions and raise the 
number of convictions. 
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However, injection drug users in Indonesia can be legally detained for periods of up
to eight or nine months before sentencing. If a suspect is facing a prison sentence of
longer than nine years (i.e., for trafficking), she or he may be detained for up to 120 days,
through a series of renewable detention periods. The prosecutor can then detain the sus-
pect for up to an additional 110 days pending trial, and during the trial, the judge can
detain the person for 150 days more. In a worst-case scenario, therefore, a suspect faces
a potential detention period of eight to nine months before sentencing. In practice, lawyers
say, most are detained for between two and four months.68 
A draft narcotics bill (Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Narkotika) currently
under discussion provides an opportunity to bring detention periods into line with inter-
national standards; however, drug user advocates who have seen the bill say the current
draft does not include the recommended reform. 
A second important issue is the Indonesian courts’ reliance on confessions as sole
or primary evidence, without placing the burden of proof on police and the prosecutor to
show that these were obtained without coercion. Indonesia’s Criminal Procedure Law
(KUHAP) does give individuals the right to remain silent and the right to be free from
duress during interrogation.69 Furthermore, if a suspect or her lawyer alleges that torture
Demonstrators in Bandung, West Java call for an end stigma and criminalization of drug users and
those living with HIV. Courtesy of Rumah Cemara
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was used, they should be able to obtain an independent medical evaluation; but in practice,
according to drug user NGOs, only doctors working for the police do these evaluations.70
Those charged with a crime should have the ability to challenge the legality of their
detention in court. While this right currently exists, according to Nowak, it is rarely exer-
cised in practice.71 In addition, a number of those interviewed for the Jangkar report said
that their persons, homes, or cars had been searched without a legal warrant. Under
Indonesia’s criminal law, victims do have the right to compensation for illegal arrest,
detention, or asset seizure, but in practice, this right is rarely exercised.72
Finally, exercising all these rights is challenging without access to legal counsel.
Under the criminal law, law enforcement
agencies are obliged to appoint legal counsel
for a defendant facing 15 years’ or more
imprisonment or the death penalty; for those
who are impoverished and facing a sentence of
five or more years, law enforcement agencies
must also appoint legal counsel.
However, lawyers and IDU activists all
reported that many drug users are reluctant to
accept the services of a lawyer for two reasons:
because the involvement of a lawyer may sug-
gest to police and the prosecutor that the crime
is more serious, and because it may signal to
corrupt police that the detainee has financial
resources.73 A staff person at Stigma, an NGO
working with drug users, said that in five
recent cases where Stigma offered to provide a lawyer free of charge, clients all refused
the services.74 It may take some time to strengthen the legal system, and to educate the
public, in order to reach the point where drug users feel able to exercise their rights under
existing law.
Rehabilitation vs. prison
A beam of light in this otherwise bleak picture is that national policy provides judges with
the option to sentence drug users to rehabilitation instead of prison. However, this is an
option judges rarely exercise, and there are only 45 drug rehabilitation facilities in the
country, which is not enough to meet the demand.75 International donors and Indonesian
NGOs might consider partnering with the judiciary to hold workshops and provide edu-
cational materials on drug addiction, in order to make judges aware of the benefits of sen-
tencing drug users to rehabilitation facilities.76
Many drug users are reluctant
to accept the services of a
lawyer for two reasons: because
the involvement of a lawyer
may suggest to police and the
prosecutor that the crime is
more serious, and because it
may signal to corrupt police
that the detainee has financial
resources.
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Looking forward
There is no country in the world that has not been plagued by police abuse. As a margin-
alized group, drug users everywhere are vulnerable to these kinds of abuses; they may
“disappear” into the prison system without causing a ripple in the social fabric. In the cur-
rent political climate, in which the international war on terror and the war on drugs have
degraded global rights standards, it is increasingly challenging to advocate for detainee
rights or to combat torture. 
Current efforts to draft a new Indonesian narcotics bill provide one opportunity for
reform. At the same time though, social pressures, including the rise of conservative reli-
gious constituencies who view a punitive approach to drug use as a moral imperative, may
create challenges for those advocating that drug dependence be treated as a medical con-
dition rather than a moral failing. Finally, a widespread cultural acceptance of beating by
police poses another obstacle to advocates fighting abuse.
Even in the best of circumstances, it is impossible to eradicate police abuse alto-
gether. But the problem can be reduced, and police can create mechanisms to improve
their own professionalism, protect human rights, and allow effective redress to victims.
The stated commitment of Indonesia’s police to ongoing system reform and improvement
of their professionalism creates openings to propose changes that could significantly
reduce police abuse against drug users. At the same time, the accession of Indonesia to
the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and its review in 2009 by the
UN Committee for Civil and Political Rights will provide Indonesia with opportunities to
reform the Criminal Procedure Law and bring laws and practices into compliance with
international human rights standards. These steps are not only critical to combating police
abuse and to the continuing evolution of Indonesia’s new police force; they are also nec-
essary steps in the fight against the twin epidemics of drug dependence and AIDS. 
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Arbitrary Detention and Abuse 
of Drug Users in Cambodia
In February 2008, Cambodia passed an anti-trafficking law sponsored by the United States
that labels drug users as a “high risk population for being trafficked,” thus giving authorities
the freedom to send drug users to “reeducation camps,” ostensibly for their own safety.
Since this law was passed, more than 300 drugs users in Phnom Penh have been detained
in such centers; upon release they are reporting a plethora of human rights violations.
Background and goals
This study includes interviews conducted from January through April 2008 in collabora-
tion with a local harm reduction nongovernmental organization in Phnom Penh, the Cam-
bodian capital. Through street outreach and a drop-in center, the NGO provides needle
exchange, overdose prevention training, case management, peer education, and medical
treatment. Since gaining access to these services, injection drug users have become more
involved in the process of advocating for additional services. They have done this in part
by making their needs known to service providers. These interviews contributed to that
process of empowerment that enables them to express themselves freely and articulately. 
Methodology
Researchers conducted short interviews with drug users to identify participants who had
experienced police abuse and who were willing to share their stories. The large number
of drug users who have had their human rights violated in Cambodia made eligible par-
ticipants easy to find. This also made it possible to screen participants as to include an
array of demographic characteristics, from nationality to HIV status to age. Though four
out of five case study participants are female, this is not representative of the overall pop-
ulation, as the majority of IDUs in Cambodia are male; however, the number of female
IDUs is steadily increasing. 
Interviews with the participants were conducted over a period of three months.
Interview questions were developed based on the interviewer’s previous knowledge of the
difficulties facing Cambodian IDUs. Each participant was informed that they were wel-
come to refuse to answer any questions. In general, once participants understood that the
study would be used to advocate for the human rights of people who use drugs, they were
very willing to provide any information they thought could help. Participants were given
$75 USD as remuneration.
Srey Mao
Srey Mao has been living in Phnom Penh since the age of 19 when she came from her
mother’s house in the Cambodian Province of Svay Reang. Her father left the family when
she was just four years old, forcing her mother to support them by herself. 
One year after coming to Phnom Penh,
Srey Mao got married. Two years later she gave
birth to a baby girl. Two years after that she
began using heroin. 
Srey Mao was introduced to heroin by a
group of friends in Phnom Penh. Srey Mao
says she uses heroin to forget her pain about
her family. At around the same time, she also
began using yama, a form of methampheta-
mine diluted or “cut” with a variety of other
chemicals, which is very common in South-
east Asia. Soon after Srey Mao started using
drugs, she sent her daughter to live with her
mother in Svay Reang. That same year Srey
Mao gave birth to her second child, a son. 
Srey Mao became homeless as a result
of forced eviction when the government
decided to claim the land she was living on.
This happened shortly after the birth of her
son, but she was determined to keep him with her despite the circumstances. They began
living in a temple, Wat Koh, where many of Phnom Penh’s drug users lived at the time.
Her husband was absent most of the time, showing up only sporadically. Srey Mao realized
that was not the life she wanted for her son. She felt she was unable to give him the care
he required and decided to give temporary custody of him to the orphanage Mith Samlanh.
She felt that with her son entrusted to the care of Mith Samlanh, she would be able to stop
using drugs and transform her chaotic lifestyle into one that would better suit her children. 
Subsequent to this decision, Srey Mao remained homeless. She relocated to Boeung
Tra Bek. Boeung Tra Bek is a district of Phnom Penh now known for its widely available
heroin, and the open-air injection of drugs that takes place there. 
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Srey Mao reports that arrests
are common if the police 
feel they can get a large 
sum ($25USD) of money 
in exchange for release. The
police also frequently extort
money from Boeung Tra Bek’s
residents, generally asking for
5,000 riel ($1.25USD) or
demanding liters of gas 
to be bought for them, 
which are approximately 
the same price. 
Boeung Tra Bek also has a strong police presence. Srey Mao reports that arrests are
common if the police feel they can get a large sum ($25USD) of money in exchange for
release. The police also frequently extort money from Boeung Tra Bek’s residents, gener-
ally asking for 5,000 riel ($1.25USD) or demanding liters of gas to be bought for them,
which are approximately the same price. 
Srey Mao has been arrested by both the police and the Department of Social Affairs
in the past. In four out of five arrests she was released to the care of an NGO. Her fifth
arrest took place during a holiday and she did
not have the option to call an NGO, as they
were all closed. Srey Mao was brought to Oksas
Knyom (“My Chance”), a drug treatment cen-
ter operated by the military police. En route to
Oksas Knyom, Srey Mao asked the reason for
her arrest. She was told it was for “sleeping on
the streets before a holiday.” 
Upon her arrival to Oksas Knyom, Srey
Mao looked in terror at the 18-room com-
pound. She was brought inside and locked in
a room with 29 other people, no beds, no mos-
quito nets, and no toilet. 
While there she received food twice daily,
once at 10 a.m. and once at 4 p.m. These were
also the times she was released from the locked
room to bathe, use the bathroom, and get
water. 
Srey Mao did not receive any medication
to lessen the physical discomfort of her heroin
withdrawal. She also did not ask for medica-
tion, for fear of being beaten by the guards.
Srey Mao reports being beaten with sticks regularly during her time at Oksas Knyom. She
states that the guards told her that their reason for beating inmates was so that they “learn
not to use drugs and that being an injection drug user is disgusting and bad.” 
Srey Mao said that an inmate was attacked by four or five guards and beaten for
requesting medication. He was beaten to the point of unconsciousness and then dragged
from the room and placed in a solitary confinement cell. Srey Mao explains that if the beat-
ing is severe enough to be fatal, the guards often remove the victim’s nearly lifeless body
and dump it on the side of the road. This is done in an attempt to disconnect the guards
from the murder.
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Srey Mao did not receive 
any medication to lessen the
physical discomfort of her 
heroin withdrawal. She also 
did not ask for medication, 
for fear of being beaten by the
guards. Srey Mao reports being
beaten with sticks regularly 
during her time at Oksas
Knyom. She states that the
guards told her that their 
reason for beating inmates 
was so that they “learn not 
to use drugs and that being 
an injection drug user is 
disgusting and bad.”
A woman, nine months pregnant, and her four-year-old son peer out of Koh Kor detention center
after being caught up in a police raid and detained with other “undesirables.” Those rounded up
were held without charges in the former Khmer Rouge execution camp. Courtesy of LICADHO
On Srey Mao’s third day at Oksas Knyom she decided she had seen enough. Srey
Mao escaped during the earlier of the twice-daily releases. She returned to Boeung Tra
Bek a few hours later. Srey Mao says she would never consider returning to Oksas Knyom
because she is terrified of being beaten, and the living conditions were horrendous. She
feels Oksas Knyom is beyond the point of redemption, even with international assistance,
and that it should be shut down for good.
Srey Mao expresses a strong desire to maintain abstinence from heroin, but feels
without help she will be unable to stop. She has recently reduced her injection use by half,
citing as reasons the latest increase in the price of drugs and her hopes for her children’s
return to her care. 
Srey Mao missed her son and decided to go to Mith Samlanh orphanage for a visit.
Her agreement with Mith Samlanh had been that her son would remain at their Phnom
Penh center and she would have the option to visit or regain custody of him at any time.
She arrived at Mith Samlanh and was unable to find her son. When she asked the center’s
staff about his whereabouts they did not provide her with an answer. Staff told her they
would send someone to Boeung Tra Bek the following day to speak with her. Two weeks
passed with no word about her son.
Srey Mao returned to Mith Samlanh demanding answers. Staff told her that her son
had been given to her mother-in-law in Battambang, a city four hours north of Phnom
Penh. Srey Mao did not authorize this decision; in fact she was unaware of it until that
moment. Srey Mao told the staff she wanted her child immediately returned to her so she
could take him to live with her mother and daughter in Svay Reang. They refused. It has
now been eight months since that conversation and all that Mith Samlanh has been able
to show Srey Mao are three very out-of-date photographs of her son. She continues to
actively pursue the issue and now has free legal representation provided by a local NGO. 
Srey Mao still lives on the streets of Boeung Tra Bek and plans to discontinue her
drug use, find employment and housing, and have her children returned to her care. Until
then Srey Mao proves her determination and will in the case of her son, and continues to
be an influential voice for drug users. Srey Mao is recognized among her peers as a natural
leader who is able to maintain her pride and dignity, even in the most difficult times. 
May
May was born in Vinh Ko Province in Vietnam. She left home at the age of 14 to find work
and help her parents support their family. Two years later she came to Phnom Penh with
a group of her friends in hopes of starting a new life.
When May was 23 she got married. Shortly after her wedding her mother passed
away. Soon thereafter she began using heroin. May says she first used heroin to suppress
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the feelings of grief she had surrounding her mother’s death. She says she continues
using heroin because it eliminates her worries about her home and family in Vietnam.
When it was brought to the attention of May’s family that she was using heroin, they dis-
owned her. May’s husband also divorced her, citing family pressure to “find a better wife
who was not a drug user” as a reason. 
Three years after she began using heroin, May remarried and gave birth to a baby
girl. At the time she was living in an apartment in Phnom Penh; one year later she became
homeless when she was evicted for nonpay-
ment of rent. May, along with her husband
and daughter, relocated to the streets of Boe-
ung Tra Bek.
May decided to stop using drugs. She
maintained abstinence for two months, but
felt pressured by her friends to use. She says
she began using again because she felt like she
had no family.
Soon after she returned to using heroin,
May was arrested for injecting drugs. She was
taken into custody along with her two-year-old
daughter, and they were brought to a detox
center called “Galop 4.” They were placed in a
locked room with 29 other people and no
water, no toilet, and no beds. They were let out
of the cell twice daily to shower, use the bath-
room, get water, and eat. The food, she
explains, was less-than-adequate portions of
rice and small amounts of vegetables.
In addition to May’s daughter, there were two other children in the cell. One was a
six-month-old baby boy and the other, a 10-year-old boy. All the children had been incar-
cerated along with their parents. May reports that the guards at Galop 4 treated the chil-
dren as if they were inmates; the children were denied use of the toilet unless it was during
a release time. 
May explains that the 10-year-old boy had been brought in with his father. The boy
had been crying for six days, complaining of a stomach ache, and was completely ignored
and denied medical care. On the night of the sixth day the guards took pity on the child
and allowed him to go outside to play. The boy ran away from Galop 4 following the advice
of his father. May explains that he was a street kid and was probably accustomed to taking
care of himself. 
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In addition to May’s daughter,
there were two other children in
the cell. One was a six-month-
old baby boy and the other, a
10-year-old boy. All the children
had been incarcerated along
with their parents. May reports
that the guards at Galop 4
treated the children as if they
were inmates; the children were
denied use of the toilet unless 
it was during a release time.
May received no education about drug use or anything else while in Galop 4. When
asked whether there were any support groups in the center, May laughs and says “No. Noth-
ing like that.” She reports she was not offered any medication to lessen the physical effects
of her heroin withdrawal, and when she asked for aspirin she was yelled at and denied.
A few days after the little boy escaped, a man attempted to escape during the after-
noon release. Three guards caught him and dragged him across the yard beating him with
batons in plain view of everyone, including the children, until he was unconscious. The
guards then tied the man’s unconscious body to a tree and left him there for the night.
When May woke up in the morning the man
was gone; the guards claimed he had escaped. 
May feared for the life of herself and her
daughter. She escaped with her daughter dur-
ing morning release that day. She returned to
Boueng Tra Bek. Her daughter was then taken
into the custody of her husband’s family and
now lives in Vietnam. 
May feels that, as a drug user, people
automatically assume she is HIV-positive and
look at her as inferior. Most Cambodians lack
education about HIV, and therefore tend to
make their own assumptions about the virus. May has never been tested for HIV because
she assumes that her daughter and husband are negative, and that she is as well.
May expresses her desire to stop using drugs and has reduced her heroin use by
half. She and her husband currently work as “recyclers,” collecting cans and bottles to sell
to local recycling centers. They earn a combined $5USD per day doing this, half of which
they spend on heroin. May says that heroin prices have recently doubled and this has made
it more difficult to obtain. She often has to split the cost of heroin with others in order to
be able to afford it. 
May hopes to find steady employment, though she is not actively looking right now,
and then to find affordable housing. She feels that she will be a good citizen, something
very important to her, if she stops using drugs. 
May remains strong through her daily struggles with homelessness and drug use.
She hopes that police will stop doing roundups in her neighborhood and bringing those
detained to detox centers like Galop 4. She states that no one actually gets help at detox
centers and that, by bringing people there, police are just leaving them for dead. May also
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She reports she was not offered
any medication to lessen the
physical effects of her heroin
withdrawal, and when she
asked for aspirin she was 
yelled at and denied.
hopes that police will become better educated about, and therefore more understanding
of, people who use drugs. 
Pean
Pean spent her childhood in the midst of Vietnam’s war, and her adolescence as a witness
to its aftermath. She came to Phnom Penh, Cambodia from Vietnam at the age of 18. She
and her mother were in search of work and a better life. Pean was married that same year.
Two years later she gave birth to a baby girl. Two years after that she became pregnant again
right before her husband left for a business trip to Thailand. Her husband was murdered
by his business partner in a dispute over money on the trip. The partner told Pean that Thai
locals had murdered her husband. She never saw the partner or her husband again. 
Shortly after, Pean delivered their second daughter. Pean spent the next 11 years rais-
ing her girls in Kandal, a province near Phnom Penh. She remarried in 2004 to her cur-
rent husband, a heroin user. 
The beginning of their marriage was stressful for Pean. They were constantly short
on rent, or going without food so her husband could maintain his drug use. After two
years of marriage, the couple found themselves expecting a baby. Pean hoped that with a
baby coming, her husband would change his ways. 
Eight months into the pregnancy nothing had changed. Pean caught her husband
stealing from her stash of money more than once and was extremely angry. Her husband
had a plan of his own to make her understand. Pean says her husband forcibly injected
her with heroin several times a day. By the time she delivered their son she was hooked. 
When asked how she feels about her husband, Pean tells me “I hate him more every-
day. What he did is unforgivable, and now our relationship is totally based on drugs. As
soon as I quit I am leaving him.” 
Pean tells me that there is nothing she likes about heroin. She feels her lifestyle 
and addiction forced her into the decision to give up her son for adoption. Her eyes fill
with tears as she says, “I had a lot of friends before I started using, but they don’t want
anything to do with me now. They judge me based on my lifestyle, they won’t even look
me in the eye.”
Pean and her family were evicted from her apartment shortly after the birth of her
son. She was unable to pay rent since now all of her money was going to buy drugs. She
and her family began living on the street in Boueng Tra Bek.
Soon after this move, Pean was arrested while talking to a fellow drug user on the
side of the road. They gave her no reason for her arrest. They took her to Toul Supee, also
known as Prey Speu. Pean describes it as “the jail for beggars;” the Cambodian govern-
ment describes the three-month program as a reeducation camp for the homeless. She
says she did not receive any education while she was there. 
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Pean began experiencing withdrawal symptoms on her first day at Toul Supee. When
asked if she got any medication to lessen it, she says “I would have asked, but there 
was no one there to ask.” No guards? “There were no guards. Only the cow people.” Cow
people? “Yes, the people who made sure no one stole the cows they had on the property.”
Further questioning revealed that Toul Supee is a military camp from the Khmer
Rouge era that the Cambodian government turned into a reeducation camp for the home-
less. Ten people were kept in each room and made to sleep on the floor. “There were a 
few orphans, about five or six years old, and the oldest person was probably about 70,” 
said Pean.
Inmates were made to bathe in and drink from the same troughs as the cows. They
were let out of their rooms once per day to bathe, drink, and eat. Pean reports that their
only daily meal consisted of a tiny portion of uncooked rice and a small serving of rotten
vegetables, sometimes containing worms.
On Pean’s second day there she was bathing and took longer than the cow guards
felt she needed. Two female and two male cow guards beat her with 2x4 boards and
dragged her back inside and locked her in a room. Medical tests conducted when she
returned to Phnom Penh revealed her hand was broken and she had a severe lower back
injury that still causes her to limp; both results of the beating.
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A mentally ill man lies covered in his own excrement at Koh Kor detention center. Detainees were not
screened for physical or mental health issues and had no access to medication or health workers.
Courtesy of LICADHO
Pean was in her room when she witnessed an inmate in her 40s hitting the walls,
screaming and yelling, and demanding food and water. Three of the cow guards burst into
the room and began beating the woman with sticks; they continued beating her until she
was unconscious. After she was unconscious for a few minutes the guards poured water
over her to wake her up; when she came to, they began beating her into unconsciousness
again, then dragged her from the room, telling the other inmates they were taking her to
the hospital. 
Pean was terrified after witnessing this; she knew she could easily be killed in Toul
Supee. She made the decision to escape. The following morning she climbed out the win-
dow, across the roof and jumped from the roof of the two-story building to the other side
of the fence surrounding the property. She made her way toward town where she caught
a motorcycle taxi. It was the moto taxi driver
who told her about the woman’s body that was
found that morning, beaten beyond recogni-
tion and dumped on the side of the road near
Toul Supee. 
Pean reflected on this information dur-
ing her two-and-a-half hour ride back to
Phnom Penh. Then she went to find some
heroin. That was one month prior to this inter-
view. 
Pean used her participant stipend to secure an apartment. She is not sure how she
will pay the $40USD monthly rent beyond this month. She currently works as a recycler,
collecting cans and bottles from the street and selling them for three cents each to the
local recycling center. She also plans to purchase an abjie cart, a large wheelbarrow-like
cart made from wood and chicken wire, with which she will be able to collect more cans
at one time. 
Pean is trying to quit using heroin and has cut back from injecting four times per
day, to injecting twice a day. She says she would quit completely, but she can’t sleep unless
she is high and she always gives in to the effects of withdrawal. She says she plans to quit
completely in one month. She wants to go to detox, but is too traumatized from her expe-
rience at Toul Supee to trust any government-run programs to help her. 
Pean feels that once she quits using drugs, her self-confidence will increase, and
she will be able to start a career and maintain her housing. Until then, she says she wants
people to accept her for who she is and not look down on her because of her lifestyle or
her past. 
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She wants to go to detox, but 
is too traumatized from her
experience at Toul Supee to
trust any government-run 
programs to help her. 
Chamda
Chamda comes in for her interview and excitedly sits down, eager to share her experi-
ences. She is wearing a bold red “protection” bracelet,77 which brightly stands out against
her muted, dusty ensemble. The front of her hair has been completely scorched off.
Chamda’s life began 32 years ago in Kratie Province in northeastern Cambodia. She
lived with her family until she married at the age of 18. After one year of marriage, her
husband disappeared to Phnom Penh, leaving Chamda alone and pregnant. 
Following the birth of her child, she took her infant son and went to Phnom Penh
to find her husband. She discovered him married and living with another woman. The
woman decided to leave him after learning that he had fathered Chamda’s child. 
Three years later, Chamda and her husband had a second son. One year after the
birth of their second child Chamda became pregnant again. She felt her relationship with
her husband was not stable, and feared he would again leave her for another woman. 
Chamda decided to terminate the pregnancy, something she now says she regrets
deeply. Cambodia is a Buddhist country and abortion is illegal and considered exceedingly
immoral according to tradition, no matter the circumstances. Women who choose to have
an abortion often do so in secret, for fear of being shamed or disowned by their families.
Abortions regularly take place under very unsanitary conditions and are performed by
unqualified individuals looking to make extra money.
One year after her abortion, Chamda became ill with a stomach virus. A friend of
hers gave her heroin to smoke, claiming it would lessen her stomach pains. Chamda
smoked every day for a week. She stopped when she began feeling better. 
Several hours after stopping, she began vomiting and having diarrhea. She had
remembered seeing an educational show on “HIV and its symptoms” on Cambodian tel-
evision that said that vomiting and diarrhea were the most common symptoms of HIV.
Remembering her husband’s affair, Chamda made her way directly to the local clinic for
an HIV test, cursing her husband the whole way. She told the doctor everything, from the
affair to the heroin smoking. 
Chamda’s HIV test proved negative and the doctor explained heroin addiction and
withdrawal symptoms to her. As Chamda understood it, the only way to feel better was to
smoke more heroin. 
The more she smoked, the better she felt. Chamda says heroin helps her forget
about the tragedy in her life. She also began smoking yama, a form of methamphetamine
which, with prolonged use, frequently causes psychosis. She tells me “When I smoke
yama I feel motivated and energized for work.”
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Chamda’s life became completely focused around drugs and she began injecting
heroin. For the next several years she managed to keep her home life separate from drugs,
staying in an apartment with her husband and three sons.
Four years passed, and Chamda began stealing laundry to sell at the markets to pay
for drugs. She was caught and arrested. She was brought to the police station and put in
an interrogation room where two male officers hit her repeatedly with the butt of a gun,
kicked and punched her. Chamda recalls that they demanded she tell them who her
accomplices were; as she had none, she had no one to implicate. They beat her until she
was coughing up blood, then continued beating her until she was unconscious. 
When Chamda woke up she was alone on the floor of a prison cell of a local police
station. Looking around, she saw two metal bed frames with no mattresses and a small
locked window. She still remembers the stench from the urine and feces on the floor. 
Shortly after regaining consciousness a
male officer came into her cell. He closed and
locked the door behind him. He told her that
for $100 USD she could walk out of the sta-
tion a free woman. She told him she didn’t
have any money. He began forcefully trying to
remove her clothes, but she pushed him away.
He continued aggressively and savagely,
punching her and trying to rape her; she
fought him off and screamed for help. After
several minutes, another guard came to see
what was going on, at which point the man
left the cell laughing and saying how much he
hated thieves. 
Chamda was kept in the cell for four days, receiving unprovoked kicks, slaps and
punches at least twice a day. She was let out once a day to use the bathroom. She explains
that if someone defecated on themselves and did not clean it immediately, the guards, who
had just refused them the use of a toilet, saw this as an invitation for a beating. 
When Chamda began having withdrawal symptoms in addition to coughing up
blood from the brutality of the beatings she had been receiving, she asked to see a doctor
or to be given medication. She was fiercely denied and told there was no money for med-
ical supplies. 
Chamda says, had she had money, she could have easily taken her mind off of her
withdrawal by purchasing some of the readily available yama and ice (a purer form of
yama) from the guards for twice the going street rate. She says that upon special request,
heroin was also made available.
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the station a free woman.
In the four days Chamda was held she received only one meal, bought for her by a
guard, and one bottle of drinking water. She was released when her abuse-induced con-
dition of coughing up blood worsened, and a senior officer “took pity on her.” When I
asked if there were any rules in the prison, she said she was only told one, “If you run, we
shoot.”
When Chamda returned home, she also returned to using drugs. She was hired by
a local NGO as a cleaner. She worked there almost a year and was then let go after 30 days
of consecutive absence. She is currently trying to get re-hired. 
Chamda is now self-employed as a “recycler.” She collects bottles and cans and sells
them to the recycling center for 100 riel each (approximately 3 cents USD). She makes
about $2.75USD a day. 
Chamda says she is stressed about being
able to afford rent. Her husband died 15 days
earlier ago of liver failure. “That’s what hap-
pened to my hair,” she says. “The loss was too
much for me to take. I don’t know how I will
support my family. We are going to end up on
the streets. I didn’t think I could handle it, so
when they put his body in the cremation oven
I jumped on top of it. I was pulled out by the
monks, but all my hair got burnt off.” 
She said she no longer feels this way,
and plans to use the money from her partici-
pant stipend to pay her rent. Chamda is still
unsure of what she will do beyond that. She
says that drug prices have recently doubled to
$2.50USD for a bag of heroin, and that has put extra financial pressure on her. She 
frequently has to beg drug dealers, or share the cost with other heroin users to maintain
her habit. 
She mentions her desire to stop using drugs but admits she is not actively trying,
though she wants to so she can see her sons grow up. She also hates the way society looks
down on drug users, saying that 90 percent of the people are uneducated therefore they
treat drug users without dignity. The other 10 percent, who have received proper educa-
tion, are compassionate and nonjudgmental, she says. 
If Chamda stops using drugs, she plans to save up money to start her own business.
She is optimistic about being a good citizen and aspires to someday help educate Cambo-
dian people about HIV. She feels that if she can do this she will be able to maintain absti-
nence from drugs and provide a good life for herself and her three sons. 
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Young Kor
Young Kor was born in the Cambodian province of Tah Kamao in 1985, just six years into
Cambodia’s process of rebuilding itself after the Khmer Rouge regime had fallen. 
Young Kor was born to a single mother who put him in the care of the Mith Samlanh
orphanage at the age of 12. He remained at Mith Samlanh on and off for two years. During
this time Young Kor reports that he was temporarily banned from the center, and forced
into homelessness five times, all of which were a result of fighting in self defense against
the center’s “bullies.” Eventually Young Kor was permanently banned from Mith Samlanh
after stabbing a male staff member’s sister in the cheek as revenge against the staff mem-
ber for his frequent verbal degradation and badgering. 
Young Kor was 14 when he became permanently homeless. He hung around with
other street kids, many of whom huffed glue and pressured him to try it, telling him “You
can fly, and then you can be anywhere you want.” Young Kor remarks that as a young child
his mother commonly accused him of using drugs, specifically huffing glue. He reasons
that he tried it to avoid thinking about family and stress, to forget about his life and to
rebel against his mother.
He continued huffing glue regularly until he was 18 and was introduced, by the
same group of friends, to heroin and ice. Ice is a form of methamphetamine commonly
used in Southeast Asia, which is very similar to its western cousin, crystal meth. Young
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Drug users sleep on the floor of a drop-in center in Phnom Penh to avoid police raids on the streets.
Courtesy of Long
Kor has continued actively using all three of these drugs. He also frequently mixes heroin
with liquid diazepam before injecting to reduce the cost of the heroin he uses. This is a
common practice among injection drug users in Cambodia since the recent increase in
drug prices. 
Young Kor has remained homeless since he was banned from Mith Samlanh eight
years ago. Despite this, he still manages to collect an income considered high by Cambo-
dian standards ($2,700USD per year), where the average annual salary is $360USD.
Young Kor makes approximately $3.75USD in tips per day as a parking attendant at a local
gas station. He takes in an additional $3.75USD per day for collecting and combining cans
and bottles to sell to recycling centers, and sell-
ing stolen goods to market vendors. 
Young Kor usually spends about $5USD
per day on drugs, though he says that three
days prior to his interview he started cutting
back the amount of heroin he uses in hopes of
getting clean.
When he was asked about his reasons
for wanting to get clean, he says he is tired of
the lifestyle and losing friends to drugs. He has
lost ten friends to drugs and drug-related
death. Eight of these were a result of overdose.
Heroin overdose is a serious problem in Cam-
bodia, due to the lack of resources for drug
users, specifically the lack of overdose preven-
tion education and the absence of naloxone (a
medication to reverse overdose) in the country.
Young Kor says that the other two friends he lost were murdered. One of them was
being held on drug-related charges in Prsar, a notorious prison in Phnom Penh. Young
Kor reports he was beaten to death by the guards in an attempt to implicate others in a
false confession. 
Since the untimely death of his friends, Young Kor says he has chosen to become
more aloof in his relationships and no longer has close friends, only acquaintances. He
laughs as he says, “I had a girlfriend, but I took off on her. I only like girls that can feed
me and she couldn’t.” 
Young Kor has had his own brushes with death as well. He has overdosed three
times, and believes he was revived when locals put lemon juice in his mouth to bring him
back to consciousness.
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Young Kor was diagnosed with HIV three years ago, and has since been diagnosed
with tuberculosis, the most common and fatal opportunistic infection for people with HIV
in Cambodia. He has completed the medication regimen for TB but is not taking anti-
retrovirals. When asked why, he said “I don’t want to, I want to let myself go to the gods.”
Shortly after his HIV diagnosis, Young Kor was arrested for injecting drugs. Young
Kor also has severe asthma and carries an inhaler everywhere he goes. Upon his arrest,
the police confiscated his inhaler. At the police station he was hit, kicked, and beaten with
sticks by the arresting officers. 
Young Kor received a one-day court trial. During his trial he told the judge he wanted
to stop using heroin and asked to be placed in a “reeducation camp,” as an alternative to
jail time. The judge denied his request stating it would be a waste of time for Young Kor
to go to detox because he would only relapse when he was released. Young Kor was sen-
tenced to four months in Prsar. He feels that his sentence to prison was an attempt to
coerce a false confession to a charge of drug dealing. 
Soon after beginning his sentence, Young Kor’s asthma began acting up, and only
worsened with his heroin withdrawals. He begged the guards for his inhaler. Their
response was an uncompassionate “Why did you use drugs in the first place?” He sat in
his cell for 10 days having asthma attacks before he was provided with an inhaler. He never
received anything to lessen his withdrawal symptoms. He says that he thought he would
die in jail. 
Following his release from jail, Young Kor returned to his mother’s home in Tah
Kamao province, in an attempt to stay off drugs. Shortly thereafter he returned to Phnom
Penh and relapsed. Since then Young Kor has voluntarily been to and completed detox
twice. First he attended an NGO-run program called “Green House.” More recently he
spent three months in the Cambodian government center called “Oksas Knyom.” As he
recalls his stays at both, the deep contrasts in the two experiences are evident.
Young Kor reflects upon his stay at Green House. Though bad by international stan-
dards, Green House is considered highly humane and cutting edge in Cambodia. 
When Young Kor began having withdrawal symptoms there, he received aspirin and
was provided with and told to drink liquid glucose. He laughs as he recalls how ineffective
the combination was in lessening the physical discomfort of his withdrawal.
During his month-and-a-half stay at Green House, he received some relapse-pre-
vention education. His education consisted of the staff instructing him to find a hobby to
occupy his time and help distract him from thinking about drugs. He feels that the staff,
had they proper training themselves, would have shared a wealth of information. 
Young Kor said he saw a counselor, who was also untrained, but very caring. In his
counseling sessions they discussed Young Kor’s wishes for the future. They talked about
working and finding a job. He was asked how many children he wanted to have and when
he would get married. Family is considered one of the most important parts of life in Cam-
50 AT WHAT COST?: HIV AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL “WAR ON DRUGS”
bodian culture, and therefore being disowned as a result of their lifestyle is devastating for
many drug users. 
Young Kor completed the program, but was not provided with any follow-up care or
referrals. He feels that, had there been care available, he would have embraced it, but there
is no aftercare for drug users in Cambodia. Thus, Young Kor was forced to return to the
street empty-handed and began using drugs again the same day.
One year passed before Young Kor decided to give detox another try. During this year
Young Kor witnessed the murder of a friend he lovingly refers to as his “street brother.”
Young Kor was sleeping on the street next to his street brother and was awakened by a
group of eight men who told him to get up and walk away quietly. Out of fear, Young Kor
did as he was told and the group began maliciously beating his street brother in the face
with a 2x4 board and chopping at his limbs with a serrated saw. His friend was brought
to a local hospital where he died two weeks later. Young Kor says that the wounds on his
street brother were so bad that stitches were impossible because his skin was so torn from
the saw that they couldn’t find a strong enough place to suture. The effects on Young Kor
of witnessing the murder are unmistakable; they are painfully written on his face as he
recalls the experience.
Young Kor was fed up with his lifestyle and looked for a way out. He went to Mith
Samlanh to speak with someone from their “drug department” to find out what his options
were for detox. Mith Samlanh brought him to Oksas Knyom the same day.
Upon his arrival to Oksas Knyom he was searched for money, which would have
been stolen by the guards, if he’d had any. He was placed in a 10x20-foot “cell worse than
jail” with 36 other men, ages 15 to 35 years old. 
Young Kor was kept in this cell 23 hours and 40 minutes a day. He was let out twice
a day, ten minutes each time, to shower, use the toilet (as there was not one in the cell),
get water and eat. The food provided was a small plastic bag of rice and small amounts of
vegetables. He states that if anyone exceeded the ten-minute time limit they were beaten
with sticks and kicked by the guards. 
When asked if he ever witnessed any physical abuse in detox, Young Kor replies that
it was a daily occurrence. One night, he said, he awoke to screams in his cell, where four
or five of his cellmates were violently stomping another man to death, his body covered by
a blanket. After a few moments, the guards came in, broke it up and removed the lifeless
body of the victim, leaving the perpetrators to return to sleep. The only punishment the
attackers received was to complete extra chores the following day; one man was forced to
sleep outside for a night. 
Young Kor stayed to complete the program. As for aftercare, upon his release he was
told to “go back to where you came from,” which he did. Young Kor never plans to return
to Oksas Knyom, although he wishes to get clean and is actively trying to get back into
Green House. 
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Young Kor, now 22 years old, tells me that becoming a better citizen by ending his
drug use is first on his list of what he wants in life. Second to that is mending his rela-
tionship with his family, as well as starting his own family. 
Young Kor is an incredible and optimistic voice for positive change in the lives of
Cambodian drug users. He thinks that Oksas Knyom could benefit greatly from capable,
educated and compassionate management, and could become truly helpful to Cambodian
drug users. Young Kor continually, and forgivingly, recognizes that the lack of education
about drugs and HIV causes the majority of the negative stigma surrounding these issues.
He hopes that future generations of Cambodians receive proper education so that the
change he envisions can be realized for Cambodian society.
Notes
77 A piece of red string that the monks tie on your wrist when you visit a temple. They bless it and it’s believed to
keep you safe from harm as long as you don’t cut it off. 
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Forced Drug Testing in China: 
Public Humiliation and a 
Disruption of Daily Life
The following stories are excerpted from a longer report compiled
and published in China by activists in November 2008 called “Drug
Users’ Urine Testing Stories” (Chengyinzhe de niaojian gushi)
Introduction
In recent years, public security officials in China have expanded the implementation of
compulsory urine testing for suspected drug users around the country. The government’s
2007 annual national drug prohibition report announced the creation of a web-based data-
Police detain suspected drug users during the “strike hard” anticrime campaign in the city of
Dongguan, China. If registered as a drug user, people may be detained and forcibly tested by the
police at any time. Reuters/China Photos
base of all registered drug users that would allow government agencies “nationwide infor-
mation sharing, dynamic monitoring and shadowing, and the creation of a new manage-
ment and control system for drug users.”78 The new drug laws that came into effect on
June 1, 2008 allow for public security officials to enforce compulsory urine testing of sus-
pected drug users. In recent months, drug users in Beijing and Yunnan report that police
have resorted to increasingly intrusive ways to find and test people who appear in their
system as having used drugs. Facilitated by a system that links registration as a drug user
to personal identification cards and that tracks the location of drug users through moni-
toring the use of these ID cards, police are, with increasing regularity, testing registered
drug users who check into hotels or saunas or apply for new government documents. In
some cases, those with a history of drug use report that they are apprehended by police,
handcuffed, and marched to the police station for testing within hours of checking into
hotels while visiting a new city. Those with a history of drug use have been asked to report
for urine tests while engaged in ordinary activities of daily life, such as registering their
children for school. Police have also reportedly stepped up active patrolling of former drug
users, with some individuals reporting being stopped on the street and asked for urine
tests several times in a single month. In at least one city, police are asking members of
certain minority groups for their identification cards to check whether they appear in the
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Drug users participate in a military-style drill at a compulsory drug treatment center in Kunming.
Experts estimate there are as many as 350,000 people detained in China’s drug treatment centers.
Reinhard Krause/Reuters 
system as registered drug users before they are allowed to enter the area’s most active
mosque. 
Besides mental anguish, embarrassment, and inconvenience of trips to the police
station, the proliferation of testing appears to expand the potential for other types of abuse,
including unnecessary and excessive violence against suspected drug users and widespread
violations of confidentiality. The following stories, collected from former drug users in sev-
eral cities by grassroots organizations working to protect the rights of Chinese drug users,
provide specific examples of the ways in which these new policies are taking a toll on peo-
ple attempting to live their lives with dignity.
The names of drug users have been changed to
protect their identities. 
My Understanding of
Compulsory Urine Testing
Yu Zhi (female, 25, Yunnan)
Compulsory urine testing sounds harsh, but
when it actually happens in real life, it makes
people feel quite baffled. What is its purpose?
Many people are asked for compulsory urine
tests as a result of their participation in activi-
ties relating to drug or AIDS prevention work.
The test is conducted on a whim, for no reason
whatsoever, without any explanation, without any evidence; and, even if the results are neg-
ative, you are not allowed to leave; the length of your detainment at the police station is
entirely up to the authority’s capricious opinion. 
The “People’s Republic of China Drug Prohibition Law” clearly states: The public
security division can enact necessary inspections of suspected drug users, and those being inspected
must comply. My understanding of this is as follows: If someone’s actions suggest that they
are a drug user, then the public security division must amass compelling evidence proving
that this person is a suspected drug user, and only then can the public security division
enact necessary urine testing.
But in real life, most often this is not the case, and below I will describe a true story
of something that happened to close friends. In August 2008, two colleagues were on their
way home from work around noon, when they were suddenly surrounded by four or five
police officers. They were forcibly brought to the police station for compulsory urine test-
ing. The test results came back negative, but with no explanation my two colleagues were
held until after six that evening before they were finally released. These two colleagues ful-
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filled their legal requirement: “those being inspected must comply;” though they were
taken by officers without cause, they still submitted to the urine testing carried out by the
public security division. To them, the whole day of submitting to that process was one of
darkness and helplessness. 
Currently, law enforcement agencies are calling for legal, upright, strict, and effec-
tive execution of the law. If implemented in a respectful and proper fashion, the process
of urine testing should allow suspected drug users to request not to have to go to the police
office for urine testing. If that is the case, can someone explain what happened to those
two colleagues? Can it be that simply because they once used drugs, this sort of coercion
is necessary? How, whether a person has com-
mitted a crime or not, can his life now still be
marred by needing to wear this “hat,” forever
bearing his mistake, making him submit to
these unnecessary and forced requests that
can come at any time, in any place? 
We are suffering, angry, screaming
inside. Where is civility?! Where are human
rights?! Where is justice?!
The Difference Between Quitting
and Not Quitting Drugs
Li (male, 30, Beijing)
One night in April of 2006, I was bathing with a friend at the bathhouse on a major street
in Beijing. As I was resting in the big hall, suddenly many policemen rushed in, running
straight for us in a very bad temper. They dragged us to their office, and didn’t even let us
dress ourselves before we had to go. 
Policeman: “Just finished shooting up, huh?”
This time I said, emboldened: “I’ve quit for a long time!”
Policeman: “Who are you trying to fool? Can anyone quit such things? You’ll tell the
truth once we’re back at the office!”
We tried to object, but no matter what we said they didn’t believe us, and so they took
us away. Many people were around us, observing, as if we had committed some crime. 
By the time we arrived at the police station it was already the early hours of the
morning. They separated us and didn’t let us use the telephone, but let me drink lots of
water and in about an hour we provided urine samples. When the test results came back
negative the policemen didn’t offer any explanation whatsoever and just let us go. 
I angrily asked, “What is the meaning of this?” 
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Many people say that drug
users cannot take life positively,
but that’s exactly what I want
to do. I also want to lead a 
normal life, but every day 
I have to fear this sort of 
situation. No matter how 
long it has been since I quit,
this is the type of treatment 
I have to face.  
But they said, “What of it? Isn’t it only natural that you guys should be tested? Or
are you expecting us to send you off with a little bow and a ride home?” 
The policemen’s attitudes were terrible from the beginning. They didn’t treat us
with an ounce of respect, and even when the test results were negative, their attitudes 
didn’t change a bit. Off drugs or not, such is the case, as if people like us must carry the
weight of this charge no matter what we do. Many people say that drug users cannot take
life positively, but that’s exactly what I want to do. I also want to lead a normal life, but
every day I have to fear this sort of situation. No matter how long it has been since I quit,
this is the type of treatment I have to face. 
How Long Will this Shadow Plague Me?
Wang Wang (female, 40, Yunnan) 
To our family, which has experienced much hardship, my daughter’s qualification for uni-
versity renewed a sense of longing and hope for life. From the day that we found out that
she had been accepted, I constantly found myself overflowing with the pride of a mother.
FORCED DRUG TESTING IN CHINA: PUBLIC HUMILIATION AND A DISRUPTION OF DAILY LIFE 5 7
A police officer checks a passenger’s identification in Guangdong province during an antidrug
operation. If registered as a drug user in China’s database, people may be marched to the police
station and held for hours pending compulsory testing. Reuters/China Photos
However, I would never have thought that immediately after my daughter was accepted,
I would bring such humiliation to her, subjecting her to such shame and 
disgrace in front of many others on my account. 
On August 15, 2008, my daughter and her classmate accompanied me to the Public
Security Office to process a household registration certificate [identification papers]. On
the way my daughter’s classmate kept congratulating her, and we entered the branch
office, unsuspectingly smiling and chatting all the while. At the office, I explained our pur-
pose to a female officer, who then asked us to wait momentarily. After a while a male and
a female officer came in, and the female officer said to me, before my daughter and every-
one else present, “Please submit to compul-
sory urine testing.” For someone who
originally intended to accompany my daughter
to process identification papers, the sudden
reversal that now I was undergoing urine test-
ing led me to ask in frank surprise: “Why?”
The female officer then proceeded to say, “We
require urine tests for all you people with a
history of drug use that come in to process
identification papers.” 
Everyone else there handling their own
business, my own daughter, my daughter’s
classmate—all their eyes were fixed on me,
some filled with disdain, others with shock.
Especially my daughter, whose face had now
paled to sickly green and white. In that
moment, I felt the ground give way below me, for my period of drug use had been very
short, and very few people even knew about it. Now everything was ruined, especially for
my daughter, for how was she to face her classmate after this? At the time, I didn’t even
know how it was that I followed the female officer into the restroom, or how I came back
out. 
Back at home, gloominess, pain, and guilt all knotted together inside me. One mis-
step leads to everlasting strife! I flipped open the drug prohibition law, and saw that Sec-
tion 32 states the following: The public security division can enact necessary inspections of
suspected drug users, and those being inspected must comply…” I could not help but ask myself:
Yes, the public security division can enact necessary inspections of suspected drug users,
but I had gone to help my daughter process her identification papers! What was the basis
of suspicion? Can it be that the police could simply take my history of drug use and use
it as evidence, and thus require me to take a compulsory urine test? Furthermore, at the
58 AT WHAT COST?: HIV AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL “WAR ON DRUGS”
At the time there were 
many people present. Even 
if they wanted me to take a
compulsory urine test, does it
mean that they have no need
to protect my personal privacy?
This humiliation of compulsory
urine testing after quitting
drugs has virtually destroyed
the happy relationship that 
I had with my daughter.
time there were many people present. Even if they wanted me to take a compulsory urine
test, does it mean that they have no need to protect my personal privacy? 
This humiliation of compulsory urine testing after quitting drugs has virtually
destroyed the happy relationship that I had with my daughter. I think back to that moment,
to the suspicion, sadness, and disappointment in my daughter’s eyes; I think back to my
return from the compulsory drug rehabilitation center, when I talked unreservedly with
my daughter; I think back to the promise that I made to her then. I was so scared, but after
my fears had abated and things were well with my daughter again, such an incident had
to happen. Thankfully, the urine testing proved my innocence, and thankfully my daughter
understood that I have devoted myself to the work of harm reduction and AIDS prevention
and treatment. However, I still worry about what would happen if one day I take medicine
because I am sick, and the medicine happens to contain an opiate? What if I once again
find myself in such a situation of humiliation and helplessness? This trip with my daugh-
ter to the public security office has left a deep, deep shadow on my wound that had been
slowly recovering. Who knows how long this shadow will plague me? 
We’ll Never be Looked at with Anything but Contempt
Compiled by Yu, as told by Ran (male, 40, Beijing) 
On July 10, Ran, a drug addict, didn’t return home because he had stayed out late drinking
with friends. That night, he stayed at a hotel in a district far from the center of town. Noth-
ing happened that night, but the next morning around 9 a.m. some policemen and secu-
rity guards came to the hotel and upon entering they asked Ran his name, forced him into
the squad car, and drove him to the police station. The police officer began his interroga-
tion with the question, “Why didn’t you go home last night?”
Ran’s response: “Last night I stayed out too late drinking with friends, so I didn’t
go home.” 
After the policeman finished asking questions he ceased paying attention to Ran.
Ran himself asked for a urine test, but the policeman said, “Wait a while first.” Ran was
then locked in a small cell, where he waited for an entire morning. 
Finally, Ran had no choice but to ask the security guard, “I don’t know why this is
taking so long, but I’d like to make a phone call.” 
They were unwilling to grant the request, and furthermore had really bad attitudes
about it. Ran even told the policemen that he had been taking methadone, and the office
manager of the clinic where he received treatment had called to testify to this, but the
policemen still wouldn’t listen. 
After a very long time, a policeman finally came in and said, very severely: “Don’t
say a thing. We’ll do a urine test and then wait for the results.” 
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It wasn’t long before the results came out, and they were negative. But the police-
man said in a very ironic tone, “So you’re fine—what a novelty! To think, that even you
people can quit.” 
Ran didn’t say anything more, but after feeling very uneasy he finally couldn’t hold
back any longer and said just one thing, “My entry into methadone treatment was also
arranged by public security personnel.”
Yet the policeman said, still in a bad temper, “What does it matter that it was
arranged by the public security? You couldn’t quit no matter who arranged it for you.”
After hearing this, Ran understood that it was useless to try to explain any further. 
Not long after, they finally let Ran go. While I was consoling him, Ran said to me,
“Don’t worry about it! Shoot, I’m already used to it! For people like us, it doesn’t even mat-
ter whether or not we’ve quit, we’ll never be looked at with anything but contempt!” 
The Past is not My Present, Much Less My Future
Li Zhang (male, 40, Yunnan) 
Not long ago, I browsed through the blog of a colleague in Beijing who, like me, has used
drugs before. I still can’t guess how deep her misery is from when the Beijing police forced
her to undergo urine testing. After having gone through tonight’s compulsory urine test,
I thought of many, many past drug addicts who have gone through the humiliation of
compulsory urine testing, and felt for them the sympathy of a fellow sufferer. 
I read again Section 32 of the Drug Prohibition Law. I discovered a problem here,
in the following statement: The public security division can enact necessary inspections of sus-
pected drug users. What is the basis of “suspected?” No matter what, suspicion can’t simply
be based on the past, but in reality the police are doing precisely that, basing their suspi-
cion on a drug user’s past record, when they force us to undergo urine testing. I can’t help
but ask myself, is my present the same as my past? The past is not my present, much less
my future! I think that when our country and government set laws, the laws need to be
more explicit, especially in detailing the basis for suspecting someone of drug use. 
In the past five years of talking with others about the nightmarish days of my past
drug use, I feel so much self-blame and regret. But a friend of mine always responds with
a smile: past drug use is like a child who is just learning to walk. After falling down once,
the important thing is that you can now pick yourself back up! I know that my friend is
trying to give me comforting advice, and I know that getting over past drug use is definitely
not as easy or relaxed as her words make it seem. I know this, so now I’m trying all the
harder, in the hopes that my life will return to the peace and calm that it was before this
experience of drugs. But because of that unbearably awful past, my life will never return
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to that time of peace and calm that I yearn for. Perhaps in the future I will need to wear
a scroll on my head for a whole day that reads, “I have used drugs before, please make me
take a urine test!” 
Legal Testimony (June 4, 2008)
Liu Zhi (male, 34, Yunnan) 
The defendant and his friend were traveling through Beijing from Yunnan province. A lit-
tle after three in the afternoon, the two of them checked into a hotel in a densely populated
district in Beijing. The morning of June 5, the defendant and his friend went out to have
fun at Tiananmen and came back to the hotel in the afternoon. At around 3 p.m., four peo-
ple came to the room in which the defendant was staying, three of whom were wearing
police uniforms. Immediately upon entering the room, the four snapped handcuffs on
the defendant and his friend, and then immediately proceeded to search their backpacks
and belongings. The police officer without a uniform took the defendant and his friend
to an adjacent room, interrogating them for some details, such as their purpose in Beijing, whether
they were currently using drugs, etc. After several minutes, the policemen took the defendant and his
friend out of the hotel and pushed them into police cars. Throughout this entire process, the police-
men never showed documents or papers to identify themselves. It was only when the defendant was
in the police car and he asked them who they were, that they finally answered that they were from the
nearest Beijing district’s police office. 
The defendant and his friend were taken to a local police station and were separated
once they got there. The police asked the defendant whether he had a history of drug use,
and whether he was currently using drugs. The defendant answered that he had used
drugs in the past but was no longer doing so. Afterward, the two were subjected to physical
examinations for the presence of drugs, and the results were negative. A record was made
of this and the two men signed a summons citation. The police let the defendant and his
friend leave the police station on their own. 
The defendant believes that in the process of administering the law, the police offi-
cers infringed on his personal rights. 
Notes
78 People’s Republic of China 2007 Annual Drug Prohibition Report.  Issued by the Office of National Committee
of Drug Prohibition, editor Yang Fengrui(2007 Nian Zhongguo Jindu Baogao, Zhongguo Guoaji Jindu
Weiyuanhiu Banggongshi). Accessed: http://cn.chinagate.com.cn/reports/2007-06/07/content_8358437_5.htm.
FORCED DRUG TESTING IN CHINA: PUBLIC HUMILIATION AND A DISRUPTION OF DAILY LIFE 6 1
Drug Control Policies and 
HIV Prevention and Care 
Among Injection Drug Users 
in Imphal, India
Dr. Venkatesan Chakrapani, M.D. and Mr. Kh. Jayanta Kumar79
Indian Network for People Living with HIV (INP+)
Introduction 
Manipur is one of the states worst affected by the HIV epidemic in northeast India.
Manipur lies adjacent to the “golden triangle,” the area where Myanmar, Laos, and Thai-
land meet, and a major center of opium production. Thus, injection and non-injection
illicit drugs are commonly available in Manipur. 
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A drug user sits with his legs chained inside a “rehabilitation” center run by a faith-based organiza-
tion in Churachandpur district, Manipur state. His ankles are bandaged because of wounds caused
by the chains. Courtesy of Northeast India Harm Reduction Network
In 1998, the estimated number of injection drug users in Manipur was 15,000-
20,000.80 Though HIV prevalence among IDUs has decreased from about 70 percent in
the early 1990s81,82 to 19.8 percent in 2006,83 studies have shown very high risk behaviors
among IDUs in Manipur, with more than 90 percent sharing needles and equipment.84
As of April 2006, there were 22,857 HIV-positive cases reported in Manipur; of these, 49
percent were categorized as having contracted HIV through injection drug use.85 Also,
HIV-positive IDUs in Manipur have a very high prevalence of hepatitis B virus (100 per-
cent) and hepatitis C virus (92-98 percent).86
In Imphal, several law enforcement agencies are present: police, military, and para-
military forces such as the “Assam rifles.”87 Insurgency movements and a “cold war”
among the different ethnic groups intermittently erupt in violent clashes. Thirty-nine
armed militant outfits are operating in Manipur state, which has a population of less than
2.6 million.88 Fights between the government and these militant groups (despite the 
“suspension of operations” or ceasefire agreements), and ethnic conflicts that have been
present in the region for many years, have led to strict law enforcement by police and a
strong army presence in Manipur.89
In India, both illicit drug users and illicit drug dealers are penalized. In 1985, com-
prehensive legislation, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act
replaced the previous three acts—the Opium Acts of 1857 and 1878, and the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1930. The NDPS Act has been amended twice—in 1989 and 2001, giving
more power to the police in terms of illicit drug-related arrests and raids. According to the
NDPS Act, a drug user found guilty of possessing a small quantity of a drug is liable for
six months of imprisonment. If he is found guilty of consumption, he could be sentenced
to either six months or one year in prison, depending on the substance consumed.90
While not using the NDPS Act per se, there are reports from major cities in India that
police interfere with HIV prevention activities among drug users.91 Though this is common
knowledge, there has been limited documentation of police interference in HIV prevention
and care programs among IDUs in Manipur. Thus, our study objective was to explore the
effects of the actions of law enforcement agencies (most notably, police activities) on access
to and utilization of HIV prevention and treatment services for IDUs in Imphal in order to
devise appropriate structural level interventions to improve their quality of life.
Methodology 
This qualitative study was implemented with active collaboration of nongovernmental
organizations in Imphal city in Manipur state in northeast India. Four focus groups and
four key informant interviews were conducted. 
Purposive sampling was used to recruit the study participants for focus group dis-
cussions. All recruitment was conducted by word of mouth only, in order to avoid potential
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risks to participants. Sociodemographic questions were asked of all participants. These
included questions about age, level of education, occupation, marital status, current drug
use status, and living arrangements. 
A total of four focus groups were conducted among the following groups:92
1. Male IDUs who are outreach workers of NGOs serving IDUs
2. Male IDUs who had faced problems from law enforcement agencies93
3. Male IDUs who had been incarcerated 
4. Female IDUs who also engage in sex work 
Four key informants were interviewed: a retired high-ranking police official, the pro-
gram manager of an NGO working for IDUs, the director of an NGO working for female
IDUs; and a drug dealer. 
Focus group venues were chosen for their convenience to participants and to ensure
the safety of participants and research staff. The study received ethics approval from the
ethics committee constituted by INP+.
Focus groups and key informant interviews were conducted using a semi-structured
in-depth interview guide in Manipuri (the local language in Manipur) with scripted probes.
Questions were modified or added over the course of the study in an iterative process 
to explore and reflect on emerging findings, a technique called progressive focusing.94
Focus group facilitators and interviewers were native Manipuri-language speakers who
also communicate well in English. All interviews and communications with participants
were conducted in Manipuri, though some key informants and focus group participants
also often used English sentences and words. 
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Drug control policies/laws: The aggregate of
policies designed to affect the supply and/or
demand for illicit drugs locally or interna-
tionally. Drug policy covers a range of strate-
gies on such issues as education, treatment,
drug laws, policing, and border surveillance.
Law enforcement agencies (in Imphal):
Police, police commandos, army (military),
and paramilitary forces. (Police commandos
are specialized police forces trained in
guerilla warfare to tackle militant groups.
Army and paramilitary forces such as Assam
rifles, Indian Reserve Battalion, and Central
Reserve Police Force all carry out counter-
insurgency activities.)
HIV prevention and treatment, care, and
support services for IDUs: Outreach educa-
tion; needle and syringe exchange programs;
oral substitution treatment (sublingual
buprenorphine); antiretroviral treatment
and treatment of opportunistic infections for
HIV-positive IDUs; drug-dependence treat-
ment and rehabilitation programs; abscess
management; screening/treatment of part-
ners; and treatment for co-infections (sexu-
ally transmitted infections, hepatitis, etc.).
Operational definitions of terms used
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The duration of focus groups ranged from 60 to 120 minutes and key informant
interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes. An honorarium of 250 Indian rupees (about
$7 USD) was given to the study participants who attended focus groups. Key informants
did not receive honoraria. Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim in
Manipuri and translated into English for data analysis. 
Multiple readings of the transcripts were performed by two independent investiga-
tors. Line-by-line review of the transcripts was conducted and first-level codes, which are
descriptors of important components of the focus groups and interviews, including in vivo
codes, were noted in the margins.95,96 Next, text corresponding to each of the first-level
codes was reviewed by at least two investigators. Using focused coding and a constant
comparative method,97,98 first-level codes were refined and organized into categories.
Finally, theoretical coding was undertaken to identify higher-level codes, relationships
among categories, and to ensure saturation of categories.99 “Member checking” (respon-
dent validation) with key informants and peer debriefing100 were undertaken with com-
munity leaders to increase trustworthiness of the findings. The results correspond to the
emergent categories; all quotations are drawn from the focus groups and key informant
interviews.
Characteristics of the participants 
A total of 33 people (23 men and 10 women) participated in the four focus groups.
Among male IDUs (n=23), ages ranged from 24 to 40 years, with a mean of 33.6
years. About 43 percent (n=10/23) had completed higher secondary education and 35 per-
cent (n=8/23) had completed an undergraduate degree. More than half (52 percent; n=12)
were unemployed and 43 percent (n=10/23) were working for a voluntary organization
serving IDUs. About 70 percent (n=16/23) were never married. Only 13 percent (n=3/23)
were current drug users. 
The age of female IDUs (n=10) ranged from 22 to 40 years, with a mean of 30.7
years. Sixty percent (n=6/10) hadn’t completed high school. Seventy percent (n=7/10) were
never married and the same proportion (n=7/10) was currently injecting drugs. 
Key findings & discussion 
Drug users in Imphal have a high likelihood of being stopped, searched, and detained
because of security concerns related to the insurgency. Both police and military have 
the power to stop and search anyone whom they suspect as a drug user or insurgent. 
They also perform “routine random checks.” Focus group participants report that frisking
is more common if a person appears frail, has multiple scars, or is a regular at a 
drug hotspot. 
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Both police and the army can arrest people in relation to drugs, but the army is
required to hand over those persons to the nearby police station. A key informant pointed
out that while there is no difference in punishment for drug users who are caught for the
first time or the second time, drug dealers are punished with increasing severity for each
subsequent arrest. 
One key informant stated, “Whatever drugs seized by law enforcement agencies are
in small quantity and are basically meant for personal consumption.” Frequent raids and
frisking of people to find out whether they
carry drugs may reveal small amounts of
drugs for personal consumption, while large
quantities of drugs that are smuggled through
the national highway that passes through
Imphal to Kolkata and then Delhi are not
caught. 
The same key informant argued that
police should only focus on supply reduction,
while NGOs can focus on demand reduction.
However, participants described several
instances of being exploited by the police:
 Drug dealers need to periodically give
“tax”—a term used by local people to refer to
paying bribes to police on a regular basis.
    Police often raid the places/rooms where female IDU sex workers work. If they find
syringes, they beat and forcibly take money from the sex workers. They also force
them to divulge where they bought their drugs, and beat them if they refuse. Dealers
may later refuse to sell them drugs, because they blame them for “outing” them to
police.
    Female IDU sex workers and male IDUs are often not remanded or arrested but
police ask them to pay a particular amount of money in exchange for not filing a
case against them. Many also routinely pay bribes to police. 
Though supply reduction is supposed to be the main motivation behind police
actions, participants’ accounts strongly suggest that money is often the prime motivation.
After frisking a suspect, if police do not find drugs, syringes, or money on an IDU, they
might offer some drugs in exchange for exposing drug dealers or other drug users. In
turn, police extort money from people IDUs identify as drug dealers or drug users.
Frequent raids and frisking of
people to find out whether 
they carry drugs may reveal
small amounts of drugs for 
personal consumption, while
large quantities of drugs that
are smuggled through the
national highway that passes
through Imphal to Kolkata 
and then Delhi are not caught.
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Ways that police actions interfere with HIV prevention and care services to
IDUs
DRUG USERS FACE PROBLEMS WHEN CARRYING SYRINGES
Because of the “stop-search” tactics adopted by police, IDUs are afraid to carry clean
syringes, since that would constitute evidence of drug use (while carrying a syringe is not
in itself illegal, carrying syringes in addition to small quantities of drugs for personal con-
sumption constitutes additional evidence). Because IDUs are afraid to carry unclean
syringes for exchange, the needle and syringe exchange program in Imphal has in essence
become just a “needle and syringe supply program.” As a key informant questioned, “If
they cannot even carry clean syringes how can you expect them to carry used syringes for
exchange?” Difficulty in carrying clean or
unclean syringes means increased likelihood
of needle sharing and lack of safe disposal of
unclean syringes. As a participant said, “When
we [inject] drugs we need to be quick. Police
might come at any time. For that reason….we
don’t mind sharing with others. Sometimes
we go to the hills to avoid police.” 
POLICE APPREHEND IDUS AS THEY LEAVE NGO DROP-IN CENTERS THAT OPERATE NEEDLE
AND SYRINGE PROGRAMS
Participants narrated incidents of police waiting outside drop-in centers to catch IDUs
“red-handed” with syringes and then extort money from them. Destruction of syringes,
though rare, is not unheard of, especially if IDUs do not have money to pay off the police.
Police may detain those persons who do not have money. As a participant shared: “Be it
[outreach] staff, or customer or client, if they find them with syringe, they always take
advantage [demand money]. Even if we do not have money, they made us mortgage our
things, be it cycle or whatever and take the money.” Even those who are found with drugs
may not be arrested if they can get money to pay off the authorities. As narrated by one
participant:
“It was in [a place] that I went with a friend of mine to get SP [spasmoprox-
yvon]. When we returned, there was a combined team of IRB [Indian Reserve
Battalion] and commandos and they stopped us. They searched us and when
they found the stuff [drugs] they beat us at first, then they checked if we had
money with us and they even mortgaged our vehicle in that area. We went back
and got it [the vehicle] back by paying money. They did all this for money only.
They did not take us properly to the police station but released us on the way.” 
Difficulty in carrying clean 
or unclean syringes means
increased likelihood of needle
sharing and lack of safe 
disposal of unclean syringes.
Used syringes impale a tree in Churachandpur district, Manipur state. Drug users are reluctant to
carry syringes due to the “stop-search” tactics used by the police, and instead choose to dispose of
them in other ways. Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP/Getty Images
Sometimes police take drug users to their quarters and drug users are asked to clean
their rooms and wash their clothes (no money is paid to drug users for these services).
Because of these experiences, IDUs are hesitant to come to drop-in centers and collect
clean syringes. Though NGOs have negotiated agreements with police not to enter their
premises, they have not been able to stop police from apprehending IDUs outside their
premises. 
One key informant, a former police official in Imphal, acknowledged that police do
take bribes from drug users, but denied that police target IDUs visiting drop-in centers:
“We do not target drop-in centers [for IDUs]...
Most of the [police] officers at the higher level
have understood the [needle exchange] pro-
gram very well but there is still a lack of under-
standing at the ground level [policemen at the
lower rungs]…sometimes police take 10 or 20
[Indian] rupees from people who carry
syringes.”
DETENTION/ARREST OF DRUG USERS BUT NO
DRUG/INFECTION-RELATED 
REFERRAL SERVICES
IDUs who are detained for questioning, or who are arrested for drug-related or other crim-
inal charges, are usually not referred to drug-related or infection-related prevention and
treatment services. Withdrawal symptoms faced by IDUs during detention are not
attended to. Though drugs are available in prisons, clean syringes are not available, result-
ing in up to 30 inmates sharing a single syringe. There are no needle and syringe pro-
grams within prisons and there are limited or no outside referrals to access drug-related
or infection-related services. Key informants reported that even after release from prisons,
IDUs are not connected to prevention or treatment services. When asked about what hap-
pens after a drug user is released from prison, participants said that they are “left on their
own” and no mechanisms exist to connect them to agencies providing harm reduction or
drug dependence treatment services. 
HARASSMENT OF PEER EDUCATORS AND OUTREACH STAFF
Participants reported that police do not recognize the NGO identity cards issued to the
field staff (peer educators and outreach workers), and the police often verbally abuse the
workers. Police do not treat outreach workers who are ex-users themselves with dignity,
and instead see them only as drug users.
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Though drugs are available 
in prisons, clean syringes are
not available, resulting in up 
to 30 inmates sharing a 
single syringe.
Consequences of police actions 
Common consequences arising from police actions include:
    Frequent frisking and increased risk of arrest if found with syringes means IDUs
are not likely to carry clean syringes or bring used syringes for needle exchange. 
    After being caught outside drop-in centers, IDUs are reluctant to return to NGOs
to utilize the available services. Thus, many months and years of rapport built with
IDUs are undone because of arrests near service providing centers.
    Police extortion of drug users causes some IDUs to commit theft to get the money
necessary for drugs and everyday expenses. IDUs are sometimes forced to go under-
ground, so that even experienced NGOs find it difficult to trace them in order to pro-
vide the necessary services.
    Female sex workers who are IDUs regularly pay bribes to the police and thus are
forced to take on more clients to earn more money, and sometimes do not insist on
condom use by their clients (as this usually means they will be paid more).
    To avoid police exploitation, drug users adopt a variety of strategies, including inject-
ing in sites such as the neck or other areas where scars are not as visible. Injecting
in the neck can be dangerous due to the likelihood of hitting an artery or a nerve.
    Police harassment of outreach workers results in a high turnover of staff; this affects
the quality of outreach work.
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Antidrug user organizations in Manipur partially tonsure suspected drug users to publicly identify
and humiliate them. Courtesy of Northeast India Harm Reduction Network
    Sending drug users to prison, where there is no provision of clean injecting equip-
ment, leads to increased risk of HIV and hepatitis C.
Misconceptions among law enforcement officials
An interview with a key informant who was a former police official as well as a former jail
warden revealed perspectives from law enforcers that have implications for involving police
in harm reduction, demand reduction, and providing services inside prisons. Misconcep-
tions may include:
    The assumption that NGOs working among IDUs are operating for profit. Hence,
police may not want to cooperate in programs that NGOs organize for them. 
    The expectation that the state government will introduce prevention and treatment
services for IDUs within prisons, as this is not seen as the responsibility of the prison
authorities. 
    The lack of belief that drug addiction is a disease, or that drug users need treatment
rather than punishment.
    Not seeing any role for police in HIV prevention since their role is “supply reduc-
tion” and not “demand reduction.” Even if they want to, they think their heavy work-
load precludes them from engaging in demand reduction or harm reduction
activities. 
    Though higher police officials have made public statements in the media that IDUs
carrying syringes will not be arrested for the mere possession of clean syringes/nee-
dles, at the ground level, police still routinely frisk and extort money from IDUs. Par-
ticipants felt that this disconnect could be because of the lack of training of
lower-grade police sepoys (constables) about drug-related issues and HIV prevention
and care. 
Actions taken to sensitize police
DIRECT ADVOCACY WITH RESPECTIVE POLICE STATION
Representatives from NGOs working with women approach police stations where women
are placed in custody and talk to them about the HIV prevention work being done among
sex workers and IDUs, and educate them about the harm reduction principles and human
rights of sex workers. Subsequently, these police are usually supportive. A key informant,
however, said that because of frequent transfers of police personnel, these direct advocacy
actions alone are insufficient. 
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SENSITIZATION PROGRAMS FOR POLICE PERSONNEL
Key informants mentioned that the Manipur State AIDS Control Society, which oversees
HIV/AIDS programs in Manipur, has conducted some sensitization programs for police
in Imphal but not all NGOs working with IDUs were involved in those programs. Thus,
those NGOs did not benefit, and police officers continue to interfere with HIV prevention
activities. According to some key informants, NGOs do not typically initiate or conduct
such sensitization programs for police, possibly because of lack of funding support and
the bureaucracy involved in getting permission for such programs. 
“Antidrug” groups and “pressure groups”: Interference in HIV prevention and
care programs among IDUs
Because Manipur lies near the “golden triangle,” illicit drugs are widely available. This
has led to the formation of many “antidrug” organizations in Manipur, which, rather than
focusing on drug abuse prevention, seem to target injection drug users; one key informant
commented that they are really “antidrug user” organizations. 
Until recently, and even occasionally today, it was not uncommon to find these
groups punishing drug users—by shooting them in the legs, or publicly humiliating drug
users by shaving their heads, forcing them to carry a board that says “I am a drug user,”
and shaving one side of their moustache. Key informants said that these activities continue
even now, though sporadically. Some “antidrug” agencies confine female IDUs, including
those who engage in sex work, and release them only after repeated requests from NGOs
that work with sex workers. A key informant relayed how her organization was threatened
by “antidrug” agencies. She said, “[An antidrug agency] called me and said, ‘Why are you
giving condoms to these women [in sex work]? Do you want action to be taken against you
and your agency?’” She said that she was seriously considering quitting social work, as
she could no longer take these periodic threats. 
Harm reduction and HIV services inside prisons
Participants said that many drug users end up in prison due to a variety of reasons, but
commonly because family members report them to police who in turn arrest them under
false charges (usually theft) and put them in jail. Or drug users may steal from their own
family members, neighbors, or other people in order to purchase drugs. On rare occa-
sions, IDUs are sent to jail for possession of drugs and syringes. 
Drugs are freely available inside prisons according to many participants who had
been to prison and key informants. Focus group participants explained that drugs enter
the prison through several routes—even through the “Hazoor” (literally means “sir;” in
this context, the term refers to head of a particular section in a prison). Though drugs are
readily available in prison, syringes are not. One syringe costs about five Indian rupees
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outside prison, but costs 100 to 200 rupees inside prison, since syringes are difficult to
bring inside prison in sufficient quantities. Hence, many IDUs in prison share syringes. 
Inside the police lock-up as well as prisons, there are no medical facilities or any
medical assistance to help drug users experiencing withdrawal. When asked about what
treatment is available for someone experiencing withdrawal symptoms, one of the partic-
ipants said with a smile, “The stick is the treatment.” Policemen beat the person who is
experiencing withdrawal symptoms with a stick (called a “lathi”). However, because of the
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availability of drugs inside prisons, other prison inmates may share drugs (heroin or oral
drugs) with the person experiencing withdrawal symptoms to reduce the severity. 
Drug users may sometimes come across sensitive doctors in prison medical facilities
who agree to prescribe them painkillers to alleviate the physical pain of withdrawal. How-
ever, many doctors do not prescribe painkillers because they are concerned about “diver-
sion” of drugs (into injection use). Even if someone is known to be HIV-positive and has
symptoms, referral to appropriate treatment outside the prison is unlikely.
Antiretroviral treatment (ART) is not
available inside prisons. Some family members
manage to get antiretroviral medicines from
government hospitals and give it to the prison-
ers, somehow bypassing the current govern-
ment guidelines that antiretrovirals can be
given only to patients when they come for the
monthly check-up in the government ART cen-
ters. Participants who had been to prisons said
that HIV-positive inmates face difficulties in
getting ART because of the bureaucratic process involved in getting approval for going to
government ART centers. Even when prisoners get the necessary approval, because of the
lack of adequate security staff to accompany the prisoner(s), people living with HIV get
ART only after considerable delay or receive ART only on an intermittent basis, which
affects treatment adherence and efficacy. 
Recommendations
a. Train/sensitize police on harm reduction and human rights of drug users:
Harm reduction and human rights training for police is required throughout the state of
Manipur and should not be limited to the project areas of organizations implementing
HIV prevention and care programs for IDUs. Police cadres at all levels need to be
trained—including police at the lower rungs, since they encounter people who use drugs
face-to-face. Police should also be educated about the need to refer IDUs who are arrested
or remanded to harm reduction and rehabilitation centers.
b. Sensitize the general public to decrease societal stigma/discrimination
against people who use drugs:
Create awareness among the general public about drug users’ human rights and the need
for humane drug treatment. 
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When asked about what 
treatment is available for some-
one experiencing withdrawal
symptoms, one of the 
participants said with a smile,
“The stick is the treatment.”
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c. Create partnerships between law enforcement agencies and the public
health sector:
Establish joint action teams that comprise local health authorities including the Depart-
ment of Health, Manipur State AIDS Control Society and Department of Social Welfare,
and law enforcement agencies to work on reducing drug-related crime and the supply of
illegal drugs, without interfering with effective drug treatment and harm reduction pro-
grams for IDUs. 
d. Police should exercise discretion in implementing drug-related 
laws/policies:
Rather than arresting IDUs or confiscating their injecting equipment, police should warn
and refer drug users to appropriate health and social services. Directives from higher levels
should be effectively communicated to police on the street.
e. In prisons, introduce harm reduction services and ensure treatment for
people living with HIV: 
There is an urgent need to introduce harm reduction services such as needle and syringe
exchange programs, medication assisted treatment, and detoxification in prison settings.
Prevention education on HIV and hepatitis and linkages with treatment for these infec-
tions are crucial. Proper linkages with prevention and treatment services need to be
ensured after IDUs are released from prisons.
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Introduction
The UN drug control conventions and the 1998 UNGASS commitments are often used
to justify prohibitionist and punitive drug policies employed by national governments in
Eurasia.101 In the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries, efforts to reduce
drug demand have been conceived largely through the lens of enforcing criminal prohi-
bitions on drugs, and have also led to coercive drug dependence treatment, raising serious
human rights concerns.102 Drug user registries and limitations of the rights of those who
are registered as drug users are in place in each of these countries. Studies done in some
Russian president Vladimir Putin and Tajik president Imomali Rakhmonov discuss a proposal to cre-
ate an antidrug coalition to fight drug smuggling. Tajikistan has adopted many of Russia’s stringent
drug policies. Reuters POOL/New
EFFECTS OF UN AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON DRUG POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA 7 9
countries in the region have reported that drug dependence treatment options in place are
often ineffective.103 Meanwhile, as of this writing, an evidence-based intervention, the use
of opioid substitution treatment (e.g., methadone and buprenorphine), is not yet imple-
mented in some countries (e.g., Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), exists only as small-scale pilot
projects in others (e.g., Uzbekistan), and in the case of Russia, remains criminally pro-
hibited.104 There are numerous reports of widespread human rights violations against peo-
ple who use drugs in countries that are members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), comprising 12 former Soviet republics. These abuses include police harass-
ment and targeting of people who use drugs in order to meet arrest quotas.105
The Conventions have often been misinterpreted, whether deliberately or inadver-
tently, as prohibiting various evidence-based measures to reduce the harms associated
with drug use—such as opioid substitution treatment, needle and syringe exchange and
supervised drug consumption sites—notwithstanding the clear conclusions reached by
the legal advisers of the UN drug control program that such interventions are permissible
under the Conventions.106 As a number of commentators have highlighted:
The ideal of a “drug free world” (to quote from the declaration adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1998), and its required prohibitionist, punitive
approach, may be based on an overarching concern for the “health and welfare
of mankind.” But in practice, the health and welfare of those in need of special
care and assistance—people who use drugs, those most at risk from drug-
related harm, and the most marginalized communities—have not been a pri-
ority. They have instead been overshadowed, and often badly damaged, by the
pursuit of that drug-free ideal.107
Against this backdrop of global and regional concern, in this essay we analyze the
role of the predominantly prohibitionist approach embodied in the UN drug control con-
ventions and the 1998 Political Declaration in shaping Russian drug legislation and policy,
and its influence on drug policy in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Our analysis proceeds in a number of stages following this
introduction.
The first part of this essay provides context by outlining the epidemiological shifts
in injection drug use and the HIV epidemic in Russia and Central Asia over the last decade
since the 1998 UNGASS on the World Drug Problem, which reveals that these intertwined
epidemics have worsened, with injection drug use functioning as a major driver of the
HIV epidemic. 
The second part analyzes the role played by the UN drug control framework, as reaf-
firmed by the 1998 UNGASS Political Declaration, in Russia’s “war on drugs.” However,
given Russia’s dominance in the region, its influence is felt well beyond its borders. 
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The third part therefore analyzes regional cooperation on drug control, with a focus
on the two model laws on drugs adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS), which largely replicate Russian policy. 
In the fourth part, a brief analysis of national drug laws in the Central Asian coun-
tries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) suggests that, despite Russia’s
apparent intention, the CIS model laws have not had a major influence on national leg-
islation in at least these CIS member states. Rather, the CIS and other regional bodies
serve primarily as fora for regular rhetorical reinforcement of the “war on drugs.” How-
ever, Russian law has clearly been exported as a model and has had some impact. We con-
sider the national approach to drugs in the four Central Asian countries that are members
of the CIS, and trace similarities between their approaches to drug control. For many polit-
ical and historical reasons—such as their common Soviet past, the economic and political
influence of Russia, and limited independent national expertise and access to independent
information accessible in Russian or local languages—the Central Asian countries have
adopted drug laws very similar to those of Russia. Yet this is only part of the story. Despite
certain legislative similarities to Russia, and the Central Asian countries’ rhetorical sup-
port for the “war on drugs” promoted by Russia (with frequent reference to the UN drug
control documents), including through regional bodies and cooperation agreements, sev-
eral of the countries have in recent years shown, in at least some areas, growing willing-
ness to pursue independent policies shaped by the local situation and circumstances. 
Finally, the fifth part concludes by identifying a number of reforms that could and
should be implemented by the governments of Russia and the Central Asian countries to
use the flexibilities afforded by the UN drug control conventions so as to adopt a more
sophisticated and balanced approach to drug use. This approach should take into account
concerns about the human rights and public health consequences of an overly strict adher-
ence to prohibition, including the spread of HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV), and expand
evidence-based, human rights-based measures to prevent and reduce harms associated
with problematic drug use.
Injection drug use and HIV in Russia and Central Asia
The Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union
currently maintain repressive laws and policies on illicit drugs, in line with the dominant
orientation and (perceived) requirements of the UN treaties on drug control. At the same
time, these countries report fast-growing epidemics of both HIV and drug use, with all
evidence indicating the former is fuelled to a considerable degree by the latter, prompting
some Central Asian states to begin the introduction of programs aimed at reducing HIV
infection and otherwise protecting the health of people who use drugs. Member States of
the Commonwealth of Independent States have recently estimated that the numbers of
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people in the region who use illegal drugs and who are dependent on drugs increase by
up to 10 percent every year.108 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the lead
agency of the UN system tasked with combating illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism, also
reports that the Central Asian countries are experiencing consistently rising levels of drug
use.109 As shown on Table 2 below, official data from both Russia110 and four Central Asian
countries111 show that, over the decade since the 1998 UNGASS on the World Drug Prob-
lem, there has been a significant increase in the number of drug users listed in those
States’ registries. Recent reports estimate the real figure of people who inject drugs is
many times higher.112
The region’s epidemic of injection drug use is paralleled by some of the fastest-grow-
ing HIV epidemics in the world.115 According to UNODC, the number of officially recorded
HIV infections in four Central Asia countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan) increased 15-fold from 2000 to 2007.116 Table 3 below shows the development
of the HIV epidemic in Russia and these countries over the last decade (corresponding
almost exactly to the decade since the 1998 UNGASS on Drugs), based on estimates by
UNAIDS and the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Indeed, the epidemics of injection drug use and HIV are closely intertwined in these
countries of the former Soviet Union. While injection drug use accounts for approximately
10 percent of HIV infections globally, in Central Asia and Russia it is associated with a
much higher percentage of HIV infections.117 According to UNAIDS, injection drug use
is the main mode of HIV transmission in the Russian Federation,118 and of the new HIV
Number of registered 
drug users113
Estimates of drug use (2008)
(among people age 15-64)114
2000 2007 No. of people
injecting drugs 
Prevalence of injection
drug use
Russia 441,927 537,774 1,825,000 1.78%
Kazakhstan 38,320 55,286 100,000 0.96%
Kyrgyzstan 4,479 8,464 25,000 0.74%
Tajikistan 4,200 8,607 17,000 0.45%
Uzbekistan 14,627 21,465 80,000 0.47%
Table 2. Injection drug use in Russia and Central Asia
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cases reported in the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2006 for which infor-
mation on the mode of transmission is available, an estimated 62 percent are attributed
to injection drug use.121 The figure is slightly higher in both Russia and Kazakhstan, where
injection drug use accounted for approximately two-thirds (66percent) of HIV infections
newly reported in 2006.122 UNODC has estimated that, in 2007, 73 percent of new HIV
infections in Kazakhstan were connected with injection drug use (somewhat higher than
the UNAIDS estimate), with corresponding figures of 72 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 58 percent
in Tajikistan, and 47 percent in Uzbekistan.123
In Russia and Central Asia, HIV prevalence is dramatically higher among people
who inject drugs than among the population as a whole, and has been estimated as fol-
lows: 37.15 percent in Russia; 9.2 percent in Kazakhstan; 8.0 percent in Kyrgyzstan; 14.7
percent in Tajikistan, and 15.6 percent in Uzbekistan.124 In Uzbekistan, which now has
the largest epidemic in Central Asia, the number of newly reported HIV diagnoses rose
exponentially between 1999 and 2003 (from 28 to 1,836 cases); the number of registered
HIV infections in injection drug users more than doubled between 2002 and 2006 (from
631 to 1,454); and almost one in three (30 percent) injection drug users tested HIV positive
in a study in Tashkent between 2003 and 2004.125 Other Central Asian countries have also
seen similar dramatic increases: for example, in a single year, HIV prevalence among
injection drug users increased from 16 percent (2005) to 24 percent (2006) in the cities
of Dushanbe and Khujand in the Republic of Tajikistan.126
1997119 2007120
Adults living 
with HIV
(age 15-49)
Adult HIV 
prevalence 
(percent)
Adults living with
HIV (age 15+)
Adult HIV 
prevalence 
(percent)
Russia 40,000 0.05 940,000 1.1
Kazakhstan 2,500 0.03 12,000 0.1
Kyrgyzstan <100 <0.005 4,200 0.1
Tajikistan <100 <0.005 10,000 0.3
Uzbekistan <100 <0.005 16,000 0.1
Table 3. HIV prevalence in Russia and Central Asia
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The UN drug control framework and Russian drug policy
The three UN drug control conventions establish strict measures (prohibition, criminal-
ization, and punishment) in relation to drug possession and the drug trade. The 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs requires states to limit in their domestic law the production
and possession of, and the trade in, scheduled drugs exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes.127 The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances expanded the list of prohib-
ited drugs.128 The 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances added precursors to the list of controlled substances, and expanded the scope
of the conventions to include restrictions on demand as well as supply.129 States parties to
the 1988 convention are required to make it a criminal offense to intentionally “possess,
purchase or cultivate narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption
contrary to the provisions of the 1961 convention, the 1961 convention as amended or the
1971 convention.”130 In addition, under the 1988 convention, each state party must, subject
to its “constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system,” make it a crime
for someone to publicly incite or induce others to use illicit drugs.
As analysts point out, however, the language of the conventions is flexible enough
to accommodate a range of responses to illicit drugs and to allow countries to tailor their
responses to national realities.131 While both the 1961 and 1971 conventions require that
parties act to discourage drug use, they also oblige states parties to take all practicable
measures “for the early identification, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation, and
social integration” of those who use illicit drugs.132 The 1988 convention underlines the
primacy of efforts to minimize human suffering related to drug use, and further reiterates
A man suffers through unmedicated withdrawal in a narcological clinic in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Alessandro Scotti/Panos
84 AT WHAT COST?: HIV AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL “WAR ON DRUGS”
that treatment, education, aftercare, and rehabilitation are acceptable alternatives to crim-
inal conviction and punishment in the case of possession, purchase, or cultivation for per-
sonal consumption that is contrary to the provisions of the 1961 and 1971 conventions.133
At the 1998 UNGASS on Drugs, UN member states unanimously declared that demand
reduction policies should aim not only at “preventing the use of drugs” but also at “reduc-
ing the adverse consequences of drug abuse.”134
It is because of such provisions in the conventions that states parties are well within
their rights to introduce more sophisticated, evidence-informed approaches to addressing
drugs than simply relying on criminal prohibition and punishment. For example, with
regard to the matter of ensuring treatment for drug dependence, although the conventions
“seem to allow very few exemptions for Sched-
ule 1 drugs, methadone is widely available for
substitution treatment in many signatory
countries.”135 Indeed, methadone has been
shown to be cost-effective,136 the WHO consid-
ers methadone and buprenorphine to be
among the “essential medicines” that coun-
tries should make widely available,137 and
WHO, UNODC, and UNAIDS have urged
increased access to substitution therapy for the
management of opioid dependence and as a
key HIV prevention measure.138 Unfortunately,
not all states parties have taken advantage of the conventions’ flexibility to implement such
proven health services. Notwithstanding a strong evidence base and extensive interna-
tional experience demonstrating the benefit of opioid substitution treatment for individual
and public health, and numerous policy recommendations from specialized UN agencies,
several states, including Russia, have not ensured access to methadone.139
The Russian Federation is a party to all three UN drug conventions, and the three
conventions have played a significant role in Russian drug policy.140 According to the
national constitution, international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part
of its legal system, and rules established by an international treaty supersede national leg-
islation.141 The prohibitionist approach that is the focus of the UN drug control conven-
tions is reflected in Russia’s own domestic law, which even exceeds the conventions’
requirements in some cases, including in ways that are damaging to public health, such
as the criminal prohibition of methadone.142 Drug legislation and policy documents cite
the UN drug conventions as the source of their guidance in national lawmaking and as
an inspiration for Russia’s firm prohibitionist approach at the domestic level. For example,
the federal Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted in 1997, opens with
an express reference to the UN drug control conventions.143
States parties are well within
their rights to introduce 
more sophisticated, evidence-
informed approaches to
addressing drugs than 
simply relying on criminal 
prohibition and punishment.
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Despite the fact that, as described above, even the UN conventions do not them-
selves go so far, modern Russia pursues a “zero tolerance” drug policy, under which the
government aims at a “drug-free world” primarily through a heavy emphasis on the law
enforcement activities supposed to curb both the consumption and trafficking of illegal
drugs. Government officials regularly claim that Russia has adopted such an approach in
order to meet the UN conventions’ drug-eradication goals.144 For example, in 2001 then-
Minister of Interior Affairs Boris Gryslov emphasized that: 
Russia needs to toughen its laws on
drugs and totally ban illicit drug use in
the Russian Federation. Total prohibi-
tion of illicit drug use is not the govern-
ment’s own initiative... but rather a strict
adherence to the UN drug conventions...
Only criminal law in our opinion can
prevent people from committing drug
related crimes and force drug dependent
individuals to undergo a treatment.145
Prominent narcologist and Russian gov-
ernment advisor Edouard Babayan has
acknowledged the flexibility inherent in the
drug control conventions. He stresses that
“neither of the UN conventions requires states
parties to follow fully the structural or terminological patterns of the international sched-
ules. This logically follows from the right of states parties to adopt “stricter measures of con-
trol or, on the contrary, exclude some of them.”146 According to Babayan, this justifies the
USSR, and later Russia, adopting stricter measures of control nationally, as compared to
the UN drug control conventions.147 He has noted with pride that Russia is practically the
only country that fully fulfils the requirements of the 1971 convention and has adopted
even stricter measures than required.148
This heavy emphasis on criminal prohibitions on drugs is accompanied by an 
extensive enforcement apparatus. Since 1991, counter-narcotics operations have become
one of the most important and prestigious activities for all Russian law enforcement 
agencies.149 Russian politicians and representatives of the Federal Service of the Russian
Federation on Control over Drugs Circulation—one of the largest in the world, employing
some 40,000 people150—often use the rhetoric of the “war on drugs,” justifying the reason
for the agency’s existence with the necessity of fighting “narcoagression against Russia”
and the “narcothreat” to the nation.151 In 2007, the system of antidrug bodies in Russia
expanded with the creation of yet another agency—the State Antidrug Committee, 
The prohibitionist approach
that is the focus of the UN
drug control conventions is
reflected in Russia’s own
domestic law, which even
exceeds the conventions’
requirements in some cases,
including in ways that are 
damaging to public health,
such as the criminal 
prohibition of methadone.
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which complements the work of the Federal Service on Control over Drugs Circulation,
and is chaired by the same person.152 There are plans to establish antidrug commissions
in the regions of Russia, in order to coordinate district-level antidrug bodies. According
to the current director of the Federal Service, Viktor Ivanov: “We have a strong enemy; the
fight with it should be conducted as in a war—tough and without mercy.”153
After the 1998 UNGASS on Drugs, Russia reinforced its commitment to prohibition
as its dominant policy approach to drugs by adopting in the following year its own “Guiding
principles and directions of counteraction of illegal narcotics and psychotropic substances and
abuse of them for the period until 2008” (the Guiding Principles).154 The specific aim of the
Guiding Principles, which do not have the
force of the law and are non-binding declara-
tions of governmental policy, is to achieve the
goals adopted at the UNGASS, namely signif-
icant and measurable results in reducing ille-
gal drug consumption by 2008. The
preamble of the Guiding Principles repeats
verbatim the preamble of the UNGASS Polit-
ical Declaration. The Guiding Principles reaf-
firm Russia’s intent to “fulfill its obligations
in the sphere of drug control in accordance with international treaties and the decisions of
the XX UN Special Session of the General Assembly on Drugs.”155 It calls on civil society,
political, religious, sports, business, and other leaders to take an active part in “forming a
society free from drug abuse.” The Guiding Principles stress Russia’s solidarity and support
for the international community with regard to overcoming the problem of drug use and
drug trafficking, and lay down governmental strategy to combat illicit drugs in a number
of areas—a strategy that is almost entirely focused on the enforcement of criminal prohi-
bitions as the means to the end of a “drug-free world,” and that further declares Russia’s
objective of ensuring that this approach is adopted or intensified regionally. 
The Guiding Principles identify efforts in the area of demand reduction that include,
among other things, measures that should be taken in order to implement provisions of
Article 10 of the 1971 UN convention (prohibiting the advertisement of controlled sub-
stances to the general public) and Article 3 of the 1988 convention (which includes the
prohibition on publicly inciting or inducing others to commit illegal activity in relation to
narcotic drugs). In particular, the Russian government pledges to: “prohibit any forms of
propaganda of drug use (interception of dissemination of books, leaflets, brochures, news-
papers, etc.) with materials relating to the philosophy and practice of drug use; … strictly
oppose mass media discussions in relation to legalization of the use of drugs and psy-
chotropic substances; create and strengthen specialized subdivisions operating within the
framework of law enforcement agencies.”156
According to the current 
director of the Federal Service,
Viktor Ivanov: “We have a strong
enemy; the fight with it should
be conducted as in a war—
tough and without mercy.”
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In relation to supply reduction, the Guiding Principles state Russia’s goal of strength-
ening regional cooperation by the CIS countries in enforcing prohibition, especially in the
area of amending national laws in relation to illicit drugs, consolidating the efforts of the
international community in the struggle against narcotics trafficking, and facilitating mul-
tilateral intergovernmental anti-narcotics
agreements with the CIS countries.157
Finally, the international cooperation sec-
tion of the Guiding Principles further makes
clear Russia’s intent to project its prohibition-
ist approach regionally, including its opposi-
tion to evidence-based treatment options for
those with opioid dependence. The Guiding
Principles explicitly state Russia’s policy to
engage in the following efforts: 
    “[c]arry out activities with regard to con-
solidation of the international commu-
nity’s efforts in the struggle against
illegal trafficking of narcotics and abuse
thereof under the auspices of the United
Nations”;
    “oppose legalization of the non-medical
consumption of narcotics and psy-
chotropic substances and the decrimi-
nalization of offenses connected with it”;
    “counteract attempts to develop and
apply methadone programs and opium
and heroin treatment programs”; and
    “endeavors shall be made to bring legis-
lation of participant countries of the CIS into conformity with… the CIS model Law
on the Prevention of Illegal Traffic in Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors.”158
As seen from the Guiding Principles, the Russian “war on drugs” approach does
not end within the extensive Russian territory. In order to achieve drug demand reduction
goals stipulated by the UNGASS 1998, Russia adopts a strategy that totally condemns any
attempts to develop and apply methadone programs, to initiate media discussion on the
subject of drugs (including methadone and other harm reduction measures), and to legal-
ize any kind of drugs, not only in Russia, but in the entire region.
Former President and now Prime Minister Vladimir Putin acknowledges that Russia
has extremely strict criminal responsibility for offenses related to drugs, with criminal
sanctions of up to 20 years’ imprisonment possible for trafficking.159 According to Putin,
The Russian “war on drugs”
approach does not end within
the extensive Russian territory.
In order to achieve drug
demand reduction goals 
stipulated by the UNGASS
1998, Russia adopts a strategy
that totally condemns any
attempts to develop and 
apply methadone programs, 
to initiate media discussion 
on the subject of drugs 
(including methadone and
other harm reduction 
measures), and to legalize 
any kind of drugs, not only in
Russia, but in the entire region.
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“the question is not in making the law stricter, but to ensure the unavoidability of punish-
ment, as for any other crime. And this is the road we are going to take further on.”160
It is, therefore, not surprising that some modest moves toward tempering the harshness
of Russian drug law have subsequently been revised.
In 2003, the federal Duma took an important step toward revisiting federal criminal
law in relation to drug offenses by significantly increasing the minimal quantity of drugs
that could lead to criminal liability for the offense of possession. Legislative amendments
introduced the notion of an “average dose” of an illegal substance, and defined a “large
amount” of drugs as 10 or more average doses and an “extra large amount” as 50 or more
average doses.161 Purchasing, possessing, manufacturing, importing, and exporting illegal
drugs in a quantity less than 10 average doses would lead to administrative, rather than
criminal, liability.162 Compulsory treatment of drug dependent offenders in prisons was
abolished, alternatives to imprisonment were introduced, and manufacturing narcotic
drugs for personal use was differentiated from manufacturing with the intent to sell.163,164
Yet that move has since been partly repealed: the concept of an “average dose” has
been revoked and the definitions of “large” and “extra large” amounts of drugs have been
revisited once again.165,166 The deputy director of the Federal Service on Control over Drugs
Circulation called the Duma’s 2003 amendments “a mistake, which now has been learned
and corrected.”167 According to him, one of the strategic directions of Russia’s drug policy
is full implementation of provisions of the UN drug control conventions, in particular strict
compliance with the drug schedules.168 As of this writing, the Federal Service of the Russian
Federation on Control over Drugs Circulation proposes to repeal the remaining amend-
ments from 2003, increase criminal sanctions for the sale of drugs in small amounts, and
re-establish compulsory drug dependence treatment.169 The agency’s proposals include
adoption of “extraordinary strict measures of control in relation to drugs for medical and
scientific purposes,” and the expansion of forced drug testing, particularly in schools and
other educational institutions.170
Regional cooperation in the area of drug control
Having reviewed the basic orientation of the three UN drug control conventions, and the
role they play in the Russian Federation’s legislative and rhetorical approach to drugs, this
section provides an overview of how both the UN norms and Russia’s approach have influ-
enced other countries within the region and within Russia’s historical sphere of influence.
The focus is primarily on Russia’s efforts via the processes of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, including developing model legislation and promoting its adoption
by member states. More briefly, some reference is made to other regional bodies for
addressing drug control, which also are overwhelmingly oriented toward the use of law
enforcement mechanisms to address drugs. Just as Russia maintains an extensive appa-
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ratus for drug law enforcement domestically, at the regional level there is also a prolifer-
ation of bodies, agreements, recommendations, and declarations aimed at reifying prohi-
bition as the dominant response to drugs. 
Commonwealth of Independent States
Founded in 1991 and headquartered in Minsk, Belarus, the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States is an international organization consisting of 12 former republics of the Soviet
Union,171 with the purpose of promoting integration and cooperation on economic, defense,
and foreign policy matters.172 Created in 1992, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (IPA) of
the CIS is an advisory body for the preparation
of “draft legislative documents of mutual inter-
est,” based in St. Petersburg, Russia.173
One of the main goals of the CIS, and
one of the major reasons for the existence of
the IPA, is the “harmonization and unifica-
tion” of legislation of the CIS Member States.
This work is implemented through the adop-
tion of model legislative acts and recommen-
dations. Since its inception, the IPA has
adopted over 200 model legislative acts,
including model Civil, Criminal, Criminal Pro-
cedure, and Tax Codes.174 In 1996 and again in
2006, at the initiative of its Permanent Com-
mission on Defense and Security Issues, the IPA adopted two model laws on drugs175 and
recommended that parliaments of CIS Member States use these in preparing their own
national legislation.176
Apart from adopting the two model laws on drugs, the “fight against narcoagres-
sion” and the “narcothreat” that faces the region in the 21st century represent a major
focus of the lawmaking efforts of the CIS, which has convened several conferences, con-
sultations and roundtables on the subject of the fight against drugs. In 2002, the Heads
of State of the CIS countries adopted the “Concept for cooperation between the Member
States of the CIS in activities to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic
substances and precursors.”177 Resulting from this were two cooperation programs
between CIS Member States for activities to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs,
psychotropic substances, and their precursors, covering the periods of 2002-2004 and
2005-2007 respectively.178 Complementing the first of these cooperation programs, in
order to intensify further the legislative activity in this area, in October 2004 the IPA estab-
lished a Joint Commission on Harmonization of Legislation in the Sphere of Combating
Terrorism, Crime and Drug Business.179 As part of the latter cooperation program, Russia’s
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law enforcement domestically,
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also a proliferation of bodies,
agreements, recommendations,
and declarations aimed at 
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Key Elements of the CIS Model Law on Drugs
1996 MODEL LAW “ON THE PREVENTION OF
ILLEGAL TRAFFIC IN DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC
SUBSTANCES AND PRECURSORS”
Drug use in a group or in public spaces is prohibited.
Illegal purchase, possession, import, and export of
narcotic and psychotropic substances in small quan-
tities for personal use leads to administrative penalty
for a first offense. A second or subsequent offense
within the same year leads to criminal prosecution.
Private and public bodies, and individuals in their per-
sonal capacity, have a legal obligation to report all
instances of use, possession, cultivation, trafficking
and other activities with illegal drugs.
Anyone suspected of using or being under the influ-
ence of illicit drugs may be subjected by police to invol-
untary drug testing. Witness statements alone suffice
as evidence in a prosecution to “prove” drug use. 
Compulsory drug dependence treatment may be
imposed. The law provides for administrative liability
for avoiding drug testing and treatment or not follow-
ing a physician’s orders. Police may enforce testing or
treatment, including through involuntary detention, in
the event that a person seeks to evade it. There is
criminal liability for escaping a medical institution fol-
lowing involuntary detention. 
A court decision ordering drug dependence treatment
is a basis for dismissal from work and termination of
enrolment in an educational institution. The law pro-
vides for mandatory registration of people who use
drugs. Those registered may be deemed temporarily
unfit to perform certain functions (although these are
not specified in the model law).
There is no mention of the rights of people who use
drugs, even those who are drug-dependent, nor of any
possibility of appeal of police or court decisions to
order a person to undergo compulsory drug testing
and treatment.
2006 MODEL LAW “ON NARCOTIC AND 
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND PRECURSORS” 
Drug use per se is prohibited and punished with a fine
or administrative detention. Purchase or possession
of drugs for personal use, even in small amounts, and
avoiding or refusing to undergo drug testing, leads to
administrative arrest. 
For purposes of detecting those who use drugs, the
state organizes preventive drug testing, including dur-
ing annual check-ups of students at all levels of edu-
cation. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that
a person uses illicit drugs or psychotropic substances,
or is under the influence of narcotic drugs, s/he is
ordered to undergo drug testing by a court, prosecu-
tor, or investigating officer. Sanctions may be imposed
for avoiding drug testing or treatment, or for not fol-
lowing doctors’ orders. Escape from or en route to a
specialized medical facility is punishable by imprison-
ment and fine.
The model law provides for registration of people with
drug dependence; those registered may temporarily
be deemed unfit to perform certain functions
(although these are not specified). A court decision
ordering a person to undergo addiction treatment is
a basis for dismissal from work or termination of
enrolment in an educational institution.
There is no mention of the rights of people who use
drugs, even those who are drug-dependent, nor of any
possibility of appeal of police or court decisions to
order a person to undergo compulsory drug testing
and treatment.
* * * * *
The 1996 model law focuses on criminal and admin-
istrative sanctions for illegal activities related to nar-
cotic drugs (which are placed in national criminal and
administrative codes) and the treatment of drug
dependence; it is primarily a set of provisions aimed
at prohibitions and their enforcement. The 2006
model law similarly has a strong prohibitionist orien-
tation, yet is also a more comprehensive document.
It regulates in detail the mandate of the drug control
agency and regulates the legal use and distribution of
narcotic drugs. The 2006 CIS model law refers to the
UN drug control conventions in defining precursors,
adopting international quotas of narcotic substances,
and in licensing criteria.
Federal Service on Control over Drugs Circulation participated in drafting the model law
on drugs subsequently adopted by the CIS’ IPA in 2006. 
There is evident overlap between Russian drug law and the legislative drafting work
of the CIS. This is not surprising, given that the Russian federal drug control agency took
an active part in drafting at least the 2006 CIS model law, consistent with its declared objec-
tive of strengthening, on a regional level, the enforcement of criminal prohibitions on
drugs.180 There are evident similarities between Russia’s 1997 “Law on narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances” and the 2006 CIS model law. Consider the following examples:
    The 1997 Russian law on drugs prohibits drug use per se.181 (The drug law does not
define the penalty for breaching the prohibition; rather, this is left to the criminal or
administrative codes.182) The 2006 CIS model law similarly recommends prohibiting
drug use. 
    The 1997 Russian law prohibits treatment using methadone and buprenorphine:
“the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances included in List II for 
the treatment of drug dependence shall be prohibited.”183 The 2006 CIS model 
law incorporates this provision word for word184—although as discussed below, 
fortunately this approach has not been reflected in the practice of various CIS 
member states, a number of which have moved ahead with implementing opioid
substitution treatment.
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Patients are handcuffed to their beds at a rehabilitation program in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Up to
50 people at a time are crammed into a room and fed a diet of only bread and water to ensure they
take the treatment seriously. Brendan Hoffman
    Similarly, the Russian 1997 law and the CIS 2006 model law are identical in their
prohibition of so-called propaganda: “Propaganda of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances (e.g., individuals’ and organizations’ activities disseminating informa-
tion about ways, methods of development, manufacture and use, places to find
drugs, and also printing and dissemination of books, and other printed and media
information, dissemination of information on TV and other means of communica-
tion, and other activities aimed at it), is prohibited. Propaganda of advantages of use
of some drugs over another, and propaganda of drug use for medical purposes,
which affects a person’s will or having a negative impact on one’s psychological or
physical health, is prohibited.”185
It is difficult to gauge the degree to
which the CIS model laws themselves, as dis-
tinct instruments, have influenced the devel-
opment of national legislation or policy in CIS
member states, including the Central Asian
countries. A number of states have moved to
implement opioid substitution treatment pro-
grams despite the explicit opposition to such
measures expressed in the 2006 CIS model
law (which itself is drawn verbatim from Rus-
sia’s 1997 law). However, in other respects,
legislation in member states is broadly consis-
tent with the other elements reflected in the
CIS model laws, such as provisions for com-
pulsory drug testing and treatment, drug user
registration, and legislatively mandating restrictions on those registered as drug users.
Timing may be one of the reasons explaining the seemingly limited incorporation of at
least the 1996 CIS model law’s provisions. The Central Asian countries adopted their
national drug laws in 1998 and 1999, by which time Russia had adopted its own, more
fully developed drug law in 1997. Given the evident similarities between the Russian law
and the legislation of the Central Asian republics, it seems that Russia’s law has been
more of a direct influence on countries in the region than the earlier CIS model law. Later,
by the time the CIS IPA adopted its second model law on drugs in 2006, each country’s
own legislation was already in place—it remains to be seen whether this second model
law will gain much traction with the region’s national governments, but to date there is
little evidence of this.
What is clear is that the UN drug control conventions and the 1998 UNGASS on
Drugs serve as the constant backdrop to the work of the CIS in this area, with the CIS
serving as an echo chamber in which the conventions are constantly invoked, affirmed
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and urged upon member states. At a 2003 international CIS conference in St. Petersburg,
the participants adopted recommendations “On implementation of the UN Drug Control
Conventions in the National Legislation of the CIS countries,” calling on member states
to speed up the harmonization of legislation in fighting against the “narcothreat.”186 The
resolution’s preamble notes that the recommendations are “guided by the provisions and
principles of the UN drug control conventions and the Political Declaration and decisions
adopted at the XX Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1998.” It continues by
“underlining that all member states of the CIS ratified these international drug control
conventions” and “remembering that at the XX Special Session of the General Assembly
of the UN, dedicated to the joint fight against the global drug problem, the States recog-
nized that drug demand reduction is an important element of comprehensive approach
to solving the drug problem.”187
In 2004, the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS countries adopted a “Program
of Cooperation of the CIS Member States in the Fight against Illegal Trafficking in Drugs,
Psychotropic Substances and Precursors for 2005-2007.”188 Among the main goals of the
program are: improvement and harmonization of national legislation, and development
and strengthening of international legal basis for the cooperation in the area of drug con-
trol. The program activities include adoption of legislation aimed at: (a) toughening crim-
inal law sanctions for trafficking, importation, and transit of illegal drugs; (b)
strengthening criminal sanctions for the sale of drugs to minors; (c) introducing liability
for drug use; (d) prohibiting propaganda of drugs and drug use; and (e) preventing drug
dependence, identifying, treating, and rehabilitating people with drug dependence, and
preventing HIV/AIDS, and hepatitis A, B, and C among drug users.189 Accordingly, the
Russian Federation’s Federal Service on Control over Drugs Circulation took a lead in
drafting for the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly the model law on drugs eventually
adopted in 2006.
In November 2005, the CIS held yet another conference in St. Petersburg, at which
member countries adopted a “Declaration of the International Conference on Problems
of International Cooperation in the Sphere of the Fight against Drug Dependence and Ille-
gal Drug Trafficking” in the CIS countries. The declaration urged states to:
    regularly conduct antidrug and anti-trafficking activities;
    organize international projects on drug control and joint actions to reduce drug
demand, prevent drug dependence, and enhance treatment and rehabilitation;
    further develop and strengthen the treaty basis for international cooperation on the
fight against drugs; and
    take action to harmonize national legislation in the sphere of drug abuse and traf-
ficking.190
The declaration recognizes the leading role of the UN in organizing the fight against
illegal drugs and drug use, and supports the existing international treaties, and the UN
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General Assembly’s 1998 Political Declaration and related decisions. The declaration
underlines the role of the parliamentarians in forming a “barrier” to illegal drug trafficking
and drug use and stresses the importance of the CIS model laws and the IPA’s 2003 rec-
ommendations on the unification of drug legislation.
Most recently, the IPA adopted in November 2006 a further resolution aimed at har-
monizing legislation and implementing intergovernmental plans for fighting against
drugs and crime, through the “Recommendations on unification and harmonization of
legislation in the area of combating trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances
and precursors.”191 The resolution reaffirmed the CIS’ commitment to creating and
improving international standards in combating current threats and challenges to security
on the territory of the CIS, including drugs. This resolution endorsed the 2006 CIS model
law on drugs and the IPA’s earlier 2003 recommendations on the unification and harmo-
nization of legislation on drugs. These new 2006 recommendations again reference the
UN drug conventions, as well as provisions of the 1996 CIS model law on drugs. In these
2006 recommendations, CIS member countries state that, despite the fact that all national
laws are based on the same international treaties, there is an absence of unified terminol-
ogy in the area of combating illegal drug trafficking. Furthermore, concern is expressed
about differences in how member states address the scheduling of controlled drugs and
terms of amending such schedules, as well as variation in provisions for criminal prose-
cution and liability for large and extra-large amounts of drugs. The unification of the above
provisions is the current goal of the IPA. 
In the political rhetoric of the CIS countries, “narcoagression” is characterized as a
threat to national security.192 The Russian Federation’s representatives are joined by the
CIS IPA members in their repeated calls for the harmonization and unification of national
legislation in the area of drug control.193 In his speech to the IPA, the chair of the Com-
mittee on Defense and Security of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Rus-
sia (the upper house of the parliament) has underlined that it is not only the IPA, but also
the parliament of the Russian Federation that undertakes efforts aimed at the harmoniza-
tion and unification of the legislation in the area of counteraction to narcoagression in the
CIS countries and internationally.194 According to the chair of the Federation Council of
the Federal Assembly, S. M. Mironov, joint efforts in combating narcoagression in the CIS
and the entire international community are necessary, and are priorities of the IPA since
its inception.
Other regional cooperation on drug law enforcement
Beyond the larger forum of the CIS, Russia and most of the Central Asian countries are
also engaged in at least two other regional bodies that devote considerable attention to
reinforcing the dominance of a criminal prohibition approach to addressing drugs.
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The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a political and military organ-
ization of seven former Soviet Union countries, established in 2002 on the basis of the
1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty, with counteracting drug trafficking as one of its
goals.195 In 2003, the CSTO adopted a decision “On strengthening measures to combat
drug dependence and drug trafficking as financial basis of transnational organized
crime.”196 According to a Kazakh parliamentarian, recommendations on unifying and har-
monizing the legislation of CSTO member states in combating international terrorism
and drug trafficking have been used to toughen the drug law of Kazakhstan.197 More
recently, in March 2008, there was a meeting of the coordination council of the heads of
the national drug control agencies (within the framework of the CSTO)198, with the main
goal of pursuing unification of legislation in the area of drug control.199 The coordination
council was created in 2004 to fight “narco-expansion” in the region, and has since coor-
dinated a number of high-profile border control anti-trafficking operations in the region.
The coordination council is currently chaired by the former Director of the Russian Fed-
eral Service on Control over Drugs Circulation.200
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental interna-
tional organization created in 2001 in Shanghai, China.201 According to the president of
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, one of the SCO’s priorities is the fight against drugs.202
In 2004, the six member states of the SCO signed an agreement to cooperate in combat-
EFFECTS OF UN AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON DRUG POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA 9 5
A prisoner with tuberculosis in Tomsk, Russia waits to receive medication at a local prison hospital.
HIV and TB are common infections among drug users in Russia’s prisons. Gary Calton/Panos
ing illegal drug trafficking.203 The preamble of the agreement recognizes the importance
of the UN drug control conventions and the Political Declaration and decisions adopted
in 1998 at the XX Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Drugs, and other rec-
ommendations of the United Nations. Member states agreed to cooperate and coordinate
their efforts in the struggle against drugs, and to present a unified position at international
fora on drugs.207 Rooted firmly in a prohibitionist framework, the agreement acknowl-
edges that the member states, according to their national legislation, may criminalize non-
medical drug use in order to prevent drug demand and drug dependence.208 During their
August 2007 meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the SCO member states reaffirmed their
previous plans and decided to actively implement the 2004 agreement.209 Finally, beyond
these regional organizations, the UN drug control treaties provide a touchstone for drug
law enforcement efforts via several bilateral agreements between drug control agencies of
the CIS countries. 
As illustrated by the overview above, the fight against “narcoaggression” is one of
the main priorities of several intergovernmental organizations within Eurasia. Every agree-
ment and recommendation adopted by those bodies uses the language of a “war on drugs”
and cites the UN drug control conventions as well as the declaration and decisions of the
1998 UNGASS on Drugs. Unfortunately, with the proposed activities mainly focused on
law enforcement, there is little mention by such regional bodies of the importance of pro-
tecting human rights, efforts to prevent the spread of HIV, or the development of effective
drug dependence treatment. The absence of these considerations is unhelpful, given the
ever-growing body of evidence as to the negative human rights and public health conse-
quences of a strict and lopsided emphasis on prohibition, prosecution, and punishment
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Prohibition of
nonmedical
use of drugs204
Compulsory
treatment 
of drug 
dependence205
Compulsory 
drug testing 
if suspected 
of drug use
Registration
of drug
users
Prohibition of
“propaganda”206
Russia r r r r r
Kazakhstan r r r r
Kyrgyzstan r r r r
Tajikistan r r r r r
Uzbekistan r r r r
Table 4. Drug statutes in Russia and Central Asia: key elements
as the primary means of addressing drugs and related harms. It is worth noting that the
UN General Assembly has affirmed the importance of ensuring that drug control must
be carried out in conformity with States’ human rights obligations,210 and the UN Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs itself has recognized their importance.211
National drug law and 
policy in Central Asia
For the purposes of this paper, we review the
situation in the four Central Asian countries
that are CIS members: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The UN drug
control conventions are cited directly in the
drug statutes of three: Kazakhstan,212 Tajik-
istan,213 and Kyrgyzstan.214 Typically, national
legislation in each country either proclaims
the priority of international treaties ratified by
the country over national laws215 or proclaims
the treaties as part of national legislation.216 All
four countries adopted their national drug
laws in the period of 1998-1999.217 In some
respects, they reflect elements found in the 1996 CIS model “Law on the prevention of
illegal traffic in drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors.” They resemble closely
the 1997 Russian “Law on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.”218
The Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian laws on drugs vary in length but fol-
low the same basic structure. Some articles of the Central Asian countries’ national
statutes on drugs are identical in wording or in essence to the 1997 Russian law on nar-
cotics.219 Common characteristics between Russian and Central Asian statutes specifically
on drugs are shown on the table below. (Note that Table 4 summarizes only countries’
specific statutes on narcotic drugs. In each country on the table, these statutes are supple-
mented by criminal and administrative codes and various resolutions that may introduce
additional regulatory elements or interpret drug laws.220)
Yet despite their support on paper for the CIS project of harmonizing and unifying
legislation in the field of drug control, and very similar wording of their drug laws, in real-
ity the drug policies of the Central Asian countries are somewhat different. All four Central
Asian countries that are member states of the CIS implement harm reduction strategies
to varying degrees. For example, as of this writing, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had imple-
mented opioid substitution treatment (OST) on a limited level, but proclaimed their 
commitment to its expansion; as of October 2008, Tajikistan was expecting to establish
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two pilot sites for providing OST in the near future;221 and Kazakhstan had yet to imple-
ment OST. In 2008, Kyrgyzstan became the first country in the region to introduce OST
in prisons. All four countries have needle exchange programs; in 2002, Kyrgyzstan
became the first country in the region to introduce such programs in prisons.222 (In con-
trast, Russia continues to prohibit criminally the use of methadone or buprenorphine for
OST, and, while needle exchange programs are operating, none yet exist in any Russian
prison setting.)
Furthermore, in fora other than the CIS, politicians from various Central Asian
countries show some openness to harm reduction interventions, and acknowledgement
of the negative consequences of an approach to drug use that relies exclusively on enforc-
ing criminal prohibitions and penalties.
In 2007, addressing the United Nations in a letter, the government of Uzbekistan,
while underlining its adherence to the international drug control conventions, also recog-
nized that primary prevention of drug dependence is important, and that access to effec-
tive, humane drug dependence treatment and rehabilitation is essential.223
In Tajikistan, the national coordination committee responding to HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis and malaria established a working group to study prospects for introducing OST
in the country and lead the establishment of pilot programs.224 Following amendments to
the criminal code in 2004, which significantly increased the minimum quantities of drugs
required to trigger criminal liability for possession, Tajikistan has one of the most liberal
drug amount tables in the former Soviet Union.225
Kyrgyzstan, the first country to introduce comprehensive interventions to reduce
harms from drug use,226 and which recently increased the minimal amounts of narcotic
drugs prohibited for circulation,227 continues to implement drug policy that does not fol-
low either Russia’s strict model or the official prescriptions of the CIS. According to Timur
Isakov, advisor to the director of the drug control agency of Kyrgyzstan:
The IPA of the CIS developed a model law on counteraction to drugs. Very
good, excellent, great. But when our parliamentarians took part in this work,
they did take into account the way Kyrgyzstan is moving, what direction it has
chosen in this sphere. This is important…We are trying to move forward and
develop our drug policy taking into account our local situation…China (with 2
billion people), Russia (with 150 million), U.S. (with 300 million)—all of them
have very tough drug policies…If we copy their style, create big structures, appa-
ratus, methods, we will not have enough financial resources and people. Addi-
tionally, who will benefit? After having worked in this area a long time, Kyrgyz
experts came to the conclusion that we need to take into account the experience
of countries which are similar to Kyrgyzstan…Russia refused to implement 
programs that reduce the harms of drug use (needle exchange, methadone 
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A prison officer in Dushanbe, Tajikistan checks a cell in the special detention center run by Tajikistan’s
Drug Control Agency. Alessandro Scotti/Panos
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programs, etc.), prohibited their existence…On the other hand Kyrgyzstan does
not have a right to experiment…as I joke, we do not have enough population
for those experiments…We must take the paths that are proven to work.228
Indeed, government officials at the highest level in Kyrgyzstan have challenged 
the strict prohibitionist approach adopted by Russia and reflected in the CIS model laws.
At a June 2005 conference, “Kyrgyzstan: A Future without Drugs,” Kyrgyz President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev declared: 
It is time to stop incarcerating people who use drugs… From our point of view,
the system where people who use drugs are criminally charged with posses-
sion of small amounts of drugs is not acceptable… It diverts state efforts and
funding from activities directed against trafficking, creates an illusion of
work…We need to study carefully and reform decisively legal provisions relat-
ing to illegal drugs and prevention of drug use.229
In sharp contrast, unlike these three sister countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan
persists with “war on drugs” rhetoric and policies. In a long-term governmental policy
“Kazakhstan 2030,” President Nursultan Nazarbaev declared:
It is necessary to toughen punishment for drug trafficking and drug dealing…
Drugs is a special and deadly sphere, and it is a question to what extent the
principles of humanism are applicable here. On one side of the scale there is
the life of the person who imports and deals drugs, on the other, the lives of
people who use drugs that are destroyed with his “help.”230
More recently, Kazakhstan’s parliament has enacted legislation toughening sanc-
tions for drug-related offenses, introducing life imprisonment for selling drugs in educa-
tional institutions and to minors, for dealing in extra-large quantities of drugs, and
trafficking by organized groups.231 The law also toughens the liability of entertainment
venues for drug offenses taking place on their premises. The government is currently con-
sidering introducing forced drug testing for students.232
As the review above indicates, some governments of the Central Asian countries
have pursued, at least to some degree, more independent drug policies with more atten-
tion to implementing evidence-based harm reduction interventions. However, despite
some positive changes, introduction of evidence-proven interventions based on principles
of human rights and protection of public health is slow in the Central Asian countries. In
many respects, national drug laws remain imitations of the outdated and punitive 1997
Russian law, with no provisions for harm reduction measures that protect the health of
both individuals who use drugs and that of the public more broadly, including through
preventing the spread of HIV. The past decade has seen a concerted effort by Russia to
push a strict prohibitionist approach to drugs at a regional level, including through the
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structures of the CIS and other regional bodies, even as evidence has mounted that such
an approach is counterproductive and damaging to public health. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
“Whether or not they are a cause or a convenient excuse, UN drug conventions
are used by national governments to justify highly punitive legal measures
and failure to implement services for people who use drugs.”
— Oleg Feodorov, Deputy Minister of
Internal Affairs, Kazakhstan233
As is apparent from the preceding
review, the UNGASS objective of achieving a
“drug-free world” through prohibition has
played a central normative role in the develop-
ment of drug policy in Russia and the CIS.
Russia leads the war on drugs in the region,
advancing its strict interpretation of the UN
drug control conventions and frequently citing
the UNGASS 1998 decisions as its inspira-
tion. More troubling is that Russian influence
is evident in the legislation of at least some of
the CIS countries. This influence is reinforced
through the regional mechanisms of the CIS and other regional intergovernmental organ-
izations. Fortunately, the repressive 1996 and 2006 CIS model laws, which have gone fur-
ther in their harshness than Russia’s national law, have not been transplanted directly into
national legislation anywhere, including in Russia. The actual Russian legislation, how-
ever, does have an impact on legislation and policies in the CIS countries. For various rea-
sons (lack of national expertise, common history and mentality, or geopolitical influence),
the Russian example is still important for the neighboring countries. The dominance of
law enforcement and drug control policy over public health and medical ethics is especially
evident in Russia and Kazakhstan. Other countries are more careful in their policies and
are more inclined to follow evidence-informed interventions in relation to drug use, which
are tailored to the specific situation in their countries. 
An approach of harsh drug laws and policies, accompanied by an extensive enforce-
ment machinery—both at the national level in countries such as Russia in particular, and
at the regional level through a proliferation of intergovernmental agreements and bod-
ies—has failed to stem the surge in drug use in Russia and the Central Asian countries.234
This approach has also led to various violations of human rights of people who use drugs
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of the CIS countries.
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and exacerbated the HIV epidemic in some of the CIS countries. Given the human, eco-
nomic and social costs at stake, it is time to rethink the basic approach. In reforming their
laws and policies, governments of the region need to take into account the impact of their
policies on public health and human rights. They need to recognize the benefits to be
gained from respecting, protecting, and ful-
filling the human rights of people who use
drugs and from implementing evidence-
based interventions, including diverse meth-
ods of drug dependence treatment such as
OST, and harm reduction programs such as
needle exchange.
The Russian government should enact the
following recommendations:
 Reconsider its narrow interpretation
of the UN drug control conventions and use
the flexibility in the conventions allowing
public health interventions to address drug
dependence instead of solely focusing on
criminal punishment. 
 Introduce reforms to eliminate or mit-
igate the harsh administrative and criminal
penalties imposed for nonviolent drug
offenses and drug use.
    Integrate evidence-based drug treatment policies into the drug treatment system.
    Immediately lift the ban on the medical use of methadone and buprenorphine in
the treatment of drug dependence and introduce maintenance therapy programs.
    Repeal the use of registries of people who use drugs and the associated limitations
of the rights of those who are registered.
Member states gathered in regional intergovernmental organizations such as the
CIS and its Inter-Parliamentary Assembly should focus greater regional cooperation on
the objectives of introducing evidence-based harm reduction interventions and of respect-
ing, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of people who use drugs. It is not clear that
the CIS IPA’s two model laws on drugs have had more than perhaps an indirect influence
on the domestic legislation of member states in Central Asia. However, if the development
and promotion of model laws is to remain a central activity of the IPA, it could take up
the challenge of drafting model legislation on drugs that reflects human rights principles
and supports the effective implementation of harm reduction services.235
An approach of harsh drug 
laws and policies, accompanied
by an extensive enforcement
machinery ... has failed to 
stem the surge in drug use 
in Russia and the Central Asian
countries. This approach has
also led to various violations of
human rights of people who
use drugs and exacerbated the
HIV epidemic in some of the
CIS countries.
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Member states of the CIS should:
    Continue developing national drug policy with recognition of the specific situations
in their countries, and flexibility offered by the UN drug control conventions.
    Take into account lessons learned in human rights protection and effective public
health interventions in relation to people who use drugs when developing regional
policy.
    Scale up opioid substitution treatment where it exists and immediately introduce it
where it does not.
    Evaluate the effectiveness of compulsory drug dependence treatment, with a view
to abolishing it as likely ineffective.
    Repeal the use of registries of people who use drugs and the associated limitations
of the rights of those who are registered.
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The Impacts of the Drug War in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Diana Rossi, Shana Harris, and Marcela Vitarelli-Batista236
Drug policies in several countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been influ-
enced by the regions’ neighbor to the north, the United States. Pressures to eradicate drug
production have resulted in human rights violations of coca farmers and surrounding
communities, and have not stemmed the tide of cultivation. At the same time, punitive
approaches to drug use have failed to reduce demand. Though there is evidence that HIV
is associated with drug use throughout the region, drug policies based heavily on law
enforcement often deter people from seeking and accessing health services. People who
use drugs also face human rights abuses, including police violence and threats to their
health due to lack of disease prevention and treatment measures. Many are imprisoned
on drug-related offenses, and with most prisons in the region filled beyond capacity but
lacking measures to prevent the spread of disease, people are at heightened risk for HIV,
hepatitis, tuberculosis, and other life-threatening conditions. 
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A member of Mexico’s Federal Investigative Agency arrests a woman on suspicion of drug posses-
sion during an antinarcotics operation in Guadalajara. Hector Guerrero/Reuters
The situation is not completely bleak: Some countries have begun to include harm
reduction measures in their public policies. Until drug control and public health measures
are brought into harmony, however, injection-driven HIV epidemics in Latin America and
the Caribbean will continue to grow.
Drug use and HIV in Latin America and the Caribbean
The geographic location of Latin America and the Caribbean makes the region important
in the transshipment of drugs bound for U.S. and European markets,237 especially
cannabis and cocaine. Local markets have developed as a result of these trafficking routes,
with the most commonly consumed drugs being cannabis, cocaine, alcohol, and
tobacco.238 Additionally, poppy fields in Mexico and Colombia provide the raw material for
heroin production.239 Heroin injection is found in Mexico, particularly in the north of the
country along the U.S.-Mexico border,240,241,242,243,244 and to a lesser extent in Colombia.245
Overall though, cocaine, which is cultivated, refined, and shipped throughout Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, is the primary injected drug in the region.246,247,248,249
Injection drug users in the region
The largest populations of injectors in Latin American countries are in Brazil, Mexico,
and Argentina with some 800,000, 96,232, and 40,600 injectors respectively.250 However,
estimates in the region vary widely. Other researchers have put the number of injection
drug users in Brazil at 196,000251 and the number in Argentina at 64,558252. Despite the
discrepancies in estimates, it is known that cocaine use overall has increased in recent
years,253 and cocaine injection is most prevalent in southern Brazil; Buenos Aires and
Rosario, Argentina; and Montevideo, Uruguay.254,255,256,257
Injection drug use is particularly prevalent along the U.S.-Mexico border, where, in
cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, the injection of both stimulants and opiates is
widespread.258,259,260,261 Tijuana alone is home to more than 200 shooting galleries, where
a growing population, currently estimated at 10,000 people, injects drugs.262 In the city
of Juarez, there were approximately 6,000 IDUs in 2001, including 3,000-3,500 “heavy”
heroin injectors.263,264
The extent of injection drug use in the Caribbean is difficult to determine, due to a
lack of available data. Injection drug use is so uncommon in the English-speaking
Caribbean that treatment centers located there rarely if ever report an injector presenting
for treatment. However, in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean islands of Puerto Rico and
the Dominican Republic, injection drug use is much more common. In Puerto Rico, the
island in the region with the highest IDU population, there are an estimated 15,000 people
who inject drugs.265 The San Juan metropolitan area alone is home to some 13,500
IDUs.266 In the Dominican Republic, it has been estimated by treatment providers that
20 percent of those who present for treatment are injection drug users.267
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HIV seroprevalence among drug users 
Injection drug use plays an important role in HIV transmission in several countries
throughout the region, including in Brazil where HIV prevalence among IDUs is between
28-42 percent and Argentina, where HIV prevalence among IDUs is between 18.8-39.2
percent; in Argentina an elevated HIV prevalence of 6.3 percent is also seen among non-
injecting cocaine users.268,269
In Uruguay, where prevalence among IDUs is reportedly 24.4 percent, a recent
study also stated that “unlike in other Latin American countries, the relative number of
female injection drug users is high in Uruguay, with an increasing number of HIV infec-
tions among pregnant women and newborns of drug-injecting mothers.”270 HIV preva-
lence among IDUs in Paraguay’s capital is reportedly 12 percent.271
In Mexico, the HIV prevalence has remained low since 1998; it is estimated at 0-6
percent among IDUs nationwide, and at 2.8 percent among IDUs in Tijuana and Ciudad
Juarez as of 2007.272,273 However, as researchers studying injection drug use in Tijuana
and Ciudad Juarez have warned, the prevalence of hepatitis C among these communities
of IDUs was 95 percent and the use of injection drugs on the border has increased steadily
since 1998, making complacency about HIV infection dangerous.274 Several studies have
documented the rapid spread of HIV among IDUs when prevention methods are unavail-
able.275
While HIV prevalence rates are high in the Caribbean, the virus is spread mainly
through sexual contact.276,277 Puerto Rico is an exception; here the majority of new HIV
cases are associated with injection drug use.278 Various studies show HIV prevalence
among IDUs in the capital of San Juan ranging from 28.8 percent to 55.2 percent.279,280,281
There is also evidence of a connection between non-injecting drug use and HIV in
the Caribbean, where associations have been found between crack use and HIV. Lewis
and Hospedales, reporting on research conducted in 1988 of crack cocaine users and HIV
stated that “despite the absence of IV [intravenous] drug use in Trinidad and Tobago, 
drug users may be significant in the transmission of the HIV virus to and within the 
heterosexual population.”282 So, as early as 1991, research was published revealing a higher
rate of HIV among this sub-group of drug users. 
This is supported by studies in the United States that have shown that crack smokers
have infection rates of HIV similar in magnitude to injection drug users.283,284,285
Researchers have hypothesized that this association occurs through the mechanism of
increased unsafe sexual practices precipitated by the use of crack.286
In Trinidad and Tobago, survey data has shown high HIV prevalence among crack
users,287 and a study in sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics found that the strongest
predictor for HIV infection was crack cocaine use.288
A further association between crack use and HIV has also been established in the
Bahamas, where cocaine use among patients with an STD was significantly associated
with HIV infection.289
In 2007, a behavioral surveillance survey of poor and indigent crack users conducted
in Saint Lucia found a 6.8 percent HIV rate among crack-using men and an 11 percent
HIV rate among crack-using women (with a
small sample of 22 women). Significant was
that a control group of poor and indigent peo-
ple who do not smoke crack were also tested,
and no HIV was found in that population.290
Despite the evidence above and other
research, Caribbean crack cocaine users have
not been included in regional or national HIV
strategic plans. This is primarily attributed to
the fact that Caribbean HIV strategies have
been “donor driven.” Donors have consistently
stated that due to the lack of injecting drug use
in the Caribbean, Caribbean drug users are
not at risk.291 
Governmental responses to drug use
The United States has called combating drug trafficking, particularly from the Andean
region and Mexico, a main foreign policy objective, and has directed as much as 50 percent
of foreign policy assistance in the hemisphere toward this goal.292 The U.S.-led “war on
drugs” remains a driving force in some of the region’s drug control policies, particularly
in Mexico and Colombia.293,294 In Venezuela and Bolivia, changes in government have led
to outright rejection of involvement by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency; in
Brazil, the American approach is also losing ground and current policies are beginning
to incorporate harm reduction principles.295
Where the United States, through military and financial support, has shaped
national governments’ counternarcotics strategies, drug control has focused primarily on
supply reduction through the eradication of coca leaf plantations; the detention and pun-
ishment of drug traffickers; and the interception of drug shipments in campaigns such
as Plan Colombia and the more recent Mérida Initiative. 
Plan Colombia was first conceived by ex-Foreign Minister Augusto Ramirez Ocampo
in 1998 as an aid initiative that would help end armed conflict in Colombia and support
participatory social and economic development in the regions most affected by violence,
illegal crops, or environmental issues.296 The plan was developed under the leadership 
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of Ocampo and then-Colombian President Andres Pastrana Arango, but transformed
under heavy U.S. influence297 before the Clinton administration finally supported it in
2000 with $1.3 billion dollars.298 In its final state, $860 million of the $1.3 billion dollars
went to Colombia and three-quarters of that sum was designated to military and police
forces.299 The 2000 Plan “proposes a principally military strategy (in the U.S. component
of Plan Colombia) to tackle illicit drug cultivation and trafficking through substantial mil-
itary assistance to the Colombian armed forces and police.”300
Such supply reduction initiatives in the Andean region have led to unanticipated
shifts in drug use, including a proliferation of clandestine laboratories, where cocaine base
paste, a cheaper and reportedly more addictive form of cocaine, is produced; this increased
production has been associated with increased physical harms as well as economic
crises.301 
In June 2008, the U.S. Congress approved the Mérida Initiative, a three-year, 1.6
billion dollar assistance package, including $400 million to Mexico and $65 million to
Central America, to fight drug-related violence.302 The initiative has been compared to
Plan Colombia and experts on U.S. policy in the region consider it similarly misguided
and overly reliant on military and police force, with few monitoring mechanisms, despite
the fact that Mexican security units battling drug trafficking have been accused of serious
human rights abuses.303
Bolivia’s counternarcotics strategy is mainly supported by aid from the United States
and has largely been shaped by American interests.304 More recently, however, the Bolivian
government has resisted the United States’ drug war, resulting in swift punishment from
the Bush administration for its “failure to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts.”305 U.S.
President Bush effectively blacklisted the country by cutting its trade benefits under the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act.306 The administration’s suspension
of Bolivia’s trade preferences, an unprecedented action against the country, could result
in the loss of 50,000 jobs and impact the Bolivian economy significantly.307
While U.S.-funded drug war efforts consistently fail to address demand reduction
in the United States, they have also had little impact on achieving their stated supply
reduction goals. For example, Plan Colombia has so far proven ineffective at reducing cul-
tivation, and even the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee com-
mented in 2008 that it is “disappointed to note that since the beginning of Plan Colombia
in 2000 the amount of hectares of coca cultivated in Colombia has gone up, not down
and the area involved in illicit drug production has increased by over 42 percent.”308
While failing to achieve a reduction in supply, such efforts often generate social and
political instability and contribute to human rights abuses of coca leaf cultivators. For
example, there have been many documented cases in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru where fumigation, security forces violence, or imprisonment related to antidrug cam-
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paigns have directly and indirectly contributed to widespread abuses of cultivators and
local communities.309,310,311,312,313
Plan Colombia’s emphasis on crop eradication, which has to a large extent focused
on aerial fumigation, has drawn its own criticism: The UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child expressed concern about the risks posed to children by aerial fumigation in
Colombia. It also noted that aerial spraying had impacts on food security because of the
damage it does to food crops.314
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health noted similar concerns following a visit
to the Colombia/Ecuador border in May 2007,
particularly noting the negative physical and
mental health effects of aerial spraying of
glyphosate along the border. He further com-
mented on the terrifying effect on children of
military helicopters that sometimes accom-
pany the aerial spraying.315
Such policies have resulted in unin-
tended environmental degradation, with coca
crops being displaced rather than eradicated
and virgin land being deforested.316
In Bolivia, U.S. aid has been used to
support programs and policies that are impli-
cated in human rights abuses, including lack
of due process, prolonged detention, alleged
torture, and impunity for both Bolivian and
U.S. law enforcement officials who are
accused of abuses.317 More recent reports document U.S.-backed drug control efforts lead-
ing to reported deaths, mistreatment, and abuse of the local population, and arbitrary
detentions by members of local security forces.318 Reports also tie forced crop eradication
by the government to violent protests, with both farmers and government forces dying in
clashes.319
In addition to influencing responses to supply reduction, the U.S. “war on drugs”
agenda has had an impact on policies aimed at demand reduction in several Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries. In practice, this means promoting a largely punitive 
and abstinence-based approach to drug use, rather than a public health-oriented, harm
reduction approach. There is a small but growing body of research documenting the health
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impact—specifically the risk of blood-borne disease transmission—of harsh drug control
policy in the region. 
Human rights abuse of drug users in the region
Human rights abuses against people who use drugs in Latin America and the Caribbean
have gone largely undocumented and while anecdotal accounts suggest that the abuse of
drug users by police and health care providers is widespread in the region, there is a
scarcity of published data to support these claims.320
There has been recent documentation of human rights abuses against drug users
in Mexico, where, according to Human Rights Watch, police abuse—sometimes amount-
ing to torture—keeps drug users away from HIV prevention services, even where govern-
ment policies support such services. One informant stated that the police “routinely extort
money and confessions from people who use drugs, sometimes using the mere posses-
sion of syringes as an excuse to harass or arrest drug users or outreach workers providing
services to them.”321
A 2004 study of injection drug users in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez documented
police violence toward IDUs specifically along the U.S.-Mexico border.322 Most participants
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An airplane fumigates coca and poppy plantations in Colombia. The pesticides used have been
implicated in health defects and damage to food crops. J.B. Russell/Panos
reported that they or someone they were with had been beaten by police; female IDUs
experienced gender-specific physical and sexual violence at the hands of officers.323 Almost
all respondents reported that police accepted or demanded payoffs, either from shooting
galleries (locations where people go to buy and inject drugs, often after paying a fee for
using the premises) or from individual drug users.324 In the same study, IDUs reported
that it was commonplace to be arbitrarily arrested and detained for up to 36 hours for
being identified as a drug user and/or possessing a used or sterile syringe.325
The researchers identified multiple ways in which policing practices in these two
cities were not only illegal but also may increase the risk of blood-borne infection among
IDUs. These included: fear of police abuse or detention and arrest, leading to hurried and
unsafe injection or use of shooting galleries (where syringes are more likely to be shared);
and 36-hour detention involving painful withdrawal symptoms, which then increased the
chances for high-risk behavior upon release.326
In 2005, a cross-sectional study of IDUs in the same region revealed that almost
half the participants (48 percent) had been arrested for possessing an unused/sterile
syringe and more than half the participants (57 percent) had been arrested for possessing
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Mexican mounted police in Ciudad Juarez check for needle marks on a suspected drug user. Police
patrol the city’s tourist and bar area in search of drug users and others they say give the city a bad
name. Vanderlei Joe Raedle/Getty Images
a used syringe.327 The study found a direct relationship between arrests for syringe pos-
session and use of syringes that had previously been used by someone else.328
The Brazilian government has made efforts to reduce human rights violations
against drug users by supporting new legislation that gives drug users the right to 
seek treatment for drug dependence without harassment. However, the reality on 
the ground is that an indiscriminant drug war policy has a disproportionate impact on
disenfranchised and vulnerable populations. Armed police storm favelas and shoot into
densely populated areas, aiming to kill drug
traffickers and often targeting and killing 
children recruited into trafficking gangs.329 In
the first six months of 2007, police reported
449 such killings and 60 police dead.330 Extra-
judicial killings are common, law enforcement
officials receive complete impunity, and the
body count is primarily young, impoverished,
black men and boys.331 According to research
done between 2004 and 2006 by the Obser-
vatório de Favelas, of 230 youth ages 11 to 24
involved in drug trafficking, 46 had died after
two years.332 As Bastos et al. eloquently point
out, policymakers have often responded to such violence by “simply increas[ing] the dose
of the same medicine, reasoning that current dilemmas are not the consequences of mis-
taken drug policies, but rather the result of an insufficient dose of an already bitter pill.”333
Policies in practice: what services are available to drug users and
what barriers remain?
Harm reduction and HIV prevention 
In contrast to other countries in the region, since the 1990s, the Brazilian government
has gradually adopted harm reduction policies that have led to a significant reduction of
AIDS and HIV cases.334,335,336,337 In 1994, the first publicly tolerated needle and syringe
exchange program began in Brazil with funding from nongovernmental organizations
and the World Bank; by 2006 there were about 150 programs in the country, operating
primarily with funds from Brazil’s Ministry of Health.338
However, harm reduction and drug control policies have often operated in tension
with each other. The first needle exchange programs in Brazil were established during 
a time when the country’s drug policies were becoming increasingly punitive, due to 
the influence of international drug treaties.339 Because there were no specific legislative
THE IMPACTS OF THE DRUG WAR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 1 1 9
Brazilian law does not specifi-
cally address the legality of 
the possession of syringes and
drug paraphernalia. Anecdotal
reports exist regarding police
using such items as evidence 
of illegal drug use in their
antidrug raids.
provisions to uphold the legality of such programs, criminal investigations of public health
officers in several cities took place. Though the cases were closed due to lack of evidence,
the legal proceedings seriously disrupted the continuity of programs at that time.340,341
Police abuse continues to be an obstacle to harm reduction programs today.342 Brazil-
ian law, for instance, does not specifically address the legality of the possession of syringes
and drug paraphernalia. Anecdotal reports exist regarding police using such items as 
evidence of illegal drug use in their antidrug raids.343 Global experience shows that police
raids often force drug users from one neighborhood to another, or may push needle
exchange programs to new locations.344 This can result in drug users not knowing where
to find needle exchange sites. Furthermore, widespread police presence in Brazilian fave-
las, including raids with small tanks, has resulted in mistrust, with any outsiders seen as
potential informants, making the work of public health workers more difficult.345
Though harm reduction is still a new and not entirely well-understood concept in
the region, where it may be associated primarily with injectable drugs, which are only
common in particular areas,346,347 the concept has gained some momentum outside of
Brazil, particularly in Argentina and Uruguay, where HIV/AIDS prevention programs are
being instituted by national AIDS agencies and NGOs. Much of the success in implement-
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A woman abandons her Rio de Janeiro neighborhood as a tank patrols the streets. Such incursions
breed distrust of outsiders, including health workers. Caio Leal/AFP/Getty Images
ing needle and syringe exchange has been due to the work of civil society; this work has
been implemented in Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and Puerto Rico without large-scale
government assistance. 
In one of those areas, specifically the border city of Tijuana, Mexico, stakeholders
interviewed about the feasibility of three harm reduction interventions reported that struc-
tural and sociocultural challenges, such as the influence of the Catholic Church and lack
of political will among government officials may hinder the implementation of harm
reduction interventions.348 In a recent study, only 38 percent and 30 percent of respondents
in the respective cities of Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez had ever had an HIV test. The major
barriers to HIV testing were social instability; mistrust; insufficient opportunities for test-
ing in public and private settings; and a potential lack of awareness of HIV testing avail-
ability.349 
In Ciudad Juarez there is one needle exchange program, the first in the country,
which has operated there since the late 1980s and was opened by an NGO; the second
program opened in 2004 in Tijuana.350 For Juarez, with approximately 6,000 IDUs351 and
Tijuana, with a growing population of approximately 10,000 IDUs,352 existing services are
insufficient. Despite Mexico’s Ministry of Health publishing a statement in support of
syringe exchange, in 2006 there were reported to be only six small, largely NGO-run pro-
grams in the country.353
Negative attitudes on the part of health workers also deter drug users from seeking
health care.354 In Mexico, it is possible to purchase sterile syringes at pharmacies, but in
areas of high drug activity, pharmacists sometimes refuse sale to those who appear to be
drug users, claiming to have run out of syringes or by artificially raising prices.355
Though heroin injection is seen in Colombia, and cocaine injection is seen in other
countries throughout Latin America, free, sterile syringes are unavailable.
In the English-speaking Caribbean, the Caribbean Harm Reduction Coalition has
helped define what harm reduction looks like in a non-injecting environment, taking it
beyond just needle and syringe exchanges and helping communities and individuals in
the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad to initiate and
promote harm reduction education, interventions, and community organizations.356
Puerto Rico is home to the Caribbean’s only needle and syringe exchange programs;
the first program there opened in July 1995, sites have since opened in 13 communities
around San Juan. However, syringe exchange has been as controversial in Puerto Rico as
in the United States itself.357
Drug treatment programs
In 2007, 1,078,821 people accessed drug treatment across the region.358 Drug users seek-
ing rehabilitation treatment usually find this service offered by psychiatric clinics and/or
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therapeutic communities. However, experts studying the status of epidemiology, service
use and HIV research in Latin America, determined that data on treatment utilization or
efficacy, was “virtually non-existent.”359
Therapeutic communities use the idea of “community” as an essential component
of treatment.360 This modality creates a dynamic where the resident helps him or herself
and others to achieve defined goals. Unfortunately, governments in the region have rarely
developed good systems to evaluate the results of treatment or to address the protection
of drug users’ human rights while they receive treatment at these centers. 
Abuses committed against drug users in treatment have been reported in the region.
For example, two treatment facilities in Brazil were cited for the maltreatment of their 
residents between June 2007 and May 2008.361 The use of chains and other forms 
of imprisonment to restrain persons dependent on alcohol and other drugs have 
been reported.362
In Brazil, most treatment centers employ an abstinence-based, 12-step approach that
is often religious in nature.363 In Argentina, the law states that drug users may be court
ordered to complete compulsory treatment.364 Most services are based on the model of
abstinence and expect residents to discontinue all drug use.365 However, there are some
treatment centers in Argentina—as well as in Brazil and Uruguay—based on harm reduc-
tion principles.366,367
Throughout the Caribbean and due to the strong influence of the United States,
drug treatment facilities generally use an abstinence-based model or a 12-step
approach.368,369 With the support of the European Union and the UK government, the
Caribbean Harm Reduction Coalition has been successful in promoting easy-to-access,
street-based harm reduction centers in the Dominican Republic, Trinidad, Jamaica, and
Saint Lucia. 
Medication-assisted treatment
While drug treatment in Latin America and the Caribbean is primarily focused on reha-
bilitation through abstinence, medication-assisted treatment for opiate dependence (with
methadone or buprenorphine) is available in Mexico and Puerto Rico. 
Though the availability of medication-assisted treatment has increased in recent
years in Mexico, it still falls short of good coverage, with 3,644 people receiving treatment
at 21 sites.370 Methadone treatment is only available in select cities, including Tijuana and
Ciudad Juarez,371 though in Tijuana methadone is offered only in two privately owned cen-
ters;372 buprenorphine is not available.373
In other countries in the region, medications to curb opiate cravings are largely
unavailable because opiate consumption is relatively low, resulting in a low demand for
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these medicines.374 Nevertheless, pilot projects and services are available to drug users in
some Argentinean cities.375,376
In contrast to the rest of the Caribbean where methadone is available only for pain
relief, methadone treatment for drug dependence is available in Puerto Rico.377 In addition
to five methadone programs in the community,378 the “Las Malvinas” men’s prison
expanded a pilot methadone program to include more than 300 inmates.379 Buprenor-
phine is also available in Puerto Rico, by prescription.380
HIV treatment for people who use drugs
The lack of HIV/AIDS prevalence estimates among drug users in the region continues to
be a barrier in assessing the needs for drug-related treatment. It is clear, however, that
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, antiretroviral treatment (ART) is still rela-
tively difficult to access for HIV-positive drug users. 
In several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay,
ART is available through the public sector.
Treatment, however, is not always free of
charge, and collateral fees represent a particu-
lar barrier for IDUs. While there are no official
policies preventing drug users from receiving
ART, there continue to be informal difficulties
for drug users seeking treatment in the region. 
A 2002 study done in Colombia found
that lack of health insurance limited drug
users’ access to health care, including ART; additionally, study participants perceived vio-
lence related to police harassment as being more dangerous than the sexual and health
risks of taking drugs.381 This fear of harassment or arrest may prevent drug users from
going to HIV clinics to receive medications, even if they have health insurance to pay for
treatment. 
In Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay, a main barrier to scaling up access to
ART for people who use drugs is health care workers’ attitudes and misconceptions.382 For
example, many health care providers fail to distinguish between different modes of use
(dosage, frequency, and circumstances of drug use), judging all drug users by a single
standard and often requiring that they seek abstinence-based drug treatment before begin-
ning ART. Additionally, they may consider drug users to be self-destructive and uncon-
cerned about their health.383,384 In Argentina for example, the late AIDS diagnosis of most
IDUs385 is thought to be a result of the social distance between IDUs and the health care
Study participants perceived
violence related to police
harassment as being more 
dangerous than the sexual and
health risks of taking drugs.
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system, often aggravated by the refusal of many Departments of Infectious Diseases to
provide antiretroviral treatment to individuals who continue to use drugs.386
Studies have shown that, given the proper supports, drug users can be just as adher-
ent to ART regimens as others and can achieve comparable treatment outcomes.387 Latin
America is no exception: in Brazil, for example, a study of active drug users in Sao Paulo
found that 69 percent of patients had adherence levels of over 80 percent, though most
were poor, had limited educations, and were unemployed.388 
Brazil introduced universal access to ART in 1996, and has documented sustained
reductions in HIV infections and AIDS cases among IDUs. Despite the success of this
policy, issues of supply interruption and drug resistance have led to some concern regard-
ing sustainability.389 In 2005, Brazil’s expenditure on ART increased by 66 percent due
to the large number of persons receiving expensive second-line treatment given to those
already resistant to some first-line HIV medications.390
In the English-speaking Caribbean, ART is free to all people living with HIV/AIDS
who require it. The challenge in getting HIV positive drug users on medication lies more
in resolving questions of access than in ensuring availability on paper.391 Outside of a pilot
project operated in Saint Lucia there are no outreach programs to test and treat crack
users. In most territories the profile of a person diagnosed with advanced HIV disease is
male, homeless and a drug user. This population makes up the majority of persons dying
from AIDS-related illnesses in Saint Lucia.392
Incarceration of Drug Users
Prisons, which aggregate people at risk for HIV infection in contexts where high-risk behav-
iors continue but where means of protection such as clean needles are unavailable, function
as HIV acceleration machines. While data is scant in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
regions are likely no exception. The “war on drugs” there has led to an increase in the num-
ber of persons imprisoned on drug-related charges. Drug war policies adopted in the
Caribbean with U.S. financial support, for example, led to the imprisonment of a large
number of people who use drugs or associated with the drug trade, resulting in prisons
filled beyond capacity.393 Although it is difficult to prove conclusively the numbers of people
who acquire HIV or other infections while in prison (due to ethical challenges and testing
difficulties, many studies rely on mathematical models or statistical associations), it is
known that the proportion of incarcerated individuals who are HIV positive or who have
other infectious diseases is much higher than in the general community.394 
While data on rates of those imprisoned for drug-related offenses is limited, the
available evidence does suggest that drug war policies have had an impact on increased
incarceration rates. Brazil is currently fourth in the world for total prison population,
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behind only the United States, Russia, and China (all countries with punitive drug poli-
cies). Mexico ranks sixth in the world for total incarcerated population.395 It remains to be
seen if Mexico’s incarceration rates will increase at a faster pace following the implemen-
tation of the Mérida Initiative.
Based on data from the International Centre for Prison Studies, the prison systems
of all countries discussed in this chapter, except Puerto Rico, are overcrowded, with most
filled far beyond their official capacity. During the last decade, the prison population in
each of these countries, except Puerto Rico (which was already high, due to the U.S.-pro-
moted war on drugs),396 has dramatically increased.397
Prison overcrowding in select Latin American countries398
The graphs on the following page show the increase in prison population in select Latin
American countries between roughly 1998 and 2008 (the years vary slightly, as indicated,
given the available data). The red sections of the graphs show the proportion of the prison
population in each country that is above the official capacity.
According to the World Prison Brief, in the period from 1998 to 2001, Colombia’s
prison population increased by 5 percent, while in the period from 2001 to 2004, it
A woman and her baby stand in their cell in a prison in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 2008, 96 percent
of the inmates in the prison had not received final sentencing; most were arrested for crimes against
property or possession or sale of drugs. Carolina Camps/Reuters
increased by 27 percent.399 A significant portion of this increase may be a direct result of
Plan Colombia, which was instituted in 2000: In the beginning of the decade, with the
support of the United States under Plan Colombia, Colombia took an increasingly tough
stance on drug offenses, and the incarceration rate for drug trafficking-related offenses
skyrocketed by 322 percent in the two-year period between 2002 and 2004.400 In the first
six years of President Uribe’s tenure (2002-2008), approximately 400,000 citizens have
been detained for drug trafficking offenses and another 626 have been extradited.401
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The red sections of the graph show the proportion of the prison population in each country that is
above the official capacity.
Very recently, countries such as Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay have
exhibited important changes in their
national and international debates about
drug policies. 
Interestingly, in Argentina, the
national government recently declared its
willingness to change the laws supporting
the decriminalization of drug possession
for personal use. The current president,
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, said that
those who have an addiction cannot be
“condemned as if they were criminals.”402
This change began with the anti-prohibi-
tionist declaration of Justice Minister
Aníbal Fernández at the 51st session of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, held in
Vienna in March 2008. The declaration rec-
ommended “the proper integration of the
United Nations human rights system with
international drug control policy.” This text
was an initiative of the Uruguayan govern-
ment and was co-sponsored by Bolivia,
Argentina, Switzerland, and eventually by
all of the European Union.403
In 2006, Brazilian law 11,343 stated
that drug users and drug dependents
should receive assistance oriented to social
inclusion. Meanwhile, the Uruguayan gov-
ernment has been “installing a national
debate on drugs regarding social and legal
issues, which has provided the opportunity
to implement social tolerance and a 
consensual deregulation. Humane and 
progressive treatment are the objectives in
our policy, because a prohibitive phenome-
non and the ‘zero tolerance’ drug policy
have shown their failure.”404
Ecuador’s new constitution,
approved in September 2008, states in arti-
cle 364 that the addiction problem is a
health system issue; it prohibits criminal-
ization or violations of drug users’ consti-
tutional rights. Ecuador has designed an
amnesty policy for dealers—called “mules”
in the region—currently under debate.
Those dealers are people who try to leave
the country with a small quantity of illegal
drugs to achieve economic benefits. The
current president Rafael Correa pointed to
the proportionality of punishment with the
possibility of pardon, by reducing the num-
ber of years in prison if the crime is a first-
time offense.405
In Bolivia, the current president Evo
Morales’ governmental policy is based on
the integration of alternative development
and against harsh antidrug laws that have
harmed coca leaf producers’ livelihoods
and resulted in displacement and
poverty.406
Healing the Split: Aligning Drug Control 
with Health and Human Rights
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In the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires in Argentina, most of the imprisoned
women are in jail for trafficking small quantities of illegal drugs. Their mean age is 30
years old and 90 percent of them have children.407
In 2006 the Brazilian government passed a new drug law that began to address 
proportionality in sentencing, differentiating possession charges and trafficking charges
by offering alternatives to incarceration for possession, while continuing to send traffick-
ers to prison with increased terms.408 However, experts question how much control the
state can exert over police interventions on the street, which are often illegal to begin
with,409 or how much impact the new law will have without reform of the judicial sys-
tem.410 When the law was still under discussion in the Senate, critics argued that it actually
did little to distinguish between user and trafficker, giving no specific guidance about
quantities that differentiate possession from trafficking and instead relying on subjective
contextual evidence such as time or place of incident or conduct of the individual.411
Furthermore, the law, lauded in the media for eliminating prison sentences for 
users, still allows judges to hand out prison time if individuals elect not to go to 
mandated treatment.412
Puerto Rico was one of only a few countries in the Caribbean/Latin American region
where the total prison population decreased, by 11 percent between 1998 and 2007. The
total prisoner count of 13,215 in December 2007 was 12 percent below official capacity.413
As with the general population, HIV infection is a serious public health problem for
inmates in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in the Southern Cone and Puerto
Rico.414,415 High HIV prevalence in prisons—combined with HIV risk behavior—creates
a critical public health issue for correctional institutions,416 as well as for society at large.
The inhumane conditions and inmate overcrowding observed in some prison systems 
perpetuate these health problems, and inmates are at constant risk of human rights 
violations.417 In both Latin America and the Caribbean, data related to this problem are
limited and difficult to access, though the figures available suggest the urgency of the need
for HIV prevention and treatment.418 In Argentina, for example, AIDS was the primary
cause of death in prisons between June 2003 and June 2006.419
In Brazil, HIV prevalence in the country’s prison system has been documented at
between 12.5 percent and 17.4 percent.420 One study in Brazil found that HIV transmission
inside prisons is primarily due to injection drug use, and that risk of transmission
increases with the length of time of imprisonment.421 A series of studies have linked HIV,
HCV and HBV infection in Brazil to individuals’ history of incarceration.422 Programs to
prevent disease transmission are fragmentary or, in many key areas, absent altogether.423
In 2000, a study among male prisoners in two prisons in northern Mexico found
a 2.53 percent HIV prevalence in one prison and a 1.8 percent HIV prevalence in
another.424 The same study showed a 37 percent prevalence among IDUs in one prison
and a 24 percent prevalence in the other.425
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As a result of the “war on drugs” policies of the 1990s, Caribbean prisons were filled
beyond capacity and the region had one of the highest rates of imprisonment in the
world.426 The incarceration history of a cohort of recently released ex-inmates in Puerto
Rico was significantly correlated with chronic drug use and seropositive HIV status. There-
fore, correctional facilities must be equipped with HIV testing, treatment, and prevention
services in order to decrease the rate of transmission within prisons.427
HIV care and treatment in the prisons of the English-speaking Caribbean is remark-
ably good compared to other countries of the hemisphere.428 As mentioned, HIV treat-
ment is free and this extends to the prison system. Two major challenges have been
observed in providing care and treatment to incarcerated populations. First, given that the
majority of prison populations in all the countries included are made up of crack users,
and given the late identification of the virus among this population, many crack-using per-
sons are only diagnosed with HIV when they are incarcerated and present at the prison
infirmary with an opportunistic infection. At that point many inmates will be given ART
(usually directly administered on a daily basis to ensure high levels of treatment compli-
ance).429 The second major challenge is that there is no active mechanism to follow up
with HIV-positive inmates upon release, the expectation being they will go to the HIV
clinic voluntarily for treatment. This has proven to be a false assumption and throughout
the Caribbean the vast majority of formerly incarcerated HIV positive drug users are lost
to treatment upon release.430
Conclusion
To date, the majority of the drug laws in Latin America and the Caribbean have centered
on punishing drug users, and harm reduction laws still remain in the initial stages of
development in many countries. Nevertheless, Brazil reaffirmed its position regarding
harm reduction policies by supporting the need for different approaches in addressing
the drug user, not only abstinence-based models.431 Today, a challenge to Brazilian harm
reduction includes changes in health financing: though Brazil has the highest number of
syringe exchange programs in the region (at 93), the number of needles handed out is
low, and these programs are generally concentrated in major urban areas.432 Decentraliza-
tion of health services means that local governments can choose whether or not to imple-
ment harm reduction policies, and many have yet to prioritize the approach.433
Elsewhere in Latin America, governments are discussing important changes to drug
policies, including harm reduction principles (see box). Overall, there is much to do:
unless governments in Latin American and the Caribbean change their policies to empha-
size harm reduction and confront the social exclusion of drug users, the transmission of
HIV and other infections among people who use drugs will continue to grow. 
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Background
This chapter examines the effect of drug policies on injection drug users, particularly HIV
prevention and care among users, and the availability and effectiveness of drug treatment
services from 1998 to 2008 in Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. While the chapter
focuses mainly on civil society perspectives, the authors also contacted other key stake-
holders to corroborate and contrast those views. The review incorporates the perspectives
Young soldiers stand guard at a drug rehabilitation center in a former hospital in Mong Thien,
Myanmar. John Vink/Magnum Photos
of key civil society representatives including people who use drugs, as well as service
providers, nongovernmental organizations, government officials working on HIV or drug
control, and UN representatives, all of whom contribute to shaping national drug policies.
In particular, the review concentrates on the results and impacts of the national drug poli-
cies in the three countries, especially in regard to HIV prevention; treatment and care
amongst IDUs; and engagement of civil society. The report highlights with specific exam-
ples where civil society, governments, and the international community have supported
public health and harm reduction initiatives, and areas where these efforts need more
urgent attention. 
This chapter also details various stakeholders’ reflections on the challenges to imple-
mentation of a comprehensive national drugs strategy in each of the countries examined.
Such an evidence-based strategy would be designed with significant civil society input;
reflect a pragmatic approach to drugs that prevents the transmission of HIV and other
blood-borne viruses; and promote equality across the health sector toward HIV treatment
and care for drug users living with HIV/AIDS. In addition, given the key role of penal
institutions in accelerating HIV transmission and the ineffectiveness of incarceration to
address issues of drug use, such a strategy should lead to a reduction in the number of
drug users in the criminal justice system and in custodial settings, while promoting and
strengthening access to a wide range of effective, evidenced-based primary health care
services, including drug treatment and HIV prevention options, all on a voluntary basis.
No such system is currently found in the countries surveyed.
Methodology
Data was collected through a combination of focus group discussions, in-depth interviews,
and through e-mail and online surveys. Respondents were selected in discussions with
key stakeholders, local consultants, and AHRN staff. There were several challenges in the
implementation of this project:
    In some cases, respondents were unaware or insufficiently informed about the
national drug control policy to provide meaningful answers. Much time was spent
explaining the national policy environment and mechanisms, rather than eliciting
data for this report.
    Service providers/NGOs, government officers, and people who use drugs have dif-
ferent perspectives and opinions. The authors made a concerted effort to synthesize
these into an overview that does justice to these differences. 
    Particularly in Myanmar, obtaining permissions for interviews hampered data col-
lection.
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Unless otherwise specified, all statements, observations and perceptions outlined
in this report have been collected from in-country focus group discussions, key informant
interviews, and a survey questionnaire.
Myanmar
The unofficial sources recruited for this study reported that over the past 10 years, local
supply and production of drugs has increased, particularly the production of ampheta-
mine-type stimulants, though opium production has increased as well, despite attempts
to eradicate poppy cultivation and local drug production. In Myanmar, the most commonly
used drugs are heroin #4, a white powder that is arguably the purest and strongest heroin
available, and stimulants, which are rapidly becoming popular among young people. 
A 2007 population size estimate conducted by UNAIDS, WHO, the National AIDS
Program and others put the number of IDUs between 60,000 and 90,000, with six non-
injection drug users for every injector; the median HIV prevalence was estimated at 43
percent, with acknowledgment of percentages up to 70 percent in so-called “hot-spots”
(places known for widespread drug use). HIV rates among IDUs have been consistently
high in the past decade.435
Some insurgent groups who have signed ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar
government are reportedly involved in drug production. Rumors indicate that some civil
society groups might be exploring the possibility of supporting HIV prevention programs
such as needle exchange for drug users, yet this is very hard to substantiate given the lim-
ited communications infrastructure and government censorship. 
Key findings
The Myanmar drug policy is enshrined in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Law of 1993 (Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. 1/1995, Yangon). The law pro-
vides a broad legal framework for the formulation and deployment of policies on drug
control and HIV. Three layers of administration oversee the legal implementation through
a national strategic plan: rehabilitation centers, run under the Ministry of Social Welfare,
offer long-term residential behavioral correctional programs for six months to one year;
drug treatment centers are entrusted with the operations of the nationwide 45-day detox-
ification process, conducted in closed, residential settings either on voluntary basis or
imposed by law as an alternative to incarceration; and recently, rapid detoxification has
been made available on a limited basis to people who qualify for methadone treatment,
where qualification is based on protocols developed by the Ministry of Health, with 
support from WHO and other agencies.
The law distinguishes between, but criminalizes drug possession, drug dealing,
drug trafficking, and possession of paraphernalia (limited to needle and syringes). 
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There are currently no specific legal provisions for human rights or for harm reduction.
Needle and syringe exchange programs and outreach services, which have been demon-
strated to be effective in reducing transmission of HIV and other blood-borne viruses, are
operating in a limited number of locations. Indeed, the tolerance of syringe exchange pro-
grams in some areas appears to have created confusion among law enforcement officials
in regard to possession of paraphernalia. In those townships where community-based
harm reduction services are operational, there are generally no arrests for possession of
paraphernalia, yet there are reports that such arrests take place in other townships. Drug
users and people living with HIV can legally form and register organizations and in the
past two years, some self-support groups have started to form. However, there are cur-
rently no procedures or mechanisms to monitor and control law enforcement abuse,
harassment, and beating either inside or outside of prisons. 
The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), operating under the
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Health, leads the implementation of the drug control policy through law
enforcement measures. CCDAC’s efforts toward supply reduction over the past ten years
include increased arrests of producers, dealers and users, as well as poppy eradication,
according to respondents. These efforts coincide with the objective of eliminating drugs
in Myanmar by 2015, in line with one of the goals of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
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.
According to drug user focus groups, up 
to 30 percent of drug users in Myanmar 
are female, with a significant proportion
involved in sex work. This exacerbates
women and girls’ vulnerability to HIV and
leads to higher levels of discrimination,
stigmatization, and alienation by family
members, their children, and the commu-
nity because of the expectations for women
to fulfill traditional gender roles. Neverthe-
less, currently less than 10 percent of those
reached by community-based harm reduc-
tion services are female.
Incarcerated women have no access
to childcare services and babies are often
born without medical support; in addition,
prevention of mother-to-child transmission
(PMTCT) services are limited. 
In the last 10 years, there have been
no efforts to address issues and concerns
related to female drug users. There are no
women-specific drug treatment or rehabili-
tation centers catering to the specific needs
of women and girls. Instead, the existing
Drug Treatment Centers accept female drug
users along with men. Punishment and
imprisonment for drug-related offenses are
not mitigated by gender. In prison there are
limited health services, let alone ART.
Women and drug use
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CCDAC has also been instrumental in supporting harm reduction activities at pilot
intervention sites. The CCDAC is guided by the 15 Year Drug Elimination Plan,436 which
outlines four priority activities: elimination of drug use through treatment, prevention of
drug use, advocacy for community participation, and international cooperation. 
Respondents report that arrests and police crackdowns have led to drug users
switching from inhaling to injecting, increasing their risk of HIV transmission and other
negative health consequences related to injection such as thrombosis and abscesses.
Indeed, crackdowns and eradication of poppy fields have led to decreased availability of
opium and heroin and, as such, injecting becomes cheaper for simple economic reasons.
Law enforcement officials are expanding their
efforts; this has also affected drug users’ part-
ners and families, and many respondents
spoke of harassment and discrimination they
suffered at the hands of law enforcement offi-
cials. 
In many villages, reports abound of pre-
mature deaths among young incarcerated
drug users, disappearances, and growing pub-
lic health hazards due to the high HIV vulner-
ability and prevalence among injectors,
although these reports are hard to substantiate
through official sources. Local drug treatment
services are extremely limited, and where
available, generally consist of forced drug detoxification centers operated by village coun-
cils. These centers are often managed as boot camps, employing measures such as forced
farm labor. 
Many drug users end up incarcerated in dire conditions. Only the most basic health
services are available in the country’s 94 prisons.437 Drug users in prison are often used
as field laborers and assigned to agricultural duties and “labor camp therapy;” many drug
users have lost their lives in these prisons. Inadequate infrastructure and deprivation are
common in prison settings where they lead to increased health and social risks. Given
those risks, HIV transmission is perceived to be rapidly increasing and authorities are
imposing mandatory testing, without counseling, of all prisoners, while antiretroviral
treatment (ART) and treatment for opportunistic infections remain underdeveloped. 
When drug users are identified as living with HIV/AIDS, they face a limited range
of options. Provision of ART in Myanmar is largely restricted to three leading international
NGOs – Médecins Sans Frontières, Aide Médicale Internationale, and Médecins du
Monde. At present, approximately 6,000 of the estimated 160,000 who need it have
Arrests and police crackdowns
have led to drug users 
switching from inhaling to
injecting, increasing their risk 
of HIV transmission and other
negative health consequences
related to injection such as
thrombosis and abscesses.
access to ART. However, in addition to those already enrolled in ART programs, a recent
pilot project operated through the national AIDS program of the Ministry of Health has
started a pilot ART project. Ultimately coverage is still very limited due to the small num-
ber of distribution sites. Although not officially excluded from ART programs, the number
of IDUs receiving ART is very low and requires urgent scale-up. Community-based harm
reduction service providers have managed to enroll IDUs in ART through collaboration
with the NGOs providing the treatment.
In recognition of the spread of HIV among drug users, methadone was introduced
in Myanmar in 2006 under the technical guidance of the World Health Organization.
Methadone is currently offered at six of the 26 major and 40 minor government-run drug
treatment centers.438 Following in-patient treatment for approximately three weeks,
methadone is provided to individuals on an outpatient basis in collaboration with com-
munity-based drug treatment services. In general, provisions for ART and methadone are
extremely limited, if available at all. Unfortunately, stigma and discrimination toward drug
users and people living with HIV is reportedly linked to low levels of HIV awareness and
is fuelled by compulsory registration of drug users at drug treatment centers, thus limiting
access to essential health services. The registration clause is relaxed in a few sites where
harm reduction services are being delivered.
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Drug users detox at a treatment center in Mong Pawk, Myanmar. Though some 30 percent of drug
users in Myanmar are women, few services are targeted to them. John Vink/Magnum Photos
Drug prevention is a component of the drug control strategy. High school students,
both inside and outside school, receive drug prevention education. However, this service
has largely been confined to big cities, as mentioned in focus groups with drug users from
smaller communities and rural areas. Another limitation of education messages rests in
the country’s limited literacy rate as well as the multiple languages in use in Myanmar.
International NGOs have had and continue to have a limited role in influencing
drug policies in Myanmar and a limited scope of operation, imposed by the government.
This is clear from the many reports that confirm that consultation of clients and NGOs
has been and continues to be very limited. Even within their limited role, NGOs are gen-
erally considered more effective through their grassroots approach, programs and acces-
sibility, in comparison to UN and government-operated activities. In effect, civil society
in Myanmar is only marginally involved in drug policy, despite their role as the only agen-
cies involved in providing care and support for drug users and people living with HIV. 
Recommendations
The following are recommendations for the government of Myanmar based on focus
groups of drug users and key informants: 
1     Review the collaboration between drug demand, supply reduction, and harm reduc-
tion policies and activities across law enforcement and health sectors in Myanmar
while incorporating and integrating expansion of free community-based drug treat-
ment services based on international standards.
2    Urgently review, expand, and implement drug treatment policy and guidelines in
line with human rights and evidence of effectiveness, especially in townships and
villages where there is limited availability of such services.
3    Establish linkages between drug control policy and HIV policy toward a more
humane approach to dealing with drug use and HIV. 
4    Incorporate harm reduction interventions at all policy levels.
5     Expand prevention education and information on HIV and drug use to cover
schools, in various local languages.
6    Establish services that meet the specific needs of female drug users.
7    Expand UN agencies’ role in promoting a comprehensive range of services for drug
users and their partners/families.
8    Urgently tackle the ongoing stigmatization and discrimination of people living with
HIV and drug users, with a particular focus on female drug users.
9    Set up mechanisms to facilitate drug-user participation and engagement in order to
contribute to the ongoing national responses to drug use and HIV.
10  Improve collaboration between law enforcement agencies and drug treatment 
services.
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11   Urgently expand treatment to all regions.
12   Initiate comprehensive harm reduction services, including vocational training and
health education in prison settings.
13   In light of the growing HIV epidemic, review and complement the legal provisions
relating to drugs with HIV guidelines.
Thailand
In Thailand there has been no meaningful engagement of civil society in policy formula-
tion or service provision for IDUs since 1998, the first point of reference for this report.
Only when the human rights violations that
accompanied the Thai government’s “war on
drugs” policy initiated in 2003—which
included more than 2,000 arbitrary extrajudi-
cial killings and the forced detention of thou-
sands of suspected drug users in military boot
camps—was civil society actively engaged with
the authorities on issues of harm reduction
and injection drug use. These early engage-
ments, including formation of a National
Working Group on Drug Use and HIV, and
resulting in international support, allowed civil society groups to undertake small-scale
service provision efforts. This included a grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria for harm reduction drop-in centers operated by the Thai Drug Users’
Network (TDN). The Global Fund grant did not go through the traditional country coor-
dinating mechanism, only further highlighting that the Thai government itself did not
actively embrace a comprehensive strategy for preventing HIV among people who use
drugs. Indeed, still today, outreach workers engaging with IDUs have no legal protection
from government authorities to conduct their work. 
The provision of needles and syringes to active injection drug users remains illegal
and therefore conducting this work can bring unwanted interactions with police. There is
anecdotal evidence to show that without legal protection to assure that outreach workers
and peer educators can deliver services to drug users, harassment and arrests of health
workers can indeed occur.439 Given the current policy environment that does not extend
legal protection to health workers, it is difficult to foresee how services can be scaled up
to reach optimal coverage levels or universal access targets among people who inject drugs
in Thailand. 
Rates of HIV prevalence among IDUs remain the highest among any community
in the country, varying between 30 percent and 50 percent in the best available esti-
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The provision of needles and
syringes to active injection 
drug users remains illegal 
and therefore conducting 
this work can bring unwanted
interactions with police.
Chained drug users have a meal break at a Buddhist temple in Ayutthaya province, Thailand.
Reuters/Stringer Thailand
mates.440 The Thai government continues to be lauded for its impressive achievement
with its 100 Percent Condom Campaign launched in the early 1990s, which led to signif-
icant reductions in HIV transmission among sex workers and their clients even though
sex work was criminalized and sex was a cultural taboo. Similar commitment and inno-
vation is needed to address injection-related HIV transmission. 
There have not been any concrete government commitments to reduce HIV trans-
mission through injection drug use. In fact, drug users (both injectors and non injectors)
continue to be overrepresented in the prison
system,441 which in Thailand (as elsewhere in
the world) has been shown to significantly
increase HIV transmission risk due to expo-
sure to high-risk behaviors that include use of
contaminated injection equipment, consen-
sual and non-consensual sex, and tattooing.442
However, in February 2008, figures from the
International Centre for Prison Studies
counted approximately 166,000 incarcerated
individuals compared to a high of more than
250,000 in 2001.443 But while the prison pop-
ulation has decreased, the proportion of peo-
ple incarcerated for drug charges has
remained consistently high.444 In addition,
there is no provision of needles or condoms in the penal system, but a few NGOs are doing
advocacy and outreach work in prisons in Bangkok and Chiang Mai. A pilot condom proj-
ect was operated in Bang Kwang prison in Bangkok in 2005 but distribution mechanisms
were unclear. Sex remains illegal in prisons therefore limiting condom distribution. In
most prisons, ART is provided. Only primary health care services are provided in all pris-
ons. 
Furthermore, the National Rehabilitation Act of 2002 was designed to divert drug
users from prison and into the treatment system. The Act noted that all people who use
drugs were to be considered patients not criminals, but since the Act was passed, the “war
on drugs” occurred and participants in focus group discussions mentioned that the “treat-
ment” approach was used as a ruse to round-up drug users more readily and confine them
to custodial settings.
During the war on drugs, blacklists were drawn up by law enforcement through
coercion and blackmail of drug suspects and communities.445 Today, when police arrest
drug users, law enforcement agents have 45 days (pretrial detention) to present a case 
to the national rehabilitation committee, under the management of the probation 
department. At a case hearing, chaired by the hospital psychiatrist with support from the
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probation department, the committee considers the case and delivers a verdict as to
whether the accused should be incarcerated or sent to a treatment center.
There are currently 50 compulsory military boot camp-style drug treatment centers
to which young methamphetamine users are sent if it is deemed they should not go to
prison. Investigations into this system, however, reveal that it is deeply flawed, under-
funded and is neither providing evidence-based drug treatment nor, in many cases, a diver-
sion from prison since users awaiting trial or treatment are usually incarcerated in a
prison setting, thereby negating the benefits of
diversion. In addition, many users still end up
in actual prisons.
Today, estimates of the numbers of
IDUs continue to indicate that there are fewer
people injecting than 10 years ago, which
should make it even easier to provide compre-
hensive services to people who inject drugs.
While it is difficult to obtain accurate data on
the number of injection drug users, a combi-
nation of older injectors dying from AIDS and
the drug war has led to a significant drop in
numbers, mostly because of shifts in use to
other drugs such as alcohol and ampheta-
mine-type stimulants.446 It should not be for-
gotten though that HIV prevalence among
injectors has remained high, at between 30
and 50 percent between 1989 and 2006447 and
there are now indications that a new wave of
injection drug use is beginning to emerge,
especially in areas close to heroin supply routes. To achieve a reduction in HIV prevalence
among IDUs and to prevent a new epidemic among new injectors, the Thai government
must significantly increase its engagement with civil society groups working on the issue,
commit to a comprehensive national harm reduction implementation plan, and invest in
evidence-based programs in order to provide the necessary supporting environment that
people who use drugs require to access comprehensive services.
It would be remiss not to acknowledge some advances in the dialogue between gov-
ernment and civil society over the past ten years. Commitments and promises have been
made in the last decade, including comments at the International AIDS Conference in
Bangkok in 2004. Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took the stage and
announced that the Thai government would embrace harm reduction strategies, and
would welcome international technical assistance to implement such strategies. Action
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To achieve a reduction in 
HIV prevalence among IDUs
and to prevent a new epidemic
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increase its engagement with
civil society groups working 
on the issue, commit to a 
comprehensive national harm
reduction implementation 
plan, and invest in evidence-
based programs.
remains elusive in implementing any national harm reduction policy and, considering
the past ten years and the apparent lack of progress on policy, it is difficult to know the
government’s plans for the future. The government’s April 2008 decision to re-launch a
version its drug war, though it has not reached the bloody level of 2003, signaled its will-
ingness to accept collateral deaths as the price of drug control,448 and the ease with which
the government may discount previous commitments or switch directions in drug policy.
Unless efforts are made to build the confidence of key stakeholders and involve them in
a transparent and unified response to this epi-
demic, efforts to curb HIV transmission
among people who use drugs and their sexual
partners will remain bleak, as will the public
health and human rights situation for people
who inject drugs in Thailand.
In 2006, an independent commission
was formed, led by Kraisak Choonhavan, for-
mer senator and chairman of the Senate For-
eign Affairs Committee, to investigate
allegations of police abuse and extrajudicial
killings during the 2003 war on drugs.449 The
report, completed in 2007, was censored and
prevented from reaching the public eye. High-
lights from the report have nonetheless been
leaked and a regional news agency reports
that: 
The committee found that about 1,370 of
those deaths were related to drugs, while
878 were not. Another 571 people were
killed for no apparent reason, according to the panel, and police investigated
just 80 of those cases. To this day, the results of the report remain safely
tucked away. The panel had no legal authority and could only make recom-
mendations for prosecution. It determined that no senior Thaksin adminis-
tration figures were linked to the killings, a finding that frustrated committee
members who believed that conservative forces were trying to whitewash the
deadly campaign.450
Key findings
IDUs in Thailand have traditionally suffered from the lack of comprehensive harm reduc-
tion services, high rates of HIV prevalence, and over-criminalization resulting in large
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numbers of IDUs spending time in custodial settings. However, respondents noted that
recent significant developments in regard to Thailand’s drug policy, including develop-
ments toward a national harm reduction policy, appear to be having a positive impact. This
is especially seen in terms of HIV prevention, given the recent awarding of a Global Fund
application that has a significant harm reduction component. There have been a small
number of government-initiated pilot programs providing medical services, including the
provision of ART to IDUs, but the coverage is extremely limited. A recent report concluded
that IDUs face greater discrimination in access to ART compared to the general population
and other marginalized groups, despite the national ART program’s open criteria.451
Indeed, the Ministry of Public Health
and the Office of the Narcotics Control Board
are drafting a national harm reduction policy
for IDUs but civil society groups are not con-
sistently consulted or included in policy draft-
ing phases. It is not clear when this will be
ready or if in fact it will see consultation with
civil society.
Despite the implementation of the
National Rehabilitation Act of 2002, drug
users continue to be over-represented in cus-
todial settings. These are high-risk environ-
ments for the transmission of HIV and
blood-borne viruses. In addition, the Department of Probation, in charge of treatment cen-
ters, informed investigators that the number of military-style compulsory drug treatment
camps is rapidly increasing452 and respondents showed concern about the lack of rigorous
evaluation of their effectiveness. Such treatment centers are predominantly housed in mil-
itary barracks and operated by military staff. What transpires inside these treatment cen-
ters is largely unknown but respondents reported military training with a focus on
discipline and lectures on morality, toward social “re-education.” 
Reports from 2005 indicate that drug users are injecting a variety of substances,
including midozalam (Dormicum). In particular, midozalam has been associated with
unsafe injections and vein damage. There is currently no strategy to address this risk
behavior and this issue has not been noted on the national agenda.
Meanwhile, civil society advocacy efforts have resulted in the inclusion of IDU serv-
ice provision in recent Global Fund applications. It remains to be seen what role the Thai
government will play as part of the initiation and expansion of services. At present, several
civil society groups are providing services to IDUs, but their reach is dependent on pre-
carious international donor funds. The Thai government’s investment in services for IDUs
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and indeed HIV prevention in custodial settings has been at best limited, while the num-
ber of prisons and those incarcerated for drug offenses has continued to increase453 and
the system remains significantly overcrowded. The prison system can hold 80,000 people
but has held as many as 240,000 in 2002 and now houses around 130,000 with many
more in military camps.454
The continued efforts of UN agencies and civil society groups toward a comprehen-
sive harm reduction strategy have led to the formation of the Thai Harm Reduction Net-
work and the National Working Group on Drug Use and HIV. These positive initiatives
are extremely tenuous due to major funding constraints; neither the government nor the
UN contributes to funding them. In addition, the National Working Group has important
limitations in reaching those key decision makers, as the Thai government’s involvement
has been restricted to parliamentarians and bureaucrats without support from high-level
decision makers and ministers.
A significant communication gap between several key stakeholders from both gov-
ernment and NGOs was revealed through the interviews conducted for this assessment
and consistently suggested that there was not enough dialogue and communication
between various departments in the Ministry of Public Health and Office of the Narcotics
Control Board and civil society groups. Over the past decade, interventions such as drug
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An activist protests the Thai government's war on drugs during a demonstration upon the arrival of
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in Bangkok in May 2006. STR/Stringer/AFP/Getty Images
treatment and HIV prevention among IDUs have thus largely been uncoordinated, under-
funded and limited in scope.
There is a continued lack of hard data that realistically measures the extent of injec-
tion drug use in Thailand. This is often cited by government stakeholders as a reason that
little investment is made in service availability.
Recommendations
The following recommendations should be enacted by the Thai government and UN agen-
cies:
1     The National Working Group on Drug Use and HIV needs to be urgently recon-
vened and empowered. UN agencies need to help find financial support for this
Working Group so that it can fulfill its mission to influence national program and
policy decisions in matters relating to injection drug use and HIV. Key community
stakeholders and strategic decision makers need to be recruited to enhance the com-
mittee’s effectiveness. 
2    The Thai government needs to further engage with civil society through community
representatives who best understand the issues of injection drug use and HIV. Civil
society’s efforts indeed can complement and enhance those of the government if
action is coordinated, transparent, and founded on common goals. This particularly
applies to the drafting process of a National Strategic Plan for Harm Reduction.
3    Despite policy changes, like the National Rehabilitation Act, that have acknowledged
the need for drug treatment and clearly mention that people who use drugs should
be treated as clients, too many drug users spend time in the criminal justice system
or compulsory drug treatment centers. People diverted to treatment spend a mini-
mum of four months in correctional settings. The centers are military barracks con-
verted into military-style drug rehabilitation implemented by the military. A rigorous
review of the National Rehabilitation Act and its implementation has just been con-
ducted, though its results remain unpublished. An open, transparent and participa-
tory evaluation should be initiated by the Thai government. In addition, a scientific
evaluation of drug treatment services is required in order to quantitatively and qual-
itatively evaluate their results. The increasing number of compulsory centers that
the government wants to open as noted by the director general of the Department
of Probation, should be immediately halted until a well-designed evaluation assess-
ing the effectiveness of these centers is undertaken.
4    The Thai government should formulate a harm reduction policy that recognizes
changing drug trends where increasing numbers of people are injecting
Dormicum455 and smoking methamphetamine tablets. Harm reduction policy and
practice must recognize the implications of these trends on HIV risk behavior, espe-
cially the need for clean injecting equipment in the case of Dormicum and improved
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availability of sexually transmitted infection diagnosis and treatment for metham-
phetamine users.
5     The various departments and ministries responsible for drug use, public health,
public security and HIV prevention, care, and treatment need to improve coordina-
tion and harmonize their agendas toward a common national strategic plan and
jointly support a comprehensive approach to the intersection of these issues. This
should culminate in an enabling environment where services to people who use
drugs can more easily be accessed and scaled up, intimidation and threats of incar-
ceration and abuse are diminished and eliminated, and where people who use drugs
can be involved meaningfully in all levels of decisions relating to their own wellbeing
through a balanced approach to public security and public health.
6    There is an urgent need to support drug use epidemiology research networks in
Thailand. The UN and other international agencies should support the technical
research capacity of the already-established Thai Academic Substance Abuse Net-
work. This would allow for ongoing monitoring of injection drug use and for better
public health responses. In addition, the Academic Substance Abuse Network
should be utilized to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of compul-
sory drug treatment centers. Furthermore, ongoing evaluation of methadone pro-
grams and other opiate substitution programs will improve the delivery of drug
treatment services for those people who voluntarily seek them. Similarly, Thai civil
society groups should also improve their monitoring and evaluation systems.
Vietnam
Fundamental shifts in HIV and drug control policies have occurred in Vietnam over the
past ten years. Indeed, a decade ago, there were virtually no policy provisions to address
HIV and injection drug use, while today explicit policies support HIV prevention among
IDUs through a national HIV/AIDS strategy and through drug control legislation. 
Indeed, the HIV/AIDS Law of June 2006, the first piece of legislation approving
harm reduction interventions, specifically mentions “the promotion of the use of condoms
and clean needles and syringes, treatment of opioid addiction by substitution, and other
harm reduction measures to support safe behaviors to prevent HIV infection and trans-
mission” (Article 2, Clause 15). Additional harm reduction interventions—expansion of
needle and syringe distribution/exchange and pilot methadone maintenance therapy, and
peer education—have been implemented as a result of the enabling environment created
by the HIV/AIDS Law. 
According to the government, by the end of 2007, up to 43 percent of IDUs in proj-
ect areas in 33 provinces with higher HIV prevalence had been reached with any kind of
health services. More than ten needles were distributed per IDU through peer educators
CIVIL SOCIETY REFLECTIONS ON 10 YEARS OF DRUG CONTROL IN MYANMAR, THAILAND AND VIETNAM 1 5 5
over a period of one month in 2007, an increase from 2.6 needles per month in 2006.456
Methadone treatment began in 2008 with six clinics in two provinces, aiming to treat
1,500 drug users by the year’s end. The National Action Plan on Harm Reduction Inter-
ventions in HIV Prevention in the 2006-2010 Period aims to increase the use of clean
needles and syringes to 90 percent among IDUs, expand harm reduction interventions
in all 64 provinces, and provide methadone treatment in 10 provinces.
Furthermore, the 2008 amendment457 to the national drug control legislation con-
tributed to the growing acknowledgement that people who use drugs require effective pre-
vention, treatment, care, and support services. The amendment, despite the general
prohibitive principles, endorses harm reduction (Article 34a), permits voluntary commu-
nity-based treatment as well as post-rehabilitation supervision, and stipulates a post-reha-
bilitation period ranging from one to two years. Combined, the provisions enshrined in
the HIV/AIDS Law and the 2008 drug control amendment have created the conditions
for local law enforcement to actively support syringe exchange programs and methadone
treatment services.
During the same period, legal punishment for drug convictions has been relaxed,
with a greater focus on drug treatment—as understood by policymakers. Drug users
reported in focus group discussions that people who are caught using drugs and convicted
of drug possession or trafficking are sent to a drug treatment center instead of prison.
Before 2000, if two or more people were caught using drugs together, they were convicted
of “organizing drug use,” resulting in a conviction of nine years, leading to an average of
seven years of imprisonment. After 2000, the same conviction, reformulated as “posses-
sion and use of drugs” led to a conviction of one to seven years with an average term of
three years served, according to respondents. Registered drug users who relapse are
recently being diverted to drug treatment centers instead of earning the traditional two-
year prison term previously enforced. It is expected that with the amendment, more drug
users will be sent to access treatment communities. 
In 1996, Vietnam had an estimated total prison population size, including pretrial
detainees, of 43,000, with a prison population rate of 56 per 100,000.458 By 2006, the
total national prison population is estimated to have more than doubled to 98,556 and a
growing incarceration rate of 116 per 100,000.459 However, drug users note that recently,
recourse to incarceration is tempered by availability of drug treatment, focusing on manda-
tory institutionalized rehabilitation.
According to drug users interviewed, detoxification is the only treatment available
and delivery varies between centers. Some provide “cold turkey” treatment where drug
users are locked in a so-called clinic for ten days to two weeks. Other centers provide some
pain relief medication but the approach is far from patient-centered and usually does not
meet client needs.
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The number of mandatory drug rehabilitation centers has been increasing for several
years. At present, 109 rehabilitation centers are operating across Vietnam, a significant
increase from the 80 centers in 2006.460 In the centers, drug users are made to work 
long hours and have no privacy or leisure time. In focus group discussions, former drug
users reported that they were made to do different kinds of tasks—from cracking cashew
nuts and painting decorative animals to making bricks. Skilled drug users were assigned
skilled tasks—such as welding—while
others carry materials and products.  
Participants of the focus group dis-
cussions also reported being subjected to
physical punishments. They said that
physical abuse by treatment center staff is
frequent and is imposed on clients for
breaking the rules. Participants reported
being physically punished by staff for
fighting among clients, selling
tobacco, carrying money, and using drugs.
The average stay in such centers has
also been increasing steadily—from three
months several years ago, to two years
today. Even more recently, special decrees
came into effect in seven locations across
the country that facilitate an extension to
the two-year stay by an additional two to
three years.461
Interviews with key informants
reveal that HIV testing in drug treatment
centers is still an issue of great concern
despite some improvements. Two centers
in Ho Chi Minh City have voluntary coun-
seling and testing services but in most
other centers, voluntary counseling and
testing is not available. Testing is done in some centers without counseling, and without
informing clients of the test results. In some other centers, testing is fee-based. 
In addition, according to interviewed drug users and leaders of groups of people liv-
ing with HIV, ART has been made available in a few centers but in most, drug users
depend on their families to bring in a supply of medication.
A billboard in Vietnam reads “Drugs kill your
family.” Such antidrug propaganda perpetuates
stigma and discrimination of drug users.
Courtesy of Peter Higgs (Reproduced from
UNODC publication: “An album of drug 
prevention posters” published in Hanoi, 2001.)
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In almost all interviews and discussions, drug treatment centers were raised as an
important challenge that led to much frustration, often described as “incubators for HIV
and human right abuse.” 
Key findings
Most governmental agencies and civil society or “mass organizations” support punishment
and mandatory rehabilitation for drug users, despite the lack of evidence to support the
projected outcomes. Indeed, drug treatment
centers remain a form of punishment; people
who test positive for drug use are forced into
the centers. In many cases, voluntary admis-
sions (prescribed for three to six months)
resulted in an extended stay comparable to
those under legal remit. From 2003 to 2008,
in Ho Chi Minh City, drug users in focus
group discussions reported that those who
enter a treatment center following a contract of
voluntary treatment for six months ended up
being kept for two years of rehabilitation and
two-to-three years post-rehabilitation. 
In the majority of drug treatment cen-
ters, drug users become cheap labor where res-
idents work long hours comparable to three
times the shift of a manual worker outside the
centers, with physical punishment if quotas are
missed. A symbolic income is provided—a
fraction of the salary for comparable work out-
side the center—for conversion into vouchers
valid only at the center’s canteen where items on sale fetch outrageous prices. Interviews
revealed that between 2007 and 2008, drug users in a Hanoi center were forced to paint
2,500 decorative statuettes every day to earn 350,000 Vietnamese Dong (VND) per month
(about $20 USD), paid as canteen vouchers. Meanwhile, manual laborers outsidethe center
can earn 1,200,000 per month for painting a quota of 800 statuettes a day. 
Drug treatment centers are generally stringently regimented where residents wake,
eat, work, wash, and sleep at fixed hours. The time allowed for eating, washing, and resting
is reduced significantly for clients who have not met the work quotas. Recreation spaces
are practically nonexistent. With little or no privacy, residents found consuming alcohol or
tobacco are subjected to severe punishments. In some cases, drug users in Hanoi reported
In many cases, voluntary
admissions (prescribed for 
three to six months) resulted 
in an extended stay comparable
to those under legal remit.
From 2003 to 2008, in Ho Chi
Minh City, drug users in focus
group discussions reported that
those who enter a treatment
center following a contract 
of voluntary treatment for six
months ended up being kept
for two years of rehabilitation
and two-to-three years post-
rehabilitation.
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that even drinking tea was prohibited. Former female clients in the focus group discussion
noted that they were given lighter workloads and were given more washing powder com-
pared to male residents. Pregnant women were usually sent back to the community. 
Many former treatment center clients who participated in the focus group discus-
sion reported punishments in the centers with horror, all involving physical restraints. 
In one center in Hanoi, both male and female residents were locked in a windowless 
one-meter-square cell for up to a week with two sparse meals each day and no access 
to showers or sunlight. In Ho Chi Minh City, punished residents were hung by 
their arms for a week. Several respondents said they felt inferior to animals after serving
such sentences. 
Drug treatment center clients described
the following four main vectors for HIV trans-
mission in the centers: 
    Sharing injection equipment: since nee-
dles are not available and drugs continue
to be smuggled in, sharing drugs and
injection equipment is common. One
needle may be shared with up to ten
people if not more, even among drug
users who are known to be living with
HIV. 
    Sharing tattooing equipment: many male and female clients have tattoos made even
though tattooing is prohibited. Sharp objects such as homemade needles, as well as
ink for tattooing are often shared. Because it is prohibited, tattooing often takes place
in hiding and in unhygienic conditions. 
    Sharing sharp objects for penile implants: increasingly common among men,
implants thought to increase the pleasure of sexual partners are being inserted in
the shaft of the penis with sharp objects. Some respondents have even reported the
exchange of implanted objects.
    Sexual transmission: male-to-male and female-to-female sex is common in most
centers. According to respondents, promiscuity among men is a significant risk for
HIV transmission where young drug users who “have fair complexions and look
clean” often become shared partners of “big brothers.” Since condoms are not pro-
vided, an official from the local Social Evil Control Department mentioned that
measures are being implemented to prevent sex between men from occurring by
having all residents bathe together and leaving the lights on during night hours.
In one center in Hanoi, both
male and female residents 
were locked in a windowless
one-meter-square cell for up 
to a week with two sparse
meals each day and no 
access to showers or sunlight.
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In contrast to drug treatment centers, harm reduction interventions are currently
being implemented in community settings with health authorities providing special
passes to operate needle and syringe exchange programs unhindered and ensure that peer
educators are not arrested while distributing needles and syringes to drug users. Although
incidents of arrests for distributing needles still occur occasionally, the frequency of such
occurrences has decreased significantly in recent times according to respondents. In early
2008, methadone treatment was initiated with the objective of reaching 1,500 clients in
two cities most affected by drugs, and reaching another 1,500 in Hanoi in 2009. 
Through the implementation of harm reduction, people affected by drugs have
become involved in the national HIV/AIDS response. A considerable number of people
who are using and recovering from drug
dependence now distribute needles and
syringes and work for NGOs through a push
to reach the sexual partners of drug users
who are also at risk of HIV infection. How-
ever, there is still no drug user organization
or group that is dedicated to protecting their
rights and wellbeing. 
Increasing numbers of drug users liv-
ing with HIV now have access to ART after
the government changed enrollment guide-
lines wherein drug abstinence is no longer a
criterion. This happened as a result of long-term advocacy efforts by different stakeholders,
including international organizations and networks of people living with HIV. In 2006 a
protocol for antiretroviral treatment was issued by the Ministry of Health, in which drug
use was removed from the exclusion criteria. Also, with PEPFAR involvement, more anti-
retroviral drugs are available than ever before. The PEFPAR team was also involved in
advocacy for treatment for drug users living with HIV. 
However, in so-called “non-project provinces” where ART is not readily available
due to lack of funding, drug users are disproportionately underrepresented and service
providers reportedly use relapse as a justification for discontinuing treatment.
Most drug treatment center clients are tested for HIV without counseling or being
informed of the test results. Out of more than 100 centers, only a few provide ART. Drug
users who were already accessing ART before entering the center and those who have
developed AIDS are informed of their status and can access treatment. However, the
majority of centers do not provide ART or treatment for opportunistic infections. Former
residents report that bribes are often necessary to initiate and even continue ART. 
Where ART is not readily 
available due to lack of funding,
drug users are disproportionately
underrepresented and 
service providers reportedly 
use relapse as a justification 
for discontinuing treatment.
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Similarly, people living with HIV suffering from opportunistic infections have to
pay or bribe officials to access treatment for those infections. Without such bribes, treat-
ment is often limited to centers’ poorly staffed and ill equipped clinics. When clients’
health becomes critical, they are transferred to respite homes or local hospitals. In cases
of poor prognosis, families are called to bring them home to die—outside the center and
the hospital.
INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DRUG POLICY
There is little involvement of civil society in drug policy. Very few respondents were aware
of the content of the national drug control policy and similarly, knowledge about drug
treatment was very limited. Drug users were aware of legal provisions that directly affected
them such as different drug-related convictions under the Criminal Code and Drug Con-
trol Law, but were not involved in policy decisions in any way. Only one Vietnamese NGO,
Institute for Social Development Studies, proactively advocates for harm reduction and
more humane approaches in drug treatment. However, civil society has never been for-
mally invited to take part in the development of drug control policies. 
Participants had mixed feelings about the impact of drug policy in regard to supply
and demand reduction. Law enforcement agencies report quantitative data that suggest
that drug use and trafficking are on the rise, yet many drug users and service providers
reported a decrease in new users and less drug consumption. Still others noted the pres-
ence of a greater range of types of drugs and increasing numbers of women using drugs.
A billboard in Vietnam encourages society to crush “drugs” and “sex,” stating that “preventing harm-
ful and poisonous culture is the responsibility of the whole society.” Courtesy of Institute for Social
Development Studies
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Recommendations 
The government of Vietnam should enact the following recommendations:
1     Implement evidence-based campaigns to raise awareness about drugs and acknowl-
edge the physiological aspects of drug dependence.
2    Integrate harm reduction into mainstream drug treatment and HIV prevention pro-
grams in order to provide the most comprehensive and effective care and treatment
for people living with HIV and ensure respect for human rights. 
3    Develop and enforce concrete guidelines to refer drug users to treatment centers
and other treatment options, and to ensure that those treatment options are in line
with international norms and standards.
4    Rapidly scale up methadone treatment and continue the expansion of syringe
exchange programs as well as outreach activities.
5     Support the development of drug user organizations and those that support them.
6    Develop mechanisms to involve civil society, including drug users, in the design and
implementation of policies that affect drug users.
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Twin Epidemics—Drug Use 
and HIV/AIDS in Pakistan 
Gul Shamim, Heller School for Social Policy and Management,
Brandeis University462
Introduction
Pakistan is at the forefront of global efforts to reduce supply and demand of illicit drugs.
This study documents some of the key health and human rights consequences of national
efforts to comply with international drug control agreements, particularly as they apply to
injection drug use and HIV. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources.
Primary data came from open-ended interviews and personal communications with injec-
tion drug users and service providers in Karachi, Pakistan. Secondary sources reviewed
for the report included national and international reports and studies on patterns of illicit
drugs and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
With a population of 164.74 million,463 Pakistan is home to one of the world’s largest
populations of opiate users.464 It is a key transit and supplier country of narcotics, partic-
ularly opium and heroin. Pakistan borders Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium pro-
ducer, and has its own history of opium production dating back to British colonial times.
However, as a signatory of various conventions related to supply and demand reduction
of opium and heroin, Pakistan achieved poppy-free status in 2000-01, down from peak
level of 9,441 hectares (ha) in 1992.465
Consequently, over the last ten to 15 years, there has been a shift from the traditional
inhaling and smoking of heroin to injecting heroin and synthetic drugs. The proportion
of injectors among all heroin users has increased significantly over the past 15 years, from
1.85 percent in 1993 to more than 15 percent in 2000466 and 26 percent in 2007.467 Simul-
taneously, Pakistan experienced an increase in HIV transmission, and the emergence of
a concentrated epidemic among IDUs. In some urban areas, the HIV prevalence rate
among IDUs has reached 51 percent.468
Currently, there are five million drug users in Pakistan.469 According to the last
National Drug Assessment Study of Pakistan (2006-2007), the number of opiate users is
628,000, out of which 77 percent (484,000) are chronic heroin users, with a substantial
number of users shifting from inhalation to injection. The estimated number of injection
drug users is 125,000.470 The epidemic is further aggravated among IDUs by severe forms
of discrimination, stigmatization, and marginalization.
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National attempts to reduce the supply and demand of illicit
drugs 
Pakistan is a signatory to the three UN Conventions of 1961, 1971, and 1988 on the control
of narcotics and psychotropic substances, and party to the General Assembly’s 20th Spe-
cial Session on Drugs. Pakistan has also signed numerous regionally based drug control
agreements including the South Asian Association of Regional Countries (SAARC) Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the Economic Co-operation
Organization (ECO) Protocol on Drug Matters. In addition, Pakistan has agreements with
Afghanistan and Iran, major producer and transit countries, to strengthen border security
and control the drug trafficking flow. 
In response to the international and
regional agreements, Pakistan has taken
aggressive legislative and programmatic meas-
ures, particularly during the last 10-15 years,
with the technical and financial support of
United Nations and other donor agencies. 
In 1997, the government of Pakistan
enacted two anti-drugs laws: the Control of
Narcotics Substance Act (CNS Act 1997), and
the Anti Narcotics Force Act (ANF Act 1997).
The CNS Act 1997 regulates prohibitions of narcotic drugs’ import, export, trafficking,
and manufacture, and prescribes punishment for contraventions.471 The act encompasses
all provisions of previous related laws in addition to new provisions of harsh punishments
for drug-related charges. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, capital punishment
for trafficking and financing of narcotic drugs was introduced under the CNS Act 1997.
The act grants death penalty for possession of more than 100 g of heroin or 200g of
opium.472 The proscribed quantity for opium is much smaller as compared to other coun-
tries in the region; for example, 500g in Sri Lanka, 2 kilograms (kg) in Bangladesh, or
10kg in India.473 As of November 2008, 88 people had been sentenced to death.474
The ANF Act 1997 sets out the constitution, functions, and powers of the Anti Nar-
cotics Force.475 One of the important steps under this act was the establishment of five
Special Narcotics Courts in 2000 to speed up drug investigations and prosecutions in
Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Quetta. Soon after the establishment, 1,050
ANF cases pending in various courts of law were transferred to these newly established
courts. Within less than one year, these courts prosecuted 400 cases, with a 92 percent
conviction rate among which 32 defendants received the death penalty.476
The act grants death penalty
for possession of more than
100g of heroin or 200g of
opium. As of November 
2008, 88 people had been 
sentenced to death.
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In addition, under the ANF Act 1997 and NCS Act 1997, for the first time, law
enforcement agencies’ jurisdiction extended to the tribal belt of the country,477 an area of
extensive poppy cultivation and the conduit for the drug trade/trafficking via Afghanistan. 
While the ANF is the primary law enforcement and coordinating agency, multiple
agencies in Pakistan have been empowered to enter premises, search, seize, and arrest
people without a warrant, in order to control the illicit drug trade. These agencies include
the Provincial Excise and Police Departments, Customs Department, Frontier Corps, Air-
port Security Force, the Federal Investigation Agency, and the Pakistan Coast Guard, all
of which work closely working with ANF.478
Since 1998, Pakistan has adopted a “no tolerance for cultivation” policy against
poppy growers. With the assistance of UNODC and a budget of 56 million USD, in 1999
the government implemented a Five Year Master Plan for Drug Abuse Control. One of the
objectives of the Master Plan was to control the supply and production of narcotic sub-
stances within the country through eradicating the entire opium poppy crop by the year
2000, and eliminating all heroin-producing laboratories.479 The UNODC playing a pivotal
role in policy formulation, operational capacity building of law enforcement agencies, and
promoting sub-regional cooperation to enhance the efforts against drug trafficking.480 
With this ambitious plan, Pakistan achieved a poppy-free status in 2001 and became
a “success story” in the global war on illicit drugs. The domestic cultivation decreased to
nearly zero, falling to 213 (ha) in 2001 from 9,441ha in 1992.481 The same year,
Afghanistan also experienced a sudden and substantial decline in production of opium
due to the Taliban’s ban on cultivation. In addition, Pakistan repeatedly seized substantial
quantities of opium and heroin: Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies seized some 8,755kg
of heroin in 2001.482 Because of the dramatic decrease of opium production in
Afghanistan, the prices of opium and heroin increased sharply in global markets, and par-
ticularly in Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, the average wholesale price of opium was 2,392
USD per kg in the year 2001, up from 1,709 USD in 2000.483
In 2003, there was a reemergence of poppy cultivation in many parts of the Pakistan
due to increased price of opium and heroin.484 However, in subsequent years, official
reports indicate a decline in domestic production and control over trafficking from
Afghanistan. The Economic Cooperation Organization Drug Control Coordination Unit
estimates that demand for heroin in Pakistan is somewhere between 60 to 80 tons.485
Along with control of domestic production and trafficking of opium, the law enforce-
ment agencies began destroying opiate conversion laboratories. By the late 1990s, most
opiate conversion laboratories had shifted to Afghanistan, presumably as a measure to
protect them from the law-enforcement actions in Pakistan, as well as to be closer to the
raw opium in Afghanistan.486 There has been an increasing number of arrests on drug-
related charges, as Chart D illustrates. 
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Health and Human Rights Consequences 
Sharp growth in number of IDUs
In Pakistan, the use of heroin and pharmaceutical drugs through injection was not a com-
mon or preferred method of use until the late 1990s. In 1979, there were 80,000-100,000
opium users and the number of heroin users was virtually unknown.487 Thirteen years
later, the National Survey on Drug Abuse (1993) estimated that there were 2.7 million drug
users in Pakistan, 1.52 million of which were heroin users. The same survey also noted
that in Karachi, a major urban center, 1.8 percent of “addicts” injected drugs.488
Subsequent national studies have indicated a sharp increase in the number of injec-
tion drug users. At present, Pakistan has one of the highest prevalence rates of injection
drug use in the world.489 According to the estimates of Pakistan’s National Drug Assess-
ment Study of 2000,490 out of 500,000 chronic heroin users, 15 percent administered
their drugs through injection. In contrast, the national study of 2006-07 presented a rel-
atively comparable numbers of heroin—484,000—but the number of injection drug users
jumped to 125,000 (26 percent), representing a 40 percent increase in the estimated fig-
ure for 2000.491 [see Chart E]
However, the actual number of IDUs could be much greater than the data reflect;
as one service provider commented: “The government’s figures are a small chunk of the
total IDU population. The actual number of IDUs is far greater at between 4 to 5 million,
including women. Most of the IDUs are mobile and live on the streets so it is very difficult
to get a hold of even half of the population. The number of IDUs is growing exponentially
because of easy access to pharmaceutical drugs.” (Male service provider, Karachi Pakistan).
Increases in heroin prices since 2001 have been accompanied by increased injecting
of synthetic drugs that are cheaper and accessible without a prescription. Several studies
of drug users in Pakistan have indicated that a transition from inhaling to injecting heroin
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Chart D. Number of persons arrested on drug charges
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and synthetic drugs is closely associated with the price, availability, and quality of heroin
and synthetic drugs.492
One 36-year-old injection drug user explained his reasons for switching from inhal-
ing to injecting drugs as follows: 
The main reason is the price of heroin. A few years back, I hardly spent 20-
30 Pak rupees daily and easily got it from a nearby dealer. Now, I have to travel
for more than an hour from Buns Road to Sohrab Goth to get the heroin and
it costs 200-300 rupees depending on the quality of heroin. I am also jobless
for the last three years, begging on the street to satisfy my addiction. Once or
twice a week, I inject heroin but the rest of the time I am injecting Avil or cap-
sule [Diazepam] with water. (36-year-old male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan)
At present, the most common pharmaceutical drugs used are benzodiazepines and
antihistamines (Avil, Diazepam, and Marzine), often used in a cocktail. Most pharmaceu-
ticals are dissolved in (often non-sterile) water before use. 
Most injection drug users prefer to inject drugs in groups in shooting galleries.”
The main reasons users cited for group injecting are to minimize the cost, for compan-
ionship, and to provide protection from the police. As an interviewee mentioned: 
Most of the time we inject drugs in a group to minimize the cost. Three or
four of us [users] collect money and buy the white stuff [heroin]. Then we
equally divide it i.e. one cc each. (32-year-old Male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan) 
In other settings, use of shooting galleries is shown to increase the odds of needle shar-
ing,493 and is associated with heightened risk of HIV infection.494
Drugs are commonly injected in the back of the hand, or in the legs and arms.
Abscesses and skin infections are common problems. 
Chart E. Increase in percentage of injectors among all heroin users
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IDUs and HIV/AIDS 
Over the last ten years, with the sharp increase in the number of injection drug users, 
Pakistan has also experienced subsequent HIV outbreaks among this segment of the pop-
ulation. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Pakistan is concentrated among IDUs and in certain
urban areas prevalence among this group has reached 51 percent.495 [see Chart F above]
The first HIV case in Pakistan was reported in 1986.496 During the initial years, the
rate of transmission was low, and Pakistan was not considered a high-prevalence country.
In contrast, the last seven years are characterized by sharp upward trends in reported cases
and HIV prevalence among IDUs.497
The first major outbreak of HIV among IDUs was reported in 2003 in the city of
Larkana, Sindh Province. Out of 175 IDUs tested, 10 percent of them were positive for
HIV.498 According to Pakistan’s National AIDS Control Program report, the HIV preva-
lence among IDUs in Karachi, Sindh, rose steeply from 0.4 percent in January 2003 to
26 percent in 2005.499
National HIV/AIDS Surveillance data indicates that the overall prevalence rate in
2005 was 10.8 percent and rose drastically to nearly 21 percent in 2008. HIV prevalence
among IDUs is more than ten times higher than reported prevalence in other groups: The
prevalence among male sex workers is 1.5-1.8 percent, and the prevalence in general pop-
ulation is less than one percent.500
With the increasing rates, the epidemic has established a foothold throughout the
country. The National Surveillance Study Round III (2008) has found HIV prevalence
rates over five percent among IDUs in all eight cities surveyed in all four provinces. This
is in comparison to a prevalence rate greater than five percent in five out of eight cities in
Pharmaceutical cocktails often contain impurities that can cause abscesses and vein damage when
injected. Courtesy of Gul Shamim
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2005.501 Half of the 125,000 injection drug users are married and an estimated 60,000
wives and 240,000 children are at risk of HIV transmission.502
According to the Pakistan National AIDS Control Program, 4,755 HIV cases have
been reported as of September 2008. IDUs account for the largest proportion of cases at
33 percent (1,577 cases).503
However, reported cases do not capture actual HIV infections in Pakistan, as people
are afraid to report due to the stigma attached to being HIV positive, and also lack of
awareness and HIV testing services. According to UNAIDS estimates, the number of
HIV/AIDS cases are between 46,000 and 210,000 in the country.504
The epidemic in Pakistan is following a trajectory similar to that of neighboring
Asian countries—a higher incidence of HIV/AIDS among injection drug users, which is
then transmitted to others through sex, including commercial sex, and paid blood dona-
tion.505 The results of the national HIV/AIDS Surveillance Round II reveal that 86% of
the 33,000 IDUs surveyed were sexually active and 46 percent reported sex with regular
female partners. In that group, 16.5 percent reported condom use during their last sexual
contact. Slightly more than a quarter (27 percent) reported paying for sex with a female
sex worker during the last six months and, among these, only 21 percent reported using
a condom.506
With the increasing number of IDUs and related HIV transmission, both govern-
ment and civil society organizations have scaled up basic services, which include needle
and syringe exchange programs, counseling, HIV testing, and detoxification. However,
with the increasing number of IDUs and shortage of resources, coverage is still limited.
Only 16 percent of IDUs have access to government-provided services.507 Expressing frus-
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tration with the lack of funding, a service provider working at a treatment and rehabilita-
tion center said:
Due to the shortage of resources and the escalating numbers of IDUs it is very
difficult to provide even basic services, i.e. syringes and space for a shower, at
drop-in centers. (Male, coordinator for last six years at drop-in center, Karachi,
Pakistan)
Many injection drug users, themselves, express a desire for treatment, but low cov-
erage and lack of access to services are major barriers. 
I want to start a new life and get rid of this addiction but there is no way that
I can move on. I went to the treatment and rehabilitation center twice, but they
just note down my name and ask me to wait for a few months. (43-year-old
male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan) 
In addition to lack of preventive serv-
ices, there is no viable after-care system fol-
lowing treatment, leaving users with little
support in relapse prevention. 
I received treatment from the center to
get rid of this illness. After four
months of treatment, I chose this door
again because of lack of moral and
financial support for my survival, in
addition to insolent treatment from
immediate family members. They
were afraid and kept me in a separate room so they would not get any of my
infections. Now that I am not with them there is no tension and also no hope
for a normal life. (32-year-old male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan)
Barriers to Access Prevention and Treatment Services
With the alarming rates of HIV transmission, IDUs also face criminalization, forced test-
ing, and discrimination and stigmatization.
Criminalization: Under the criminal justice system of Pakistan, possession of illicit
drugs is illegal and punishable. The International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (2008) published by the U.S. Department of State claims that the “the Government
of Pakistan views addicts as victims, not criminals,” but the reality is different. Police
behavior has been harsh toward people who use drugs.508 Arrest, detention, and impris-
onment of drug users, particularly injection drug users, are very common. People who
We have now become a very easy
source of income for the police. 
If we do not have money then
they will arrest and put us in the
jail…quite often, they will beat 
us without any reason. They
assume that we are intoxicated
and do not feel the pain. 
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use drugs often have to pay money to law enforcement authorities to protect themselves
from arrest and detention. 
As one drug user said:
To keep ourselves away from the watchdogs [police] we have to shift our 
location frequently. They are in search of us to get money most of the time.
We have now become a very easy source of income for the police. If we do not
have money then they will arrest and put us in the jail…quite often, they will
beat us without any reason. They assume that we are intoxicated and do not
feel the pain. Sometimes they even ask [us] to take off our clothes and they hit
[us] on our injection wounds, which is very painful. (41-year-old male IDU,
Karachi, Pakistan)
Involuntary HIV testing: Both the national and international laws prohibit forced
HIV testing for any individual. However, in Pakistan, authorities often forcefully send
injection drug users for testing. During the fieldwork for this study, 13 interviewees said
that their HIV status was positive. Nine of these said that the tests were conducted without
their consent. As mentioned by one of the street drug users: 
I would never have allowed them if I knew before the test that it was for HIV.
A year ago, I went to the drug rehabilitation center due to a high fever and
A policeman stands in front of a pile of burning drugs on the outskirts of Peshawar. Tariq
Mahmood/AFP/Getty Images
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they referred me to the civil hospital. There were some tests and the doctor
gave me four tablets and asked me to buy some other medicines from the
pharmacy, which I didn’t buy because I did not have the money to buy them.
A few months later, the service provider at the rehabilitation center informed
me that I am HIV positive. After that they never offered me any kind of treat-
ment except free syringes. (37-year-old male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan)
There have been several instances of large-scale forced testing in the past. Following
a major HIV outbreak among IDUs in 2003, IDUs were forcibly tested for HIV. 
According to the Pakistan National AIDS Consortium:
On June 15th 2003 the Larkana jail authorities referred an inmate, who was
jailed on charges of illegal drug use, for HIV testing to the Sindh AIDS Con-
trol Program (SACP), Larkana. The inmate tested positive for HIV and the jail
authorities reacted in alarm. Eighty jail inmates arrested on drug charges were
tested for HIV involuntarily. The jail authorities also began arresting people
using drugs on the streets for mandatory testing. A total of 145 drug users
were screened without consent, out of which 65 were arrested from the streets.
To make matters worse, the local newspapers and local TV channel began to
interview the HIV- positive persons without consent. The HIV-positive per-
sons who were now openly identified became a target for stigma and discrim-
ination. As a result, drug users on the streets were driven underground from
fear of being jailed and tested.509
Media reports stated that, “the fear of the police, forced testing, and media harass-
ment led the injecting drug users, and HIV infected persons to flee the city and spread all
over the province and the country.”510
Such behavior from law enforcement authorities inhibits the access of people who
inject drugs to available prevention services; due to fear of arrest and forced testing, they
remain isolated and transient.
Discrimination and Stigmatization: Generally, in Pakistan, injection drug use is con-
sidered a social evil and HIV/AIDS is seen as a punishment for those who act against the
defined moral values. Islam, the state religion of Pakistan, prohibits sexual intercourse
outside of marriage, adultery, homosexuality, and the use of intoxicants.511 There is general
perception that AIDS is a divine punishment for anyone who indulges in such behaviors.
IDUs who have no private residence in which to inject are subject to particular discrim-
ination, with isolation and deprivation fueling high-risk behaviors. As one IDU said:
We have been thrown out of the society due to addiction so now we have to
depend only on drugs. To get the daily dose we will do anything, for example,
sell either blood or sex. (37-year-old male IDU 37 years old, Karachi Pakistan) 
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In addition, IDUs face severe forms of discrimination from health care providers in
the government-run facilities that are the only ones affordable for them. As one person
put it:
The doors of the private hospitals and clinics are closed for us, as we cannot
afford to pay. We can go to government hospital but the hospital staff do not
treat us respectfully so we avoid seeking care for general health problems. I
have been to the civil hospital several times because of my asthma. The behav-
ior of the hospital staff from the cleaner to the doctor was very rude. They were
treating me like a second-class citizen. Without even listening to my whole
problem, they handed over a list of medicines and asked me to buy them from
the pharmacy. (36-years-old male IDU, Karachi, Pakistan)
IDUs report that they often prefer to self-medicate rather than seek care, even in
cases of severe illness and infections, because of the disrespectful behavior of health care
providers. 
The following are three case studies that illustrate some of the issues described above.
Case 1
Mr. Zafer is a young IDU, 26 years old, residing with other IDUs on the streets of Saddar
(a very busy marketplace in downtown Karachi). Unmarried, with an eighth-grade educa-
tion, he started using drugs at the age of 13—first cigarettes and then Charras (homemade
hashish). He says he started using drugs due to the influence of his friends. He used to
spend 20-30 Pak Rupees512 per day for two doses of charras. After some time, he started
using Samadbond (a strong adhesive commonly available at stationery and hardware
stores) and spending 40 rupees a day for three doses. He would get this money from his
family, who were not aware of his drug habits. 
Subsequently, Mr. Zafer switched to using heroin, heating it on a piece of tin (a lid
of a can or similar) and inhaling the fumes. He spent 100 rupees per dose. For the last
four years, Mr. Zafer has injected drugs, including heroin, antihistamines (Avil) and seda-
tives (Diazepam) intravenously. 
Mr. Zafer listed the non-availability and high price of heroin as the primary reasons
for switching to injecting from inhaling:
Good-quality heroin is not available in the market anymore. There is low-qual-
ity heroin available at unaffordable prices. If we inject the low-quality heroin,
its effects are immediate and prolonged. Most of the time, it becomes very dif-
ficult to get even low-quality heroin so we have to depend on Avil or other
drugs. Now the dealers also change their locations frequently, due to the sud-
den raids by the police.
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Currently, Mr. Zafar is injecting twice a day, one dose in the morning and one in the
evening. Heroin costs him around Rs. 200-250 per dose and pharmaceutical drugs only
cost Rs. 30–60. He earns this money by cleaning vehicles, and sometimes through petty
crimes with other friends such as snatching purses or wallets at gunpoint. 
Mr. Zafer has been arrested three times and jailed twice (for three months and six
months) for possession of a small quantity of heroin. About his experiences in jail he said: 
They use very abusive language and physically tortured me every day because
I did not have money to give them and nobody visited me in jail. Most of the
time they kept me busy cleaning and gardening as a punishment. Police do
not consider us as humans inside or outside of jail.
Asked about his HIV status, Mr. Zafer said:
Two months back, I had a test done and I have been told that I am HIV pos-
itive. I planned to get the treatment for my addiction and the coordinator at
the center suggested that I go for the HIV test before starting the drug treat-
ment. Now after the positive result I cannot give it up because these drugs are
my best friends. They keep me away from tensions.
Now Mr. Zafer’s main concern is that he wants to get treatment. He hopes that the
government will support him. He thinks he might have contracted the virus while he was
in jail. 
Case 2
Mr. Yaqoob, a 45-year-old married man and resident of Karachi, began using charras about
30 years ago for enjoyment. Along with that, he smoked two to four cigarettes a day, and
it would cost 10-15 rupees. Then he started injecting cocaine in order to achieve a longer-
lasting effect than cigarettes and charras. He spent 50 rupees per dose and worked as a
gardener to make money. He is HIV positive, having contracted the virus through sharing
contaminated syringes with his colleagues. “It has been four years since I was diagnosed
with HIV and I have not gotten any treatment for it yet… I have lost my family,” said Mr.
Yaqoob. 
Soon after his diagnosis, he received treatment (detoxification) for his addiction
from a drug rehabilitation and treatment center. He hoped to start a new life and get HIV
treatment. But after several months he rejoined his old group, as he said, “I joined my old
street friends because nobody was ready to accept me, including my family. They were
afraid that they might get infected from me.” 
Mr. Yaqoob has had several encounters with the police, and has been jailed five
times. Asked about the availability of drugs in the jail, he said, “If you have money then
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you can easily get the best quality charras and heroin in the jail, but if you don’t, then you
will be treated as a dog.” 
Expressing his main concern, Mr. Yaqoob said, “There is no shelter for me. I need
a space to spend the rest of my life. I have not received any treatment for HIV yet and I
am hoping that the government will provide treatment.” 
Case 3
Mr. Azam, a 33-year-old married man, is HIV positive. He says, “Two and half years ago
I had my test done in a civil hospital and the test was positive. No treatment or services
have been provided yet.” Due to limited capacity and resources, the government is unable
to provide basic HIV treatment and management services to all HIV-positive cases, and
private care services are out of reach due to their high cost. 
Currently, Mr. Azam is living at a rehabilitation center in Karachi that offers accom-
modation for a limited number of IDUs and runs drop-in centers. He is worried about his
family. With eyes full of tears he said:
It has been nine years for my marriage and I have a son and daughter. Initially,
my wife supported me but after a year, she left me. My children are with her.
They visit me once a month, and once they told me that to earn money, they
fetch water in big containers (for households). There is no schooling for them
and I am here. Quite often, I think I should commit suicide, as I cannot do
anything for my children… I am useless and nobody cares about me.
Mr. Azam’s story of substance use began at age ten with his first cigarette. Gradually,
by the age of 15 he had graduated to charras. His preferred method was smoking or inhal-
ing the fumes by heating the drugs on a piece of tinfoil. He would spend 100 rupees a
day. After his marriage at the age of 24, he started injecting white crystal (made from
cocaine) for an immediate reaction. This cost him Rs. 200-300 per day (for two doses).
He said that he was caught by the police one time, but was freed after bribing the police
with Rs 1,500. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
Pakistan has achieved the targets of supply reduction in the global war on drugs through
aggressive antinarcotics policies and programmatic measures. The stringent policies that
led to these advances in drug control, however, have also led to an increasing number of
injection drug users and high rates of HIV transmission. Reduction in heroin supply and
quality, and sharp increases in prices coupled with lack of demand reduction programs,
has resulted in a shift to injection of synthetic drugs easily available from pharmacies.
Other high-risk behaviors, such as unprotected sex, make generalization of the HIV epi-
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demic likely. HIV prevention measures for IDUs, such as programs providing sterile nee-
dles and syringes, remain inaccessible to the majority of injectors. 
Pakistan is at a critical juncture with regard to the increasing number of injection
drug users and related HIV transmission. The epidemic is concentrated among IDUs,
and is further aggravated by multiple factors, including lack of prevention and treatment
services, discrimination, and criminalization. 
To avoid a public health catastrophe in near future, there is an urgent need to
address injection drug use and HIV through a holistic approach. First and foremost, Pak-
istan should scale up comprehensive harm reduction programs including needle
exchange, condom distribution, education and counseling, free voluntary and confidential
HIV testing, and rehabilitation services. The rehabilitation programs should involve family
members and include skills building, which can help participants gain economic self-suf-
ficiency and social integration after drug treatment. The government should provide free
treatment and management services for HIV-positive cases. Specific prevention and vol-
untarily testing programs should also be available for children and the wives of IDUs. 
Secondly, government workers that interact with people who use drugs, particularly
health care and law enforcement personnel, should be sensitized to the needs and rights
of IDUs. Higher authorities must no longer ignore abusive behavior of police toward IDUs
(i.e. harassment, physical abuse, involuntarily HIV testing), and instead should adopt and
promote a rights-based approach in dealing with IDUs. Public awareness efforts, including
those involving religious leaders and institutions, are also needed in order to reduce
stigma associated with injection drug use and HIV. As this study indicates, IDUs, includ-
ing HIV-positive IDUs, understand the obstacles to care, and should be included in deci-
sion and policy discourses that affect them. Finally, national laws that violate human
rights, such as those that allow the death penalty for drug possession, should be repealed. 
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1
 Illicit drug use is use contrary to the UN Conventions;  harmful drug use is drug use which causes harm to individuals, 
families, communities or the environment; illicit/harmful drug use is drug use where action is necessary, including but 
not limited to prevention or intervention in the fields of criminal justice, education, health care, social support, 
treatment or rehabilitation 
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 Illicit drug use is use contrary to the UN Conventions;  harmful drug use is drug use which causes harm to individuals, 
families, communities or the environment; illicit/harmful drug use is drug use where action is necessary, including but 
not limited to prevention or intervention in the fields of criminal justice, education, health care, social support, 
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 Illicit drug use is use contrary to the UN Conventions;  harmful drug use is drug use which causes harm to individuals, 
families, communities or the environment; illicit/harmful drug use is drug use where action is necessary, including but 
not limited to prevention or intervention in the fields of criminal justice, education, health care, social support, 
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A decade after governments worldwide pledged to
achieve a “drug-free world,” there is little evidence
that the supply or demand of illicit drugs has been
reduced. Instead, aggressive drug control policies
have led to increased incarceration for minor of-
fenses, human rights violations, and disease. This
book examines the descent of the global war on
drugs into a war on people who use drugs. From
Puerto Rico to Phnom Penh, Manipur to Moscow,
the scars of this war are carried on the bodies and
minds of drug users, their families, and the health
and service providers who work with them.
